the critique of practical reason-第5章

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or　himself　are　not　laws　by　which　one　is　inevitably　bound；　because　reason　in　practical　matters　has　to　do　with　the　subject；　namely；　with　the　faculty　of　desire；　the　special　character　of　which　may　occasion　variety　in　the　rule。　The　practical　rule　is　always　a　product　of　reason；　because　it　prescribes　action　as　a　means　to　the　effect。　But　in　the　case　of　a　being　with　whom　reason　does　not　of　itself　determine　the　will；　this　rule　is　an　imperative；　i。e。；　a　rule　characterized　by　〃shall；〃　which　expresses　the　objective　necessitation　of　the　action　and　signifies　that；　if　reason　completely　determined　the　will；　the　action　would　inevitably　take　place　according　to　this　rule。　Imperatives；　therefore；　are　objectively　valid；　and　are　quite　distinct　from　maxims；　which　are　subjective　principles。　The　former　either　determine　the　conditions　of　the　causality　of　the　rational　being　as　an　efficient　cause；　i。e。；　merely　in　reference　to　the　effect　and　the　means　of　attaining　it；　or　they　determine　the　will　only；　whether　it　is　adequate　to　the　effect　or　not。　The　former　would　be　hypothetical　imperatives；　and　contain　mere　precepts　of　skill；　the　latter；　on　the　contrary；　would　be　categorical；　and　would　alone　be　practical　laws。　Thus　maxims　are　principles；　but　not　imperatives。　Imperatives　themselves；　however；　when　they　are　conditional　（i。e。；　do　not　determine　the　will　simply　as　will；　but　only　in　respect　to　a　desired　effect；　that　is；　when　they　are　hypothetical　imperatives）；　are　practical　precepts　but　not　laws。　Laws　must　be　sufficient　to　determine　the　will　as　will；　even　before　I　ask　whether　I　have　power　sufficient　for　a　desired　effect；　or　the　means　necessary　to　produce　it；　hence　they　are　categorical：　otherwise　they　are　not　laws　at　all；　because　the　necessity　is　wanting；　which；　if　it　is　to　be　practical；　must　be　independent　of　conditions　which　are　pathological　and　are　therefore　only　contingently　connected　with　the　will。　Tell　a　man；　for　example；　that　he　must　be　industrious　and　thrifty　in　youth；　in　order　that　he　may　not　want　in　old　age；　this　is　a　correct　and　important　practical　precept　of　the　will。　But　it　is　easy　to　see　that　in　this　case　the　will　is　directed　to　something　else　which　it　is　presupposed　that　it　desires；　and　as　to　this　desire；　we　must　leave　it　to　the　actor　himself　whether　he　looks　forward　to　other　resources　than　those　of　his　own　acquisition；　or　does　not　expect　to　be　old；　or　thinks　that　in　case　of　future　necessity　he　will　be　able　to　make　shift　with　little。　Reason；　from　which　alone　can　spring　a　rule　involving　necessity；　does；　indeed；　give　necessity　to　this　precept　（else　it　would　not　be　an　imperative）；　but　this　is　a　necessity　dependent　on　subjective　conditions；　and　cannot　be　supposed　in　the　same　degree　in　all　subjects。　But　that　reason　may　give　laws　it　is　necessary　that　it　should　only　need　to　presuppose　itself；　because　rules　are　objectively　and　universally　valid　only　when　they　hold　without　any　contingent　subjective　conditions；　which　distinguish　one　rational　being　from　another。　Now　tell　a　man　that　he　should　never　make　a　deceitful　promise；　this　is　a　rule　which　only　concerns　his　will；　whether　the　purposes　he　may　have　can　be　attained　thereby　or　not；　it　is　the　volition　only　which　is　to　be　determined　a　priori　by　that　rule。　If　now　it　is　found　that　this　rule　is　practically　right；　then　it　is　a　law；　because　it　is　a　categorical　imperative。　Thus；　practical　laws　refer　to　the　will　only；　without　considering　what　is　attained　by　its　causality；　and　we　may　disregard　this　latter　（as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense）　in　order　to　have　them　quite　pure。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　THEOREM　I。

　　All　practical　principles　which　presuppose　an　object　（matter）　of　the　faculty　of　desire　as　the　ground　of　determination　of　the　will　are　empirical　and　can　furnish　no　practical　laws。　　　By　the　matter　of　the　faculty　of　desire　I　mean　an　object　the　realization　of　which　is　desired。　Now；　if　the　desire　for　this　object　precedes　the　practical　rule　and　is　the　condition　of　our　making　it　a　principle；　then　I　say　（in　the　first　place）　this　principle　is　in　that　case　wholly　empirical；　for　then　what　determines　the　choice　is　the　idea　of　an　object　and　that　relation　of　this　idea　to　the　subject　by　which　its　faculty　of　desire　is　determined　to　its　realization。　Such　a　relation　to　the　subject　is　called　the　pleasure　in　the　realization　of　an　object。　This；　then；　must　be　presupposed　as　a　condition　of　the　possibility　of　determination　of　the　will。　But　it　is　impossible　to　know　a　priori　of　any　idea　of　an　object　whether　it　will　be　connected　with　pleasure　or　pain；　or　be　indifferent。　In　such　cases；　therefore；　the　determining　principle　of　the　choice　must　be　empirical　and；　therefore；　also　the　practical　material　principle　which　presupposes　it　as　a　condition。　　　In　the　second　place；　since　susceptibility　to　a　pleasure　or　pain　can　be　known　only　empirically　and　cannot　hold　in　the　same　degree　for　all　rational　beings；　a　principle　which　is　based　on　this　subjective　condition　may　serve　indeed　as　a　maxim　for　the　subject　which　possesses　this　susceptibility；　but　not　as　a　law　even　to　him　（because　it　is　wanting　in　objective　necessity；　which　must　be　recognized　a　priori）；　it　follows；　therefore；　that　such　a　principle　can　never　furnish　a　practical　law。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　III。　THEOREM　II。

　　All　material　practical　principles　as　such　are　of　one　and　the　same　kind　and　come　under　the　general　principle　of　self…love　or　private　happiness。　　　Pleasure　arising　from　the　idea　of　the　idea　of　the　existence　of　a　thing；　in　so　far　as　it　is　to　determine　the　desire　of　this　thing；　is　founded　on　the　susceptibility　of　the　subject；　since　it　depends　on　the　presence　of　an　object；　hence　it　belongs　to　sense　（feeling）；　and　not　to　understanding；　which　expresses　a　relation　of　the　idea　to　an　object　according　to　concepts；　not　to　the　subject　according　to　feelings。　It　is；　then；　practical　only　in　so　far　as　the　faculty　of　desire　is　determined　by　the　sensation　of　agreeableness　which　the　subject　expects　from　the　actual　existence　of　the　object。　Now；　a　rational　being's　consciousness　of　the　pleasantness　of　life　uninterruptedly　accompanying　his　whole　existence　is　happiness；　and　the　principle　which　makes　this　the　supreme　ground　of　determination　of　the　will　is　the　principle　of　self…love。　All　material　principles；　then；　which　place　the　determining　ground　of　the　will　in　the　pleasure　or　pain　to　be　received　from　the　existence　of　any　object　are　all　of　the　same　kind；　inasmuch　as　they　all　belong　to　the　principle　of　self…love　or　private　happiness。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　COROLLARY。

　　All　material　practical　rules　place　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　in　the　lower　desires；　and　if　there　were　no　purely　formal　laws　of　the　will　adequate　to　determine　it；　then　we　could　not　admit　any　higher　desire　at　all。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK　I。

　　It　is　surprising　that　men；　otherwise　acute；　can　think　it　possible　to　distinguish　between　higher　and　lower　desires；　according　as　the　ideas　which　are　connected　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure　have　their　origin　in　the　senses　or　in　the　understanding；　for　when　we　inquire　what　are　the　determining　grounds　of　desire；　and　place　them　in　some　expected　pleasantness；　it　is　of　no　consequence　whence　the　idea　of　this　pleasing　object　is　derived；　but　only　how　much　it　pleases。　Whether　an　idea　has　its　seat　and　source　in　the　understanding　or　not；　if　it　can　only　determine　the　choice　by　presupposing　a　feeling　of　pleasure　in　the　subject；　it　follows　that　its　capability　of　determining　the　choice　depends　altogether　on　the　nature　of　the　inner　sense；　namely；　that　this　can　be　agreeably　affected　by　it。　However　dissimilar　ideas　of　objects　may　be；　though　they　be　ideas　of　the　understanding；　or　even　of　the　reason　in　contrast　to　ideas　of　sense；　yet　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　by　means　of　which　they　constitute　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　（the　expected　satisfaction　which　impels　the　activity　to　the　production　of　the　object）；　is　of　one　and　the　same　kind；　not　only　inasmuch　as　it　can　only　be　known　empirically；　but　also　inasmuch　as　it　affects　one　and　the　same　vital　force　which　manifests　itself　in　the　faculty　of　desire；　and　in　this　respect　can　only　differ　in　degree　from　every　other　ground　of　determination。　Otherwise；　how　could　we　compare　in　respect　of　magnitude　two　principles　of　determination；　the　ideas　of　which　depe