the critique of pure reason-第71章
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from a want of due attention to logical rules。 So soon as the
attention is awakened to the case before us; this illusion totally
disappears。 Transcendental illusion; on the contrary; does not cease
to exist; even after it has been exposed; and its nothingness
clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism。 Take; for
example; the illusion in the proposition: 〃The world must have a
beginning in time。〃 The cause of this is as follows。 In our reason;
subjectively considered as a faculty of human cognition; there exist
fundamental rules and maxims of its exercise; which have completely
the appearance of objective principles。 Now from this cause it happens
that the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our
conceptions; is regarded as an objective necessity of the
determination of things in themselves。 This illusion it is
impossible to avoid; just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea
appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore;
because we see the former by means of higher rays than the latter; or;
which is a still stronger case; as even the astronomer cannot
prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some
time afterwards; although he is not deceived by this illusion。
Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing
the illusory appearance in transcendental judgements; and guarding
us against it; but to make it; as in the case of logical illusion;
entirely disappear and cease to be illusion is utterly beyond its
power。 For we have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion;
which rests upon subjective principles and imposes these upon us as
objective; while logical dialectic; in the detection of sophisms;
has to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the
propositions; or with an artificially constructed illusion; in
imitation of the natural error。 There is; therefore; a natural and
unavoidable dialectic of pure reason… not that in which the bungler;
from want of the requisite knowledge; involves himself; nor that which
the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading; but that which is
an inseparable adjunct of human reason; and which; even after its
illusions have been exposed; does not cease to deceive; and
continually to lead reason into momentary errors; which it becomes
necessary continually to remove。
II。 Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory
Appearance。
A。 OF REASON IN GENERAL。
All our knowledge begins with sense; proceeds thence to
understanding; and ends with reason; beyond which nothing higher can
be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of
intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought。 At this
stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this; the
highest faculty of cognition; and I confess I find myself here in some
difficulty。 Of reason; as of the understanding; there is a merely
formal; that is; logical use; in which it makes abstraction of all
content of cognition; but there is also a real use; inasmuch as it
contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles;
which it does not borrow either from the senses or the
understanding。 The former faculty has been long defined by logicians
as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immediate
conclusions (consequentiae immediatae); but the nature of the
latter; which itself generates conceptions; is not to be understood
from this definition。 Now as a division of reason into a logical and a
transcendental faculty presents itself here; it becomes necessary to
seek for a higher conception of this source of cognition which shall
comprehend both conceptions。 In this we may expect; according to the
analogy of the conceptions of the understanding; that the logical
conception will give us the key to the transcendental; and that the
table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue
to the conceptions of reason。
In the former part of our transcendental logic; we defined the
understanding to be the faculty of rules; reason may be
distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles。
The term principle is ambiguous; and commonly signifies merely a
cognition that may be employed as a principle; although it is not in
itself; and as regards its proper origin; entitled to the distinction。
Every general proposition; even if derived from experience by the
process of induction; may serve as the major in a syllogism; but it is
not for that reason a principle。 Mathematical axioms (for example;
there can be only one straight line between two points) are general
a priori cognitions; and are therefore rightly denominated principles;
relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them。 But I cannot
for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line
from principles… I cognize it only in pure intuition。
Cognition from principles; then; is that cognition in which I
cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions。 Thus
every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a
principle。 For the major always gives a conception; through which
everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized
according to a principle。 Now as every general cognition may serve
as the major in a syllogism; and the understanding presents us with
such general a priori propositions; they may be termed principles;
in respect of their possible use。
But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in
relation to their origin; we shall find them to be anything rather
than cognitions from conceptions。 For they would not even be
possible a priori; if we could not rely on the assistance of pure
intuition (in mathematics); or on that of the conditions of a possible
experience。 That everything that happens has a cause; cannot be
concluded from the general conception of that which happens; on the
contrary the principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of
obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception。
Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot
supply; and they alone are entitled to be called principles。 At the
same time; all general propositions may be termed comparative
principles。
It has been a long…cherished wish… that (who knows how late); may
one day; be happily accomplished… that the principles of the endless
variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed; for in
this way alone can we find the secret of simplifying legislation。
But in this case; laws are nothing more than limitations of our
freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony
with itself; they consequently have for their object that which is
completely our own work; and of which we ourselves may be the cause by
means of these conceptions。 But how objects as things in themselves…
how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be
determined。 according to conceptions; is a question which it seems
well nigh impossible to answer。 Be this; however; as it may… for on
this point our investigation is yet to be made… it is at least
manifest from what we have said that cognition from principles is
something very different from cognition by means of the understanding;
which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a
principle; but in itself… in so far as it is synthetical… is neither
based upon mere thought; nor contains a general proposition drawn from
conceptions alone shall comprehend
The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of
phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the
production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under
principles。 Reason; therefore; never applies directly to experience;
or to any sensuous object; its object is; on the contrary; the
understanding; to the manifold cognition of which it gi