the critique of pure reason-第91章

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regarded　in　this　manner；　if　we　wish　to　know　whether　there　is　or　is　not

contained　in　it　a　manifold　whose　parts　are　external　to　each　other。





　　　　　　　　　　THIRD　CONFLICT　OF　THE　TRANSCENDENTAL　IDEAS。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THESIS。



　　Causality　according　to　the　laws　of　nature；　is　not　the　only　causality

operating　to　originate　the　phenomena　of　the　world。　A　causality　of

freedom　is　also　necessary　to　account　fully　for　these　phenomena。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROOF。



　　Let　it　be　supposed；　that　there　is　no　other　kind　of　causality　than

that　according　to　the　laws　of　nature。　Consequently；　everything　that

happens　presupposes　a　previous　condition；　which　it　follows　with

absolute　certainty；　in　conformity　with　a　rule。　But　this　previous

condition　must　itself　be　something　that　has　happened　（that　has

arisen　in　time；　as　it　did　not　exist　before）；　for；　if　it　has　always

been　in　existence；　its　consequence　or　effect　would　not　thus

originate　for　the　first　time；　but　would　likewise　have　always

existed。　The　causality；　therefore；　of　a　cause；　whereby　something

happens；　is　itself　a　thing　that　has　happened。　Now　this　again

presupposes；　in　conformity　with　the　law　of　nature；　a　previous

condition　and　its　causality；　and　this　another　anterior　to　the

former；　and　so　on。　If；　then；　everything　happens　solely　in　accordance

with　the　laws　of　nature；　there　cannot　be　any　real　first　beginning　of

things；　but　only　a　subaltern　or　comparative　beginning。　There　cannot；

therefore；　be　a　completeness　of　series　on　the　side　of　the　causes　which

originate　the　one　from　the　other。　But　the　law　of　nature　is　that

nothing　can　happen　without　a　sufficient　a　priori　determined　cause。　The

proposition　therefore…　if　all　causality　is　possible　only　in　accordance

with　the　laws　of　nature…　is；　when　stated　in　this　unlimited　and　general

manner；　self…contradictory。　It　follows　that　this　cannot　be　the　only

kind　of　causality。

　　From　what　has　been　said；　it　follows　that　a　causality　must　be

admitted；　by　means　of　which　something　happens；　without　its　cause　being

determined　according　to　necessary　laws　by　some　other　cause

preceding。　That　is　to　say；　there　must　exist　an　absolute　spontaneity　of

cause；　which　of　itself　originates　a　series　of　phenomena　which　proceeds

according　to　natural　laws…　consequently　transcendental　freedom；

without　which　even　in　the　course　of　nature　the　succession　of　phenomena

on　the　side　of　causes　is　never　complete。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ANTITHESIS。



　　There　is　no　such　thing　as　freedom；　but　everything　in　the　world

happens　solely　according　to　the　laws　of　nature。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROOF。



　　Granted；　that　there　does　exist　freedom　in　the　transcendental

sense；　as　a　peculiar　kind　of　causality；　operating　to　produce　events　in

the　world…　a　faculty；　that　is　to　say；　of　originating　a　state；　and

consequently　a　series　of　consequences　from　that　state。　In　this　case；

not　only　the　series　originated　by　this　spontaneity；　but　the

determination　of　this　spontaneity　itself　to　the　production　of　the

series；　that　is　to　say；　the　causality　itself　must　have　an　absolute

commencement；　such　that　nothing　can　precede　to　determine　this　action

according　to　unvarying　laws。　But　every　beginning　of　action　presupposes

in　the　acting　cause　a　state　of　inaction；　and　a　dynamically　primal

beginning　of　action　presupposes　a　state；　which　has　no　connection…　as

regards　causality…　with　the　preceding　state　of　the　cause…　which　does

not；　that　is；　in　any　wise　result　from　it。　Transcendental　freedom　is

therefore　opposed　to　the　natural　law　of　cause　and　effect；　and　such　a

conjunction　of　successive　states　in　effective　causes　is　destructive　of

the　possibility　of　unity　in　experience　and　for　that　reason　not　to　be

found　in　experience…　is　consequently　a　mere　fiction　of　thought。

　　We　have；　therefore；　nothing　but　nature　to　which　we　must　look　for

connection　and　order　in　cosmical　events。　Freedom…　independence　of

the　laws　of　nature…　is　certainly　a　deliverance　from　restraint；　but

it　is　also　a　relinquishing　of　the　guidance　of　law　and　rule。　For　it

cannot　be　alleged　that；　instead　of　the　laws　of　nature；　laws　of　freedom

may　be　introduced　into　the　causality　of　the　course　of　nature。　For；

if　freedom　were　determined　according　to　laws；　it　would　be　no　longer

freedom；　but　merely　nature。　Nature；　therefore；　and　transcendental

freedom　are　distinguishable　as　conformity　to　law　and　lawlessness。

The　former　imposes　upon　understanding　the　difficulty　of　seeking　the

origin　of　events　ever　higher　and　higher　in　the　series　of　causes；

inasmuch　as　causality　is　always　conditioned　thereby；　while　it

compensates　this　labour　by　the　guarantee　of　a　unity　complete　and　in

conformity　with　law。　The　latter；　on　the　contrary；　holds　out　to　the

understanding　the　promise　of　a　point　of　rest　in　the　chain　of　causes；

by　conducting　it　to　an　unconditioned　causality；　which　professes　to

have　the　power　of　spontaneous　origination；　but　which；　in　its　own　utter

blindness；　deprives　it　of　the　guidance　of　rules；　by　which　alone　a

completely　connected　experience　is　possible。





　　　　　　　　　　　　　OBSERVATIONS　ON　THE　THIRD　ANTINOMY。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　THESIS。



　　The　transcendental　idea　of　freedom　is　far　from　constituting　the

entire　content　of　the　psychological　conception　so　termed；　which　is　for

the　most　part　empirical。　It　merely　presents　us　with　the　conception

of　spontaneity　of　action；　as　the　proper　ground　for　imputing　freedom　to

the　cause　of　a　certain　class　of　objects。　It　is；　however；　the　true

stumbling…stone　to　philosophy；　which　meets　with　unconquerable

difficulties　in　the　way　of　its　admitting　this　kind　of　unconditioned

causality。　That　element　in　the　question　of　the　freedom　of　the　will；

which　bas　for　so　long　a　time　placed　speculative　reason　in　such

perplexity；　is　properly　only　transcendental；　and　concerns　the

question；　whether　there　must　be　held　to　exist　a　faculty　of　spontaneous

origination　of　a　series　of　successive　things　or　states。　How　such　a

faculty　is　possible　is　not　a　necessary　inquiry；　for　in　the　case　of

natural　causality　itself；　we　are　obliged　to　content　ourselves　with　the

a　priori　knowledge　that　such　a　causality　must　be　presupposed；　although

we　are　quite　incapable　of　comprehending　how　the　being　of　one　thing

is　possible　through　the　being　of　another；　but　must　for　this

information　look　entirely　to　experience。　Now　we　have　demonstrated　this

necessity　of　a　free　first　beginning　of　a　series　of　phenomena；　only

in　so　far　as　it　is　required　for　the　comprehension　of　an　origin　of

the　world；　all　following　states　being　regarded　as　a　succession

according　to　laws　of　nature　alone。　But；　as　there　has　thus　been

proved　the　existence　of　a　faculty　which　can　of　itself　originate　a

series　in　time…　although　we　are　unable　to　explain　how　it　can　exist…　we

feel　ourselves　authorized　to　admit；　even　in　the　midst　of　the　natural

course　of　events；　a　beginning；　as　regards　causality；　of　different

successions　of　phenomena；　and　at　the　same　time　to　attribute　to　all

substances　a　faculty　of　free　action。　But　we　ought　in　this　case　not

to　allow　ourselves　to　fall　into　a　common　misunderstanding；　and　to

suppose　that；　because　a　successive　series　in　the　world　can　only　have　a

comparatively　first　beginning…　another　state　or　condition　of　things

always　preceding…　an　absolutely　first　beginning　of　a　series　in　the

course　of　nature　is　impossible。　For　we　are　not　speaking　here　of　an

absolutely　first　beginning　in　relation　to　time；　but　as　regards

causality　alone。　When；　for　example；　I；　completely　of　my　own　free　will；

and　independently　of　the　necessarily　determinative　influence　of

natural　causes；　rise　from　my　chair；　there　commences　with　this　event；

including　its　material　consequences　in　infinitum；　an　absolutely　new

series；　although；　in　relation　to　time；　this　event　is　merely　the

continuation　of　a　preceding　series。　For　this　resolution　and　act　of

mine　do　not　form　part　of　the　succession　of　effects　in　nature；　and

are　not　mere　continuations　of　it；　on　the　contrary；　the　determining

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