the critique of pure reason-第81章

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merely　the　relation　to　the　self…consciousness　of　the　subject；　as　the

form　of　thought。　In　the　former　premiss　we　speak　of　things　which　cannot

be　cogitated　otherwise　than　as　subjects。　In　the　second；　we　do　not

speak　of　things；　but　of　thought　all　objects　being　abstracted）；　in

which　the　Ego　is　always　the　subject　of　consciousness。　Hence　the

conclusion　cannot　be；　〃I　cannot　exist　otherwise　than　as　subject〃；

but　only　〃I　can；　in　cogitating　my　existence；　employ　my　Ego　only　as　the

subject　of　the　judgement。〃　But　this　is　an　identical　proposition；　and

throws　no　light　on　the　mode　of　my　existence。



　　That　this　famous　argument　is　a　mere　paralogism；　will　be　plain　to　any

one　who　will　consider　the　general　remark　which　precedes　our　exposition

of　the　principles　of　the　pure　understanding；　and　the　section　on

noumena。　For　it　was　there　proved　that　the　conception　of　a　thing；　which

can　exist　per　se…　only　as　a　subject　and　never　as　a　predicate；

possesses　no　objective　reality；　that　is　to　say；　we　can　never　know

whether　there　exists　any　object　to　correspond　to　the　conception；

consequently；　the　conception　is　nothing　more　than　a　conception；　and

from　it　we　derive　no　proper　knowledge。　If　this　conception　is　to

indicate　by　the　term　substance；　an　object　that　can　be　given；　if　it

is　to　become　a　cognition；　we　must　have　at　the　foundation　of　the

cognition　a　permanent　intuition；　as　the　indispensable　condition　of　its

objective　reality。　For　through　intuition　alone　can　an　object　be　given。

But　in　internal　intuition　there　is　nothing　permanent；　for　the　Ego　is

but　the　consciousness　of　my　thought。　If　then；　we　appeal　merely　to

thought；　we　cannot　discover　the　necessary　condition　of　the　application

of　the　conception　of　substance…　that　is；　of　a　subject　existing　per　se…

to　the　subject　as　a　thinking　being。　And　thus　the　conception　of　the

simple　nature　of　substance；　which　is　connected　with　the　objective

reality　of　this　conception；　is　shown　to　be　also　invalid；　and　to　be；　in

fact；　nothing　more　than　the　logical　qualitative　unity　of

self…consciousness　in　thought；　whilst　we　remain　perfectly　ignorant

whether　the　subject　is　composite　or　not。



　　　　　　　Refutation　of　the　Argument　of　Mendelssohn　for　the

　　　　　　　　　　Substantiality　or　Permanence　of　the　Soul。



　　This　acute　philosopher　easily　perceived　the　insufficiency　of　the

common　argument　which　attempts　to　prove　that　the　soul…　it　being

granted　that　it　is　a　simple　being…　cannot　perish　by　dissolution　or

decomposition；　he　saw　it　is　not　impossible　for　it　to　cease　to　be　by

extinction；　or　disappearance。　He　endeavoured　to　prove　in　his　Phaedo；

that　the　soul　cannot　be　annihilated；　by　showing　that　a　simple　being

cannot　cease　to　exist。　Inasmuch　as；　be　said；　a　simple　existence　cannot

diminish；　nor　gradually　lose　portions　of　its　being；　and　thus　be　by

degrees　reduced　to　nothing　（for　it　possesses　no　parts；　and　therefore

no　multiplicity）；　between　the　moment　in　which　it　is；　and　the　moment　in

which　it　is　not；　no　time　can　be　discovered…　which　is　impossible。　But

this　philosopher　did　not　consider　that；　granting　the　soul　to　possess

this　simple　nature；　which　contains　no　parts　external　to　each　other　and

consequently　no　extensive　quantity；　we　cannot　refuse　to　it　any　less

than　to　any　other　being；　intensive　quantity；　that　is；　a　degree　of

reality　in　regard　to　all　its　faculties；　nay；　to　all　that　constitutes

its　existence。　But　this　degree　of　reality　can　become　less　and　less

through　an　infinite　series　of　smaller　degrees。　It　follows；

therefore；　that　this　supposed　substance…　this　thing；　the　permanence　of

which　is　not　assured　in　any　other　way；　may；　if　not　by　decomposition；

by　gradual　loss　（remissio）　of　its　powers　（consequently　by

elanguescence；　if　I　may　employ　this　expression）；　be　changed　into

nothing。　For　consciousness　itself　has　always　a　degree；　which　may　be

lessened。*　Consequently　the　faculty　of　being　conscious　may　be

diminished；　and　so　with　all　other　faculties。　The　permanence　of　the

soul；　therefore；　as　an　object　of　the　internal　sense；　remains

undemonstrated；　nay；　even　indemonstrable。　Its　permanence　in　life　is

evident；　per　se；　inasmuch　as　the　thinking　being　（as　man）　is　to　itself；

at　the　same　time；　an　object　of　the　external　senses。　But　this　does

not　authorize　the　rational　psychologist　to　affirm；　from　mere

conceptions；　its　permanence　beyond　life。*＇2＇



　　*Clearness　is　not；　as　logicians　maintain；　the　consciousness　of　a

representation。　For　a　certain　degree　of　consciousness；　which　may

not；　however；　be　sufficient　for　recollection；　is　to　be　met　with　in

many　dim　representations。　For　without　any　consciousness　at　all；　we

should　not　be　able　to　recognize　any　difference　in　the　obscure

representations　we　connect；　as　we　really　can　do　with　many　conceptions；

such　as　those　of　right　and　justice；　and　those　of　the　musician；　who

strikes　at　once　several　notes　in　improvising　a　piece　of　music。　But　a

representation　is　clear；　in　which　our　consciousness　is　sufficient

for　the　consciousness　of　the　difference　of　this　representation　from

others。　If　we　are　only　conscious　that　there　is　a　difference；　but　are

not　conscious　of　the　difference…　that　is；　what　the　difference　is…

the　representation　must　be　termed　obscure。　There　is；　consequently；

an　infinite　series　of　degrees　of　consciousness　down　to　its　entire

disappearance。

　　*＇2＇　There　are　some　who　think　they　have　done　enough　to　establish　a

new　possibility　in　the　mode　of　the　existence　of　souls；　when　they

have　shown　that　there　is　no　contradiction　in　their　hypotheses　on

this　subject。　Such　are　those　who　affirm　the　possibility　of　thought…　of

which　they　have　no　other　knowledge　than　what　they　derive　from　its

use　in　connecting　empirical　intuitions　presented　in　this　our　human

life…　after　this　life　bas　ceased。　But　it　is　very　easy　to　embarrass

them　by　the　introduction　of　counter…possibilities；　which　rest　upon

quite　as　good　a　foundation。　Such；　for　example；　is　the　possibility　of

the　division　of　a　simple　substance　into　several　substances；　and

conversely；　of　the　coalition　of　several　into　one　simple　substance。

For；　although　divisibility　presupposes　composition；　it　does　not

necessarily　require　a　composition　of　substances；　but　only　of　the

degrees　（of　the　several　faculties）　of　one　and　the　same　substance。

Now　we　can　cogitate　all　the　powers　and　faculties　of　the　soul…　even

that　of　consciousness…　as　diminished　by　one　half；　the　substance

still　remaining。　In　the　same　way　we　can　represent　to　ourselves　without

contradiction；　this　obliterated　half　as　preserved；　not　in　the　soul；

but　without　it；　and　we　can　believe　that；　as　in　this　case　every。

thing　that　is　real　in　the　soul；　and　has　a　degree…　consequently　its

entire　existence…　has　been　halved；　a　particular　substance　would

arise　out　of　the　soul。　For　the　multiplicity；　which　has　been　divided；

formerly　existed；　but　not　as　a　multiplicity　of　substances；　but　of

every　reality　as　the　quantum　of　existence　in　it；　and　the　unity　of

substance　was　merely　a　mode　of　existence；　which　by　this　division　alone

has　been　transformed　into　a　plurality　of　subsistence。　In　the　same

manner　several　simple　substances　might　coalesce　into　one；　without

anything　being　lost　except　the　plurality　of　subsistence；　inasmuch　as

the　one　substance　would　contain　the　degree　of　reality　of　all　the

former　substances。　Perhaps；　indeed；　the　simple　substances；　which

appear　under　the　form　of　matter；　might　（not　indeed　by　a　mechanical

or　chemical　influence　upon　each　other；　but　by　an　unknown　influence；　of

which　the　former　would　be　but　the　phenomenal　appearance）；　by　means

of　such　a　dynamical　division　of　the　parent…souls；　as　intensive

quantities；　produce　other　souls；　while　the　former　repaired　the　loss

thus　sustained　with　new　matter　of　the　same　sort。　I　am　far　from

allowing　any　value　to　such　chimeras；　and　the　principles　of　our

analytic　have　clearly　proved　that　no　other　than　an　empirical　use　of

the　categories…　that　of　substance；　for　example…　is　possible。　But　if

the　rationalist　is　bold　enough　to　construct；　on　the　mere　authority

of　the　faculty　of　thought…　wi