the critique of pure reason-第80章

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discovering　those　properties　which　do　not　belong　to　possible

experience　（such　as　the　quality　of　simplicity）；　nor　could　it　make

any　apodeictic　enunciation　on　the　nature　of　thinking　beings：　it

would　therefore　not　be　a　rational　psychology。

　　Now；　as　the　proposition　〃I　think〃　（in　the　problematical　sense）

contains　the　form　of　every　judgement　in　general　and　is　the　constant

accompaniment　of　all　the　categories；　it　is　manifest　that　conclusions

are　drawn　from　it　only　by　a　transcendental　employment　of　the

understanding。　This　use　of　the　understanding　excludes　all　empirical

elements；　and　we　cannot；　as　has　been　shown　above；　have　any

favourable　conception　beforehand　of　its　procedure。　We　shall

therefore　follow　with　a　critical　eye　this　proposition　through　all

the　predicaments　of　pure　psychology；　but　we　shall；　for　brevity's　sake；

allow　this　examination　to　proceed　in　an　uninterrupted　connection。

　　Before　entering　on　this　task；　however；　the　following　general

remark　may　help　to　quicken　our　attention　to　this　mode　of　argument。

It　is　not　merely　through　my　thinking　that　I　cognize　an　object；　but

only　through　my　determining　a　given　intuition　in　relation　to　the　unity

of　consciousness　in　which　all　thinking　consists。　It　follows　that　I

cognize　myself；　not　through　my　being　conscious　of　myself　as

thinking；　but　only　when　I　am　conscious　of　the　intuition　of　myself　as

determined　in　relation　to　the　function　of　thought。　All　the　modi　of

self…consciousness　in　thought　are　hence　not　conceptions　of　objects

（conceptions　of　the　understanding…　categories）；　they　are　mere

logical　functions；　which　do　not　present　to　thought　an　object　to　be

cognized；　and　cannot　therefore　present　my　Self　as　an　object。　Not　the

consciousness　of　the　determining；　but　only　that　of　the　determinable

self；　that　is；　of　my　internal　intuition　（in　so　far　as　the　manifold

contained　in　it　can　be　connected　conformably　with　the　general

condition　of　the　unity　of　apperception　in　thought）；　is　the　object。

　　1。　In　all　judgements　I　am　the　determining　subject　of　that　relation

which　constitutes　a　judgement。　But　that　the　I　which　thinks；　must　be

considered　as　in　thought　always　a　subject；　and　as　a　thing　which　cannot

be　a　predicate　to　thought；　is　an　apodeictic　and　identical　proposition。

But　this　proposition　does　not　signify　that　I；　as　an　object；　am；　for

myself；　a　self…subsistent　being　or　substance。　This　latter　statement…

an　ambitious　one…　requires　to　be　supported　by　data　which　are　not　to　be

discovered　in　thought；　and　are　perhaps　（in　so　far　as　I　consider　the

thinking　self　merely　as　such）　not　to　be　discovered　in　the　thinking

self　at　all。

　　2。　That　the　I　or　Ego　of　apperception；　and　consequently　in　all

thought；　is　singular　or　simple；　an；3　cannot　be　resolved　into　a

plurality　of　subjects；　and　therefore　indicates　a　logically　simple

subject…　this　is　self…evident　from　the　very　conception　of　an　Ego；

and　is　consequently　an　analytical　proposition。　But　this　is　not

tantamount　to　declaring　that　the　thinking　Ego　is　a　simple　substance…

for　this　would　be　a　synthetical　proposition。　The　conception　of

substance　always　relates　to　intuitions；　which　with　me　cannot　be

other　than　sensuous；　and　which　consequently　lie　completely　out　of

the　sphere　of　the　understanding　and　its　thought：　but　to　this　sphere

belongs　the　affirmation　that　the　Ego　is　simple　in　thought。　It　would

indeed　be　surprising；　if　the　conception　of　〃substance；〃　which　in　other

cases　requires　so　much　labour　to　distinguish　from　the　other　elements

presented　by　intuition…　so　much　trouble；　too；　to　discover　whether　it

can　be　simple　（as　in　the　case　of　the　parts　of　matter）…　should　be

presented　immediately　to　me；　as　if　by　revelation；　in　the　poorest

mental　representation　of　all。

　　3。　The　proposition　of　the　identity　of　my　Self　amidst　all　the

manifold　representations　of　which　I　am　conscious；　is　likewise　a

proposition　lying　in　the　conceptions　themselves；　and　is　consequently

analytical。　But　this　identity　of　the　subject；　of　which　I　am

conscious　in　all　its　representations；　does　not　relate　to　or　concern

the　intuition　of　the　subject；　by　which　it　is　given　as　an　object。

This　proposition　cannot　therefore　enounce　the　identity　of　the

person；　by　which　is　understood　the　consciousness　of　the　identity　of

its　own　substance　as　a　thinking　being　in　all　change　and　variation　of

circumstances。　To　prove　this；　we　should　require　not　a　mere　analysis　of

the　proposition；　but　synthetical　judgements　based　upon　a　given

intuition。

　　4。　I　distinguish　my　own　existence；　as　that　of　a　thinking　being；　from

that　of　other　things　external　to　me…　among　which　my　body　also　is

reckoned。　This　is　also　an　analytical　proposition；　for　other　things　are

exactly　those　which　I　think　as　different　or　distinguished　from　myself。

But　whether　this　consciousness　of　myself　is　possible　without　things

external　to　me；　and　whether　therefore　I　can　exist　merely　as　a　thinking

being　（without　being　man）…　cannot　be　known　or　inferred　from　this

proposition。

　　Thus　we　have　gained　nothing　as　regards　the　cognition　of　myself　as

object；　by　the　analysis　of　the　consciousness　of　my　Self　in　thought。

The　logical　exposition　of　thought　in　general　is　mistaken　for　a

metaphysical　determination　of　the　object。

　　Our　Critique　would　be　an　investigation　utterly　superfluous；　if　there

existed　a　possibility　of　proving　a　priori；　that　all　thinking　beings

are　in　themselves　simple　substances；　as　such；　therefore；　possess　the

inseparable　attribute　of　personality；　and　are　conscious　of　their

existence　apart　from　and　unconnected　with　matter。　For　we　should　thus

have　taken　a　step　beyond　the　world　of　sense；　and　have　penetrated

into　the　sphere　of　noumena；　and　in　this　case　the　right　could　not　be

denied　us　of　extending　our　knowledge　in　this　sphere；　of　establishing

ourselves；　and；　under　a　favouring　star；　appropriating　to　ourselves

possessions　in　it。　For　the　proposition：　〃Every　thinking　being；　as

such；　is　simple　substance；〃　is　an　a　priori　synthetical　proposition；

because　in　the　first　place　it　goes　beyond　the　conception　which　is

the　subject　of　it；　and　adds　to　the　mere　notion　of　a　thinking　being　the

mode　of　its　existence；　and　in　the　second　place　annexes　a　predicate

（that　of　simplicity）　to　the　latter　conception…　a　predicate　which　it

could　not　have　discovered　in　the　sphere　of　experience。　It　would　follow

that　a　priori　synthetical　propositions　are　possible　and　legitimate；

not　only；　as　we　have　maintained；　in　relation　to　objects　of　possible

experience；　and　as　principles　of　the　possibility　of　this　experience

itself；　but　are　applicable　to　things　in　themselves…　an　inference　which

makes　an　end　of　the　whole　of　this　Critique；　and　obliges　us　to　fall

back　on　the　old　mode　of　metaphysical　procedure。　But　indeed　the

danger　is　not　so　great；　if　we　look　a　little　closer　into　the　question。

　　There　lurks　in　the　procedure　of　rational　Psychology　a　paralogism；

which　is　represented　in　the　following　syllogism：

　　That　which　cannot　be　cogitated　otherwise　than　as　subject；　does　not

exist　otherwise　than　as　subject；　and　is　therefore　substance。

　　A　thinking　being；　considered　merely　as　such；　cannot　be　cogitated

otherwise　than　as　subject。

　　Therefore　it　exists　also　as　such；　that　is；　as　substance。

　　In　the　major　we　speak　of　a　being　that　can　be　cogitated　generally　and

in　every　relation；　consequently　as　it　may　be　given　in　intuition。　But

in　the　minor　we　speak　of　the　same　being　only　in　so　far　as　it　regards

itself　as　subject；　relatively　to　thought　and　the　unity　of

consciousness；　but　not　in　relation　to　intuition；　by　which　it　is

presented　as　an　object　to　thought。　Thus　the　conclusion　is　here　arrived

at　by　a　Sophisma　figurae　dictionis。*



　　*Thought　is　taken　in　the　two　premisses　in　two　totally　different

senses。　In　the　major　it　is　considered　as　relating　and　applying　to

objects　in　general；　consequently　to　objects　of　intuition　also。　In

the　minor；　we　understand　it　as　relating　merely　to

self…consciousness。　In　this　sense；　we　do　not　cogitate　an　object；　but

merely　the　relation　to　the　self…consciousness　of　the　su