the critique of practical reason-第40章

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ed；　this　deduction　saves　us　from　restricting；　with　Epicurus；　all　and　every　use　of　them；　even　for　practical　purposes；　to　the　objects　and　motives　of　the　senses。　But　now　that　the　Critique　has　shown　by　that　deduction；　first；　that　they　are　not　of　empirical　origin；　but　have　their　seat　and　source　a　priori　in　the　pure　understanding；　secondly；　that　as　they　refer　to　objects　in　general　independently　of　the　intuition　of　them；　hence；　although　they　cannot　effect　theoretical　knowledge；　except　in　application　to　empirical　objects；　yet　when　applied　to　an　object　given　by　pure　practical　reason　they　enable　us　to　conceive　the　supersensible　definitely；　only　so　far；　however；　as　it　is　defined　by　such　predicates　as　are　necessarily　connected　with　the　pure　practical　purpose　given　a　priori　and　with　its　possibility。　The　speculative　restriction　of　pure　reason　and　its　practical　extension　bring　it　into　that　relation　of　equality　in　which　reason　in　general　can　be　employed　suitably　to　its　end；　and　this　example　proves　better　than　any　other　that　the　path　to　wisdom；　if　it　is　to　be　made　sure　and　not　to　be　impassable　or　misleading；　must　with　us　men　inevitably　pass　through　science；　but　it　is　not　till　this　is　complete　that　we　can　be　convinced　that　it　leads　to　this　goal。

　　　　　　VIII。　Of　Belief　from　a　Requirement　of　Pure　Reason。

　　A　want　or　requirement　of　pure　reason　in　its　speculative　use　leads　only　to　a　hypothesis；　that　of　pure　practical　reason　to　a　postulate；　for　in　the　former　case　I　ascend　from　the　result　as　high　as　I　please　in　the　series　of　causes；　not　in　order　to　give　objective　reality　to　the　result　（e。g。；　the　causal　connection　of　things　and　changes　in　the　world）；　but　in　order　thoroughly　to　satisfy　my　inquiring　reason　in　respect　of　it。　Thus　I　see　before　me　order　and　design　in　nature；　and　need　not　resort　to　speculation　to　assure　myself　of　their　reality；　but　to　explain　them　I　have　to　presuppose　a　Deity　as　their　cause；　and　then　since　the　inference　from　an　effect　to　a　definite　cause　is　always　uncertain　and　doubtful；　especially　to　a　cause　so　precise　and　so　perfectly　defined　as　we　have　to　conceive　in　God；　hence　the　highest　degree　of　certainty　to　which　this　pre…supposition　can　be　brought　is　that　it　is　the　most　rational　opinion　for　us　men。*　On　the　other　hand；　a　requirement　of　pure　practical　reason　is　based　on　a　duty；　that　of　making　something　（the　summum　bonum）　the　object　of　my　will　so　as　to　promote　it　with　all　my　powers；　in　which　case　I　must　suppose　its　possibility　and；　consequently；　also　the　conditions　necessary　thereto；　namely；　God；　freedom；　and　immortality；　since　I　cannot　prove　these　by　my　speculative　reason；　although　neither　can　I　refute　them。　This　duty　is　founded　on　something　that　is　indeed　quite　independent　of　these　suppositions　and　is　of　itself　apodeictically　certain；　namely；　the　moral　law；　and　so　far　it　needs　no　further　support　by　theoretical　views　as　to　the　inner　constitution　of　things；　the　secret　final　aim　of　the　order　of　the　world；　or　a　presiding　ruler　thereof；　in　order　to　bind　me　in　the　most　perfect　manner　to　act　in　unconditional　conformity　to　the　law。　But　the　subjective　effect　of　this　law；　namely；　the　mental　disposition　conformed　to　it　and　made　necessary　by　it；　to　promote　the　practically　possible　summum　bonum；　this　pre…supposes　at　least　that　the　latter　is　possible；　for　it　would　be　practically　impossible　to　strive　after　the　object　of　a　conception　which　at　bottom　was　empty　and　had　no　object。　Now　the　above…mentioned　postulates　concern　only　the　physical　or　metaphysical　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　in　a　word；　those　which　lie　in　the　nature　of　things；　not；　however；　for　the　sake　of　an　arbitrary　speculative　purpose；　but　of　a　practically　necessary　end　of　a　pure　rational　will；　which　in　this　case　does　not　choose；　but　obeys　an　inexorable　command　of　reason；　the　foundation　of　which　is　objective；　in　the　constitution　of　things　as　they　must　be　universally　judged　by　pure　reason；　and　is　not　based　on　inclination；　for　we　are　in　nowise　justified　in　assuming；　on　account　of　what　we　wish　on　merely　subjective　grounds；　that　the　means　thereto　are　possible　or　that　its　object　is　real。　This；　then；　is　an　absolutely　necessary　requirement；　and　what　it　pre…supposes　is　not　merely　justified　as　an　allowable　hypothesis；　but　as　a　postulate　in　a　practical　point　of　view；　and　admitting　that　the　pure　moral　law　inexorably　binds　every　man　as　a　command　（not　as　a　rule　of　prudence）；　the　righteous　man　may　say：　〃I　will　that　there　be　a　God；　that　my　existence　in　this　world　be　also　an　existence　outside　the　chain　of　physical　causes　and　in　a　pure　world　of　the　understanding；　and　lastly；　that　my　duration　be　endless；　I　firmly　abide　by　this；　and　will　not　let　this　faith　be　taken　from　me；　for　in　this　instance　alone　my　interest；　because　I　must　not　relax　anything　of　it；　inevitably　determines　my　judgement；　without　regarding　sophistries；　however　unable　I　may　be　to　answer　them　or　to　oppose　them　with　others　more　plausible。*＇2＇

　　*But　even　here　we　should　not　be　able　to　allege　a　requirement　of　reason；　if　we　had　not　before　our　eyes　a　problematical；　but　yet　inevitable；　conception　of　reason；　namely；　that　of　an　absolutely　necessary　being。　This　conception　now　seeks　to　be　defined；　and　this；　in　addition　to　the　tendency　to　extend　itself；　is　the　objective　ground　of　a　requirement　of　speculative　reason；　namely；　to　have　a　more　precise　definition　of　the　conception　of　a　necessary　being　which　is　to　serve　as　the　first　cause　of　other　beings；　so　as　to　make　these　latter　knowable　by　some　means。　Without　such　antecedent　necessary　problems　there　are　no　requirements…　at　least　not　of　pure　reason…　the　rest　are　requirements　of　inclination。　　　*＇2＇　In　the　Deutsches　Museum；　February；　1787；　there　is　a　dissertation　by　a　very　subtle　and　clear…headed　man；　the　late　Wizenmann；　whose　early　death　is　to　be　lamented；　in　which　he　disputes　the　right　to　argue　from　a　want　to　the　objective　reality　of　its　object；　and　illustrates　the　point　by　the　example　of　a　man　in　love；　who　having　fooled　himself　into　an　idea　of　beauty；　which　is　merely　a　chimera　of　his　own　brain；　would　fain　conclude　that　such　an　object　really　exists　somewhere。　I　quite　agree　with　him　in　this；　in　all　cases　where　the　want　is　founded　on　inclination；　which　cannot　necessarily　postulate　the　existence　of　its　object　even　for　the　man　that　is　affected　by　it；　much　less　can　it　contain　a　demand　valid　for　everyone；　and　therefore　it　is　merely　a　subjective　ground　of　the　wish。　But　in　the　present　case　we　have　a　want　of　reason　springing　from　an　objective　determining　principle　of　the　will；　namely；　the　moral　law；　which　necessarily　binds　every　rational　being；　and　therefore　justifies　him　in　assuming　a　priori　in　nature　the　conditions　proper　for　it；　and　makes　the　latter　inseparable　from　the　complete　practical　use　of　reason。　It　is　a　duty　to　realize　the　summum　bonum　to　the　utmost　of　our　power；　therefore　it　must　be　possible；　consequently　it　is　unavoidable　for　every　rational　being　in　the　world　to　assume　what　is　necessary　for　its　objective　possibility。　The　assumption　is　as　necessary　as　the　moral　law；　in　connection　with　which　alone　it　is　valid。

　　In　order　to　prevent　misconception　in　the　use　of　a　notion　as　yet　so　unusual　as　that　of　a　faith　of　pure　practical　reason；　let　me　be　permitted　to　add　one　more　remark。　It　might　almost　seem　as　if　this　rational　faith　were　here　announced　as　itself　a　command；　namely；　that　we　should　assume　the　summum　bonum　as　possible。　But　a　faith　that　is　commanded　is　nonsense。　Let　the　preceding　analysis；　however；　be　remembered　of　what　is　required　to　be　supposed　in　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum；　and　it　will　be　seen　that　it　cannot　be　commanded　to　assume　this　possibility；　and　no　practical　disposition　of　mind　is　required　to　admit　it；　but　that　speculative　reason　must　concede　it　without　being　asked；　for　no　one　can　affirm　that　it　is　impossible　in　itself　that　rational　beings　in　the　world　should　at　the　same　time　be　worthy　of　happiness　in　conformity　with　the　moral　law　and　also　possess　this　happiness　proportionately。　Now　in　respect　of　the　first　element　of　the　summum　bonum；　namely；　that　which　concerns　morality；　the　moral　law　gives　merely　a　command；　and　to　doubt　the　possibility　of　that　element　would　be　the　same　as　to　call　in　question　the　moral　law　itself。　But　as　regards　the　second　element　of　that　object；