the critique of pure reason-第8章

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once　the　method　of　Wolf；　and　of　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　can

have　no　other　aim　but　to　shake　off　the　fetters　of　science；　to　change

labour　into　sport；　certainty　into　opinion；　and　philosophy　into

philodoxy。

　　In　this　second　edition；　I　have　endeavoured；　as　far　as　possible；　to

remove　the　difficulties　and　obscurity　which；　without　fault　of　mine

perhaps；　have　given　rise　to　many　misconceptions　even　among　acute

thinkers。　In　the　propositions　themselves；　and　in　the　demonstrations　by

which　they　are　supported；　as　well　as　in　the　form　and　the　entire　plan

of　the　work；　I　have　found　nothing　to　alter；　which　must　be　attributed

partly　to　the　long　examination　to　which　I　had　subjected　the　whole

before　offering　it　to　the　public　and　partly　to　the　nature　of　the　case。

For　pure　speculative　reason　is　an　organic　structure　in　which　there

is　nothing　isolated　or　independent；　but　every　Single　part　is　essential

to　all　the　rest；　and　hence；　the　slightest　imperfection；　whether　defect

or　positive　error；　could　not　fail　to　betray　itself　in　use。　I

venture；　further；　to　hope；　that　this　system　will　maintain　the　same

unalterable　character　for　the　future。　I　am　led　to　entertain　this

confidence；　not　by　vanity；　but　by　the　evidence　which　the　equality　of

the　result　affords；　when　we　proceed；　first；　from　the　simplest　elements

up　to　the　complete　whole　of　pure　reason　and；　and　then；　backwards

from　the　whole　to　each　part。　We　find　that　the　attempt　to　make　the

slightest　alteration；　in　any　part；　leads　inevitably　to　contradictions；

not　merely　in　this　system；　but　in　human　reason　itself。　At　the　same

time；　there　is　still　much　room　for　improvement　in　the　exposition　of

the　doctrines　contained　in　this　work。　In　the　present　edition；　I　have

endeavoured　to　remove　misapprehensions　of　the　aesthetical　part；

especially　with　regard　to　the　conception　of　time；　to　clear　away　the

obscurity　which　has　been　found　in　the　deduction　of　the　conceptions

of　the　understanding；　to　supply　the　supposed　want　of　sufficient

evidence　in　the　demonstration　of　the　principles　of　the　pure

understanding；　and；　lastly；　to　obviate　the　misunderstanding　of　the

paralogisms　which　immediately　precede　the　rational　psychology。

Beyond　this　point…　the　end　of　the　second　main　division　of　the

〃Transcendental　Dialectic〃…　I　have　not　extended　my　alterations；*

partly　from　want　of　time；　and　partly　because　I　am　not　aware　that　any

portion　of　the　remainder　has　given　rise　to　misconceptions　among

intelligent　and　impartial　critics；　whom　I　do　not　here　mention　with

that　praise　which　is　their　due；　but　who　will　find　that　their

suggestions　have　been　attended　to　in　the　work　itself。



　　*The　only　addition；　properly　so　called…　and　that　only　in　the

method　of　proof…　which　I　have　made　in　the　present　edition；　consists　of

a　new　refutation　of　psychological　idealism；　and　a　strict

demonstration…　the　only　one　possible；　as　I　believe…　of　the　objective

reality　of　external　intuition。　However　harmless　idealism　may　be

considered…　although　in　reality　it　is　not　so…　in　regard　to　the

essential　ends　of　metaphysics；　it　must　still　remain　a　scandal　to

philosophy　and　to　the　general　human　reason　to　be　obliged　to　assume；　as

an　article　of　mere　belief；　the　existence　of　things　external　to

ourselves　（from　which；　yet；　we　derive　the　whole　material　of

cognition　for　the　internal　sense）；　and　not　to　be　able　to　oppose　a

satisfactory　proof　to　any　one　who　may　call　it　in　question。　As　there　is

some　obscurity　of　expression　in　the　demonstration　as　it　stands　in

the　text；　I　propose　to　alter　the　passage　in　question　as　follows：

〃But　this　permanent　cannot　be　an　intuition　in　me。　For　all　the

determining　grounds　of　my　existence　which　can　be　found　in　me　are

representations　and；　as　such；　do　themselves　require　a　permanent；

distinct　from　them；　which　may　determine　my　existence　in　relation　to

their　changes；　that　is；　my　existence　in　time；　wherein　they　change。〃　It

may；　probably；　be　urged　in　opposition　to　this　proof　that；　after　all；　I

am　only　conscious　immediately　of　that　which　is　in　me；　that　is；　of　my

representation　of　external　things；　and　that；　consequently；　it　must

always　remain　uncertain　whether　anything　corresponding　to　this

representation　does　or　does　not　exist　externally　to　me。　But　I　am

conscious；　through　internal　experience；　of　my　existence　in　time

（consequently；　also；　of　the　determinability　of　the　former　in　the

latter）；　and　that　is　more　than　the　simple　consciousness　of　my

representation。　It　is；　in　fact；　the　same　as　the　empirical

consciousness　of　my　existence；　which　can　only　be　determined　in

relation　to　something；　which；　while　connected　with　my　existence；　is

external　to　me。　This　consciousness　of　my　existence　in　time　is；

therefore；　identical　with　the　consciousness　of　a　relation　to　something

external　to　me；　and　it　is；　therefore；　experience；　not　fiction；

sense；　not　imagination；　which　inseparably　connects　the　external　with

my　internal　sense。　For　the　external　sense　is；　in　itself；　the

relation　of　intuition　to　something　real；　external　to　me；　and　the

reality　of　this　something；　as　opposed　to　the　mere　imagination　of　it；

rests　solely　on　its　inseparable　connection　with　internal　experience　as

the　condition　of　its　possibility。　If　with　the　intellectual

consciousness　of　my　existence；　in　the　representation：　I　am；　which

accompanies　all　my　judgements；　and　all　the　operations　of　my

understanding；　I　could；　at　the　same　time；　connect　a　determination　of

my　existence　by　intellectual　intuition；　then　the　consciousness　of　a

relation　to　something　external　to　me　would　not　be　necessary。　But　the

internal　intuition　in　which　alone　my　existence　can　be　determined；

though　preceded　by　that　purely　intellectual　consciousness；　is　itself

sensible　and　attached　to　the　condition　of　time。　Hence　this

determination　of　my　existence；　and　consequently　my　internal　experience

itself；　must　depend　on　something　permanent　which　is　not　in　me；　which

can　be；　therefore；　only　in　something　external　to　me；　to　which　I　must

look　upon　myself　as　being　related。　Thus　the　reality　of　the　external

sense　is　necessarily　connected　with　that　of　the　internal；　in　order

to　the　possibility　of　experience　in　general；　that　is；　I　am　just　as

certainly　conscious　that　there　are　things　external　to　me　related　to　my

sense　as　I　am　that　I　myself　exist　as　determined　in　time。　But　in

order　to　ascertain　to　what　given　intuitions　objects；　external　me；

really　correspond；　in　other　words；　what　intuitions　belong　to　the

external　sense　and　not　to　imagination；　I　must　have　recourse；　in

every　particular　case；　to　those　rules　according　to　which　experience　in

general　（even　internal　experience）　is　distinguished　from

imagination；　and　which　are　always　based　on　the　proposition　that

there　really　is　an　external　experience。　We　may　add　the　remark　that　the

representation　of　something　permanent　in　existence；　is　not　the　same

thing　as　the　permanent　representation；　for　a　representation　may　be

very　variable　and　changing…　as　all　our　representations；　even　that　of

matter；　are…　and　yet　refer　to　something　permanent；　which　must；

therefore；　be　distinct　from　all　my　representations　and　external　to　me；

the　existence　of　which　is　necessarily　included　in　the　determination　of

my　own　existence；　and　with　it　constitutes　one　experience…　an

experience　which　would　not　even　be　possible　internally；　if　it　were　not

also　at　the　same　time；　in　part；　external。　To　the　question　How？　we

are　no　more　able　to　reply；　than　we　are；　in　general；　to　think　the

stationary　in　time；　the　coexistence　of　which　with　the　variable；

produces　the　conception　of　change。



　　In　attempting　to　render　the　exposition　of　my　views　as　intelligible

as　possible；　I　have　been　compelled　to　leave　out　or　abridge　various

passages　which　were　not　essential　to　the　completeness　of　the　work；　but

which　many　readers　might　consider　useful　in　other　respects；　and

might　be　unwilling　to　miss。　This　trifling　loss；　which　could　not　be

avoided　without　swelling　the　book　beyond　due　limits；　may　be

supplied；　at　the　pleasure　of　the　reader；　by　a　comparison　with　the

first