the critique of practical reason-第13章

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etermining　the　will。　　　Now　all　our　human　insight　is　at　an　end　as　soon　as　we　have　arrived　at　fundamental　powers　or　faculties；　for　the　possibility　of　these　cannot　be　understood　by　any　means；　and　just　as　little　should　it　be　arbitrarily　invented　and　assumed。　Therefore；　in　the　theoretic　use　of　reason；　it　is　experience　alone　that　can　justify　us　in　assuming　them。　But　this　expedient　of　adducing　empirical　proofs；　instead　of　a　deduction　from　a　priori　sources　of　knowledge；　is　denied　us　here　in　respect　to　the　pure　practical　faculty　of　reason。　For　whatever　requires　to　draw　the　proof　of　its　reality　from　experience　must　depend　for　the　grounds　of　its　possibility　on　principles　of　experience；　and　pure；　yet　practical；　reason　by　its　very　notion　cannot　be　regarded　as　such。　Further；　the　moral　law　is　given　as　a　fact　of　pure　reason　of　which　we　are　a　priori　conscious；　and　which　is　apodeictically　certain；　though　it　be　granted　that　in　experience　no　example　of　its　exact　fulfilment　can　be　found。　Hence；　the　objective　reality　of　the　moral　law　cannot　be　proved　by　any　deduction　by　any　efforts　of　theoretical　reason；　whether　speculative　or　empirically　supported；　and　therefore；　even　if　we　renounced　its　apodeictic　certainty；　it　could　not　be　proved　a　posteriori　by　experience；　and　yet　it　is　firmly　established　of　itself。　　　But　instead　of　this　vainly　sought　deduction　of　the　moral　principle；　something　else　is　found　which　was　quite　unexpected；　namely；　that　this　moral　principle　serves　conversely　as　the　principle　of　the　deduction　of　an　inscrutable　faculty　which　no　experience　could　prove；　but　of　which　speculative　reason　was　compelled　at　least　to　assume　the　possibility　（in　order　to　find　amongst　its　cosmological　ideas　the　unconditioned　in　the　chain　of　causality；　so　as　not　to　contradict　itself）…　I　mean　the　faculty　of　freedom。　The　moral　law；　which　itself　does　not　require　a　justification；　proves　not　merely　the　possibility　of　freedom；　but　that　it　really　belongs　to　beings　who　recognize　this　law　as　binding　on　themselves。　The　moral　law　is　in　fact　a　law　of　the　causality　of　free　agents　and；　therefore；　of　the　possibility　of　a　supersensible　system　of　nature；　just　as　the　metaphysical　law　of　events　in　the　world　of　sense　was　a　law　of　causality　of　the　sensible　system　of　nature；　and　it　therefore　determines　what　speculative　philosophy　was　compelled　to　leave　undetermined；　namely；　the　law　for　a　causality；　the　concept　of　which　in　the　latter　was　only　negative；　and　therefore　for　the　first　time　gives　this　concept　objective　reality。　　　This　sort　of　credential　of　the　moral　law；　viz。；　that　it　is　set　forth　as　a　principle　of　the　deduction　of　freedom；　which　is　a　causality　of　pure　reason；　is　a　sufficient　substitute　for　all　a　priori　justification；　since　theoretic　reason　was　compelled　to　assume　at　least　the　possibility　of　freedom；　in　order　to　satisfy　a　want　of　its　own。　For　the　moral　law　proves　its　reality；　so　as　even　to　satisfy　the　critique　of　the　speculative　reason；　by　the　fact　that　it　adds　a　positive　definition　to　a　causality　previously　conceived　only　negatively；　the　possibility　of　which　was　incomprehensible　to　speculative　reason；　which　yet　was　compelled　to　suppose　it。　For　it　adds　the　notion　of　a　reason　that　directly　determines　the　will　（by　imposing　on　its　maxims　the　condition　of　a　universal　legislative　form）；　and　thus　it　is　able　for　the　first　time　to　give　objective；　though　only　practical；　reality　to　reason；　which　always　became　transcendent　when　it　sought　to　proceed　speculatively　with　its　ideas。　It　thus　changes　the　transcendent　use　of　reason　into　an　immanent　use　（so　that　reason　is　itself；　by　means　of　ideas；　an　efficient　cause　in　the　field　of　experience）。　　　The　determination　of　the　causality　of　beings　in　the　world　of　sense；　as　such；　can　never　be　unconditioned；　and　yet　for　every　series　of　conditions　there　must　be　something　unconditioned；　and　therefore　there　must　be　a　causality　which　is　determined　wholly　by　itself。　Hence；　the　idea　of　freedom　as　a　faculty　of　absolute　spontaneity　was　not　found　to　be　a　want　but；　as　far　as　its　possibility　is　concerned；　an　analytic　principle　of　pure　speculative　reason。　But　as　it　is　absolutely　impossible　to　find　in　experience　any　example　in　accordance　with　this　idea；　because　amongst　the　causes　of　things　as　phenomena　it　would　be　impossible　to　meet　with　any　absolutely　unconditioned　determination　of　causality；　we　were　only　able　to　defend　our　supposition　that　a　freely　acting　cause　might　be　a　being　in　the　world　of　sense；　in　so　far　as　it　is　considered　in　the　other　point　of　view　as　a　noumenon；　showing　that　there　is　no　contradiction　in　regarding　all　its　actions　as　subject　to　physical　conditions　so　far　as　they　are　phenomena；　and　yet　regarding　its　causality　as　physically　unconditioned；　in　so　far　as　the　acting　being　belongs　to　the　world　of　understanding；　and　in　thus　making　the　concept　of　freedom　the　regulative　principle　of　reason。　By　this　principle　I　do　not　indeed　learn　what　the　object　is　to　which　that　sort　of　causality　is　attributed；　but　I　remove　the　difficulty；　for；　on　the　one　side；　in　the　explanation　of　events　in　the　world；　and　consequently　also　of　the　actions　of　rational　beings；　I　leave　to　the　mechanism　of　physical　necessity　the　right　of　ascending　from　conditioned　to　condition　ad　infinitum；　while　on　the　other　side　I　keep　open　for　speculative　reason　the　place　which　for　it　is　vacant；　namely；　the　intelligible；　in　order　to　transfer　the　unconditioned　thither。　But　I　was　not　able　to　verify　this　supposition；　that　is；　to　change　it　into　the　knowledge　of　a　being　so　acting；　not　even　into　the　knowledge　of　the　possibility　of　such　a　being。　This　vacant　place　is　now　filled　by　pure　practical　reason　with　a　definite　law　of　causality　in　an　intelligible　world　（causality　with　freedom）；　namely；　the　moral　law。　Speculative　reason　does　not　hereby　gain　anything　as　regards　its　insight；　but　only　as　regards　the　certainty　of　its　problematical　notion　of　freedom；　which　here　obtains　objective　reality；　which；　though　only　practical；　is　nevertheless　undoubted。　Even　the　notion　of　causality…　the　application；　and　consequently　the　signification；　of　which　holds　properly　only　in　relation　to　phenomena；　so　as　to　connect　them　into　experiences　（as　is　shown　by　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason）…　is　not　so　enlarged　as　to　extend　its　use　beyond　these　limits。　For　if　reason　sought　to　do　this；　it　would　have　to　show　how　the　logical　relation　of　principle　and　consequence　can　be　used　synthetically　in　a　different　sort　of　intuition　from　the　sensible；　that　is　how　a　causa　noumenon　is　possible。　This　it　can　never　do；　and；　as　practical　reason；　it　does　not　even　concern　itself　with　it；　since　it　only　places　the　determining　principle　of　causality　of　man　as　a　sensible　creature　（which　is　given）　in　pure　reason　（which　is　therefore　called　practical）；　and　therefore　it　employs　the　notion　of　cause；　not　in　order　to　know　objects；　but　to　determine　causality　in　relation　to　objects　in　general。　It　can　abstract　altogether　from　the　application　of　this　notion　to　objects　with　a　view　to　theoretical　knowledge　（since　this　concept　is　always　found　a　priori　in　the　understanding　even　independently　of　any　intuition）。　Reason；　then；　employs　it　only　for　a　practical　purpose；　and　hence　we　can　transfer　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　into　the　intelligible　order　of　things；　admitting；　at　the　same　time；　that　we　cannot　understand　how　the　notion　of　cause　can　determine　the　knowledge　of　these　things。　But　reason　must　cognise　causality　with　respect　to　the　actions　of　the　will　in　the　sensible　world　in　a　definite　manner；　otherwise；　practical　reason　could　not　really　produce　any　action。　But　as　to　the　notion　which　it　forms　of　its　own　causality　as　noumenon；　it　need　not　determine　it　theoretically　with　a　view　to　the　cognition　of　its　supersensible　existence；　so　as　to　give　it　significance　in　this　way。　For　it　acquires　significance　apart　from　this；　though　only　for　practical　use；　namely；　through　the　moral　law。　Theoretically　viewed；　it　remains　always　a　pure　a　priori　concept　of　the　understanding；　which　can　be　applied　to　objects　whether　they　have　been　given　sensibly　or　not；　although　in　the　latter　case　it　has　no　definite　theoretical　significance　or　application；　but　is　only　a　formal；　though　essential；　conception　of　the　understanding　relating　to　an　object　in　general。　The　significance　which　reason　gives　it　through　the　moral