the critique of practical reason-第4章

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ould　be　quite　satisfied　with　this　system　of　universal　empiricism；　for；　as　is　well　known；　he　desired　nothing　more　than　that；　instead　of　ascribing　any　objective　meaning　to　the　necessity　in　the　concept　of　cause；　a　merely　subjective　one　should　be　assumed；　viz。；　custom；　in　order　to　deny　that　reason　could　judge　about　God；　freedom；　and　immortality；　and　if　once　his　principles　were　granted；　he　was　certainly　well　able　to　deduce　his　conclusions　therefrom；　with　all　logical　coherence。　But　even　Hume　did　not　make　his　empiricism　so　universal　as　to　include　mathematics。　He　holds　the　principles　of　mathematics　to　be　analytical；　and　if　his　were　correct；　they　would　certainly　be　apodeictic　also：　but　we　could　not　infer　from　this　that　reason　has　the　faculty　of　forming　apodeictic　judgements　in　philosophy　also…　that　is　to　say；　those　which　are　synthetical　judgements；　like　the　judgement　of　causality。　But　if　we　adopt　a　universal　empiricism；　then　mathematics　will　be　included。　　　Now　if　this　science　is　in　contradiction　with　a　reason　that　admits　only　empirical　principles；　as　it　inevitably　is　in　the　antinomy　in　which　mathematics　prove　the　infinite　divisibility　of　space；　which　empiricism　cannot　admit；　then　the　greatest　possible　evidence　of　demonstration　is　in　manifest　contradiction　with　the　alleged　conclusions　from　experience；　and　we　are　driven　to　ask；　like　Cheselden's　blind　patient；　〃Which　deceives　me；　sight　or　touch？〃　（for　empiricism　is　based　on　a　necessity　felt；　rationalism　on　a　necessity　seen）。　And　thus　universal　empiricism　reveals　itself　as　absolute　scepticism。　It　is　erroneous　to　attribute　this　in　such　an　unqualified　sense　to　Hume；*　since　he　left　at　least　one　certain　touchstone　（which　can　only　be　found　in　a　priori　principles）；　although　experience　consists　not　only　of　feelings；　but　also　of　judgements。

　　*Names　that　designate　the　followers　of　a　sect　have　always　been　accompanied　with　much　injustice；　just　as　if　one　said；　〃N　is　an　Idealist。〃　For　although　he　not　only　admits；　but　even　insists；　that　our　ideas　of　external　things　have　actual　objects　of　external　things　corresponding　to　them；　yet　he　holds　that　the　form　of　the　intuition　does　not　depend　on　them　but　on　the　human　mind。

　　However；　as　in　this　philosophical　and　critical　age　such　empiricism　can　scarcely　be　serious；　and　it　is　probably　put　forward　only　as　an　intellectual　exercise　and　for　the　purpose　of　putting　in　a　clearer　light；　by　contrast；　the　necessity　of　rational　a　priori　principles；　we　can　only　be　grateful　to　those　who　employ　themselves　in　this　otherwise　uninstructive　labour。　INTRODUCTION　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　INTRODUCTION。

　　　　　　　Of　the　Idea　of　a　Critique　of　Practical　Reason。

　　The　theoretical　use　of　reason　was　concerned　with　objects　of　the　cognitive　faculty　only；　and　a　critical　examination　of　it　with　reference　to　this　use　applied　properly　only　to　the　pure　faculty　of　cognition；　because　this　raised　the　suspicion；　which　was　afterwards　confirmed；　that　it　might　easily　pass　beyond　its　limits；　and　be　lost　among　unattainable　objects；　or　even　contradictory　notions。　It　is　quite　different　with　the　practical　use　of　reason。　In　this；　reason　is　concerned　with　the　grounds　of　determination　of　the　will；　which　is　a　faculty　either　to　produce　objects　corresponding　to　ideas；　or　to　determine　ourselves　to　the　effecting　of　such　objects　（whether　the　physical　power　is　sufficient　or　not）；　that　is；　to　determine　our　causality。　For　here；　reason　can　at　least　attain　so　far　as　to　determine　the　will；　and　has　always　objective　reality　in　so　far　as　it　is　the　volition　only　that　is　in　question。　The　first　question　here　then　is　whether　pure　reason　of　itself　alone　suffices　to　determine　the　will；　or　whether　it　can　be　a　ground　of　determination　only　as　dependent　on　empirical　conditions。　Now；　here　there　comes　in　a　notion　of　causality　justified　by　the　critique　of　the　pure　reason；　although　not　capable　of　being　presented　empirically；　viz。；　that　of　freedom；　and　if　we　can　now　discover　means　of　proving　that　this　property　does　in　fact　belong　to　the　human　will　（and　so　to　the　will　of　all　rational　beings）；　then　it　will　not　only　be　shown　that　pure　reason　can　be　practical；　but　that　it　alone；　and　not　reason　empirically　limited；　is　indubitably　practical；　consequently；　we　shall　have　to　make　a　critical　examination；　not　of　pure　practical　reason；　but　only　of　practical　reason　generally。　For　when　once　pure　reason　is　shown　to　exist；　it　needs　no　critical　examination。　For　reason　itself　contains　the　standard　for　the　critical　examination　of　every　use　of　it。　The　critique；　then；　of　practical　reason　generally　is　bound　to　prevent　the　empirically　conditioned　reason　from　claiming　exclusively　to　furnish　the　ground　of　determination　of　the　will。　If　it　is　proved　that　there　is　a　＇practical＇　reason；　its　employment　is　alone　immanent；　the　empirically　conditioned　use；　which　claims　supremacy；　is　on　the　contrary　transcendent　and　expresses　itself　in　demands　and　precepts　which　go　quite　beyond　its　sphere。　This　is　just　the　opposite　of　what　might　be　said　of　pure　reason　in　its　speculative　employment。　　　However；　as　it　is　still　pure　reason；　the　knowledge　of　which　is　here　the　foundation　of　its　practical　employment；　the　general　outline　of　the　classification　of　a　critique　of　practical　reason　must　be　arranged　in　accordance　with　that　of　the　speculative。　We　must；　then；　have　the　Elements　and　the　Methodology　of　it；　and　in　the　former　an　Analytic　as　the　rule　of　truth；　and　a　Dialectic　as　the　exposition　and　dissolution　of　the　illusion　in　the　judgements　of　practical　reason。　But　the　order　in　the　subdivision　of　the　Analytic　will　be　the　reverse　of　that　in　the　critique　of　the　pure　speculative　reason。　For；　in　the　present　case；　we　shall　commence　with　the　principles　and　proceed　to　the　concepts；　and　only　then；　if　possible；　to　the　senses；　whereas　in　the　case　of　the　speculative　reason　we　began　with　the　senses　and　had　to　end　with　the　principles。　The　reason　of　this　lies　again　in　this：　that　now　we　have　to　do　with　a　will；　and　have　to　consider　reason；　not　in　its　relation　to　objects；　but　to　this　will　and　its　causality。　We　must；　then；　begin　with　the　principles　of　a　causality　not　empirically　conditioned；　after　which　the　attempt　can　be　made　to　establish　our　notions　of　the　determining　grounds　of　such　a　will；　of　their　application　to　objects；　and　finally　to　the　subject　and　its　sense　faculty。　We　necessarily　begin　with　the　law　of　causality　from　freedom；　that　is；　with　a　pure　practical　principle；　and　this　determines　the　objects　to　which　alone　it　can　be　applied。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。

　　　　　　　　　　　ELEMENTS　OF　PURE　PRACTICAL　REASON。

　　　　　　BOOK　I。　The　Analytic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　the　Principles　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　DEFINITION。

　　Practical　principles　are　propositions　which　contain　a　general　determination　of　the　will；　having　under　it　several　practical　rules。　They　are　subjective；　or　maxims；　when　the　condition　is　regarded　by　the　subject　as　valid　only　for　his　own　will；　but　are　objective；　or　practical　laws；　when　the　condition　is　recognized　as　objective；　that　is；　valid　for　the　will　of　every　rational　being。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　Supposing　that　pure　reason　contains　in　itself　a　practical　motive；　that　is；　one　adequate　to　determine　the　will；　then　there　are　practical　laws；　otherwise　all　practical　principles　will　be　mere　maxims。　In　case　the　will　of　a　rational　being　is　pathologically　affected；　there　may　occur　a　conflict　of　the　maxims　with　the　practical　laws　recognized　by　itself。　For　example；　one　may　make　it　his　maxim　to　let　no　injury　pass　unrevenged；　and　yet　he　may　see　that　this　is　not　a　practical　law；　but　only　his　own　maxim；　that；　on　the　contrary；　regarded　as　being　in　one　and　the　same　maxim　a　rule　for　the　will　of　every　rational　being；　it　must　contradict　itself。　In　natural　philosophy　the　principles　of　what　happens；　e。g。；　the　principle　of　equality　of　action　and　reaction　in　the　communication　of　motion）　are　at　the　same　time　laws　of　nature；　for　the　use　of　reason　there　is　theoretical　and　determined　by　the　nature　of　the　object。　In　practical　philosophy；　i。e。；　that　which　has　to　do　only　with　the　grounds　of　determination　of　the　will；　the　principles　which　a　man　makes　for　himself　are　not　laws　by　which　one　is　inevitably　bound；　because　reason　in　practical　matters　has　to