charmides-第13章

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was　just　now　saying；　that　all　craftsmen　make　or　do　something？







I　do。







And　do　they　make　or　do　their　own　business　only；　or　that　of　others　also？







They　make　or　do　that　of　others　also。







And　are　they　temperate；　seeing　that　they　make　not　for　themselves　or　their



own　business　only？







Why　not？　he　said。







No　objection　on　my　part；　I　said；　but　there　may　be　a　difficulty　on　his　who



proposes　as　a　definition　of　temperance；　'doing　one's　own　business；'　and



then　says　that　there　is　no　reason　why　those　who　do　the　business　of　others



should　not　be　temperate。







Nay　（The　English　reader　has　to　observe　that　the　word　'make'　（Greek）；　in



Greek；　has　also　the　sense　of　'do'　（Greek）。）；　said　he；　did　I　ever



acknowledge　that　those　who　do　the　business　of　others　are　temperate？　　I



said；　those　who　make；　not　those　who　do。







What！　I　asked；　do　you　mean　to　say　that　doing　and　making　are　not　the　same？







No　more；　he　replied；　than　making　or　working　are　the　same；　thus　much　I　have



learned　from　Hesiod；　who　says　that　'work　is　no　disgrace。'　　Now　do　you



imagine　that　if　he　had　meant　by　working　and　doing　such　things　as　you　were



describing；　he　would　have　said　that　there　was　no　disgrace　in　themfor



example；　in　the　manufacture　of　shoes；　or　in　selling　pickles；　or　sitting　for



hire　in　a　house　of　ill…fame？　　That；　Socrates；　is　not　to　be　supposed：　　but　I



conceive　him　to　have　distinguished　making　from　doing　and　work；　and；　while



admitting　that　the　making　anything　might　sometimes　become　a　disgrace；　when



the　employment　was　not　honourable；　to　have　thought　that　work　was　never　any



disgrace　at　all。　　For　things　nobly　and　usefully　made　he　called　works；　and



such　makings　he　called　workings；　and　doings；　and　he　must　be　supposed　to



have　called　such　things　only　man's　proper　business；　and　what　is　hurtful；



not　his　business：　　and　in　that　sense　Hesiod；　and　any　other　wise　man；　may　be



reasonably　supposed　to　call　him　wise　who　does　his　own　work。







O　Critias；　I　said；　no　sooner　had　you　opened　your　mouth；　than　I　pretty　well



knew　that　you　would　call　that　which　is　proper　to　a　man；　and　that　which　is



his　own；　good；　and　that　the　makings　（Greek）　of　the　good　you　would　call



doings　（Greek）；　for　I　am　no　stranger　to　the　endless　distinctions　which



Prodicus　draws　about　names。　　Now　I　have　no　objection　to　your　giving　names



any　signification　which　you　please；　if　you　will　only　tell　me　what　you　mean



by　them。　　Please　then　to　begin　again；　and　be　a　little　plainer。　　Do　you　mean



that　this　doing　or　making；　or　whatever　is　the　word　which　you　would　use；　of



good　actions；　is　temperance？







I　do；　he　said。







Then　not　he　who　does　evil；　but　he　who　does　good；　is　temperate？







Yes；　he　said；　and　you；　friend；　would　agree。







No　matter　whether　I　should　or　not；　just　now；　not　what　I　think；　but　what　you



are　saying；　is　the　point　at　issue。







Well；　he　answered；　I　mean　to　say；　that　he　who　does　evil；　and　not　good；　is



not　temperate；　and　that　he　is　temperate　who　does　good；　and　not　evil：　　for



temperance　I　define　in　plain　words　to　be　the　doing　of　good　actions。







And　you　may　be　very　likely　right　in　what　you　are　saying；　but　I　am　curious



to　know　whether　you　imagine　that　temperate　men　are　ignorant　of　their　own



temperance？







I　do　not　think　so；　he　said。







And　yet　were　you　not　saying；　just　now；　that　craftsmen　might　be　temperate　in



doing　another's　work；　as　well　as　in　doing　their　own？







I　was；　he　replied；　but　what　is　your　drift？







I　have　no　particular　drift；　but　I　wish　that　you　would　tell　me　whether　a



physician　who　cures　a　patient　may　do　good　to　himself　and　good　to　another



also？







I　think　that　he　may。







And　he　who　does　so　does　his　duty？







Yes。







And　does　not　he　who　does　his　duty　act　temperately　or　wisely？







Yes；　he　acts　wisely。







But　must　the　physician　necessarily　know　when　his　treatment　is　likely　to



prove　beneficial；　and　when　not？　or　must　the　craftsman　necessarily　know　when



he　is　likely　to　be　benefited；　and　when　not　to　be　benefited；　by　the　work



which　he　is　doing？







I　suppose　not。







Then；　I　said；　he　may　sometimes　do　good　or　harm；　and　not　know　what　he　is



himself　doing；　and　yet；　in　doing　good；　as　you　say；　he　has　done　temperately



or　wisely。　　Was　not　that　your　statement？







Yes。







Then；　as　would　seem；　in　doing　good；　he　may　act　wisely　or　temperately；　and



be　wise　or　temperate；　but　not　know　his　own　wisdom　or　temperance？







But　that；　Socrates；　he　said；　is　impossible；　and　therefore　if　this　is；　as



you　imply；　the　necessary　consequence　of　any　of　my　previous　admissions；　I



will　withdraw　them；　rather　than　admit　that　a　man　can　be　temperate　or　wise



who　does　not　know　himself；　and　I　am　not　ashamed　to　confess　that　I　was　in



error。　　For　self…knowledge　would　certainly　be　maintained　by　me　to　be　the



very　essence　of　knowledge；　and　in　this　I　agree　with　him　who　dedicated　the



inscription；　'Know　thyself！'　at　Delphi。　　That　word；　if　I　am　not　mistaken；



is　put　there　as　a　sort　of　salutation　which　the　god　addresses　to　those　who



enter　the　temple；　as　much　as　to　say　that　the　ordinary　salutation　of　'Hail！'



is　not　right；　and　that　the　exhortation　'Be　temperate！'　would　be　a　far



better　way　of　saluting　one　another。　　The　notion　of　him　who　dedicated　the



inscription　was；　as　I　believe；　that　the　god　speaks　to　those　who　enter　his



temple；　not　as　men　speak；　but；　when　a　worshipper　enters；　the　first　word



which　he　hears　is　'Be　temperate！'　　This；　however；　like　a　prophet　he



expresses　in　a　sort　of　riddle；　for　'Know　thyself！'　and　'Be　temperate！'　are



the　same；　as　I　maintain；　and　as　the　letters　imply　（Greek）；　and　yet　they　may



be　easily　misunderstood；　and　succeeding　sages　who　added　'Never　too　much；'



or；　'Give　a　pledge；　and　evil　is　nigh　at　hand；'　would　appear　to　have　so



misunderstood　them；　for　they　imagined　that　'Know　thyself！'　was　a　piece　of



advice　which　the　god　gave；　and　not　his　salutation　of　the　worshippers　at



their　first　coming　in；　and　they　dedicated　their　own　inscription　under　the



idea　that　they　too　would　give　equally　useful　pieces　of　advice。　　Shall　I



tell　you；　Socrates；　why　I　say　all　this？　　My　object　is　to　leave　the　previous



discussion　（in　which　I　know　not　whether　you　or　I　are　more　right；　but；　at



any　rate；　no　clear　result　was　attained）；　and　to　raise　a　new　one　in　which　I



will　attempt　to　prove；　if　you　deny；　that　temperance　is　self…knowledge。







Yes；　I　said；　Critias；　but　you　come　to　me　as　though　I　professed　to　know



about　the　questions　which　I　ask；　and　as　though　I　could；　if　I　only　would；



agree　with　you。　　Whereas　the　fact　is　that　I　enquire　with　you　into　the　truth



of　that　which　is　advanced　from　time　to　time；　just　because　I　do　not　know；



and　when　I　have　enquired；　I　will　say　whether　I　agree　with　you　or　not。　



Please　then　to　allow　me　time　to　reflect。







Reflect；　he　said。







I　am　reflecting；　I　replied；　and　discover　that　temperance；　or　wisdom；　if



implying　a　knowledge　of　anything；　must　be　a　science；　and　a　science　of



something。







Yes；　he　said；　the　science　of　itself。







Is　not　medicine；　I　said；　the　science　of　health？







True。







And　suppose；　I　said；　that　I　were　asked　by　you　what　is　the　use　or　effect　of



medicine；　which　is　this　science　of　health；　I　should　answer　that　medicine　is



of　very　great　use　in　producing　health；　which；　as　you　will　admit；　is　an



excellent　effect。







Granted。







And　if　you　were　to　ask　me；　what　is　the　result　or　effect　of　architecture；



which　is　the　science　of　building；　I　should　say　houses；　and　so　of　o