the critique of pure reason-第58章

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of　ourselves；　it　does　not　follow　that　every　intuitive　representation

of　external　things　involves　the　existence　of　these　things；　for　their

representations　may　very　well　be　the　mere　products　of　the

imagination　（in　dreams　as　well　as　in　madness）；　though；　indeed；　these

are　themselves　created　by　the　reproduction　of　previous　external

perceptions；　which；　as　has　been　shown；　are　possible　only　through　the

reality　of　external　objects。　The　sole　aim　of　our　remarks　has；　however；

been　to　prove　that　internal　experience　in　general　is　possible　only

through　external　experience　in　general。　Whether　this　or　that

supposed　experience　be　purely　imaginary　must　be　discovered　from　its

particular　determinations　and　by　comparing　these　with　the　criteria

of　all　real　experience。



　　Finally；　as　regards　the　third　postulate；　it　applies　to　material

necessity　in　existence；　and　not　to　merely　formal　and　logical　necessity

in　the　connection　of　conceptions。　Now　as　we　cannot　cognize

completely　a　priori　the　existence　of　any　object　of　sense；　though　we

can　do　so　comparatively　a　priori；　that　is；　relatively　to　some　other

previously　given　existence…　a　cognition；　however；　which　can　only　be　of

such　an　existence　as　must　be　contained　in　the　complex　of　experience；

of　which　the　previously　given　perception　is　a　part…　the　necessity　of

existence　can　never　be　cognized　from　conceptions；　but　always；　on　the

contrary；　from　its　connection　with　that　which　is　an　object　of

perception。　But　the　only　existence　cognized；　under　the　condition　of

other　given　phenomena；　as　necessary；　is　the　existence　of　effects

from　given　causes　in　conformity　with　the　laws　of　causality。　It　is

consequently　not　the　necessity　of　the　existence　of　things　（as

substances）；　but　the　necessity　of　the　state　of　things　that　we　cognize；

and　that　not　immediately；　but　by　means　of　the　existence　of　other

states　given　in　perception；　according　to　empirical　laws　of

causality。　Hence　it　follows　that　the　criterion　of　necessity　is　to　be

found　only　in　the　law　of　possible　experience…　that　everything　which

happens　is　determined　a　priori　in　the　phenomenon　by　its　cause。　Thus　we

cognize　only　the　necessity　of　effects　in　nature；　the　causes　of　which

are　given　us。　Moreover；　the　criterion　of　necessity　in　existence

possesses　no　application　beyond　the　field　of　possible　experience；

and　even　in　this　it　is　not　valid　of　the　existence　of　things　as

substances；　because　these　can　never　be　considered　as　empirical

effects；　or　as　something　that　happens　and　has　a　beginning。

Necessity；　therefore；　regards　only　the　relations　of　phenomena

according　to　the　dynamical　law　of　causality；　and　the　possibility

grounded　thereon；　of　reasoning　from　some　given　existence　（of　a

cause）　a　priori　to　another　existence　（of　an　effect）。　〃Everything

that　happens　is　hypothetically　necessary；〃　is　a　principle　which

subjects　the　changes　that　take　place　in　the　world　to　a　law；　that　is；

to　a　rule　of　necessary　existence；　without　which　nature　herself　could

not　possibly　exist。　Hence　the　proposition；　〃Nothing　happens　by　blind

chance　（in　mundo　non　datur　casus）；〃　is　an　a　priori　law　of　nature。

The　case　is　the　same　with　the　proposition；　〃Necessity　in　nature　is　not

blind；〃　that　is；　it　is　conditioned；　consequently　intelligible

necessity　（non　datur　fatum）。　Both　laws　subject　the　play　of　change　to

〃a　nature　of　things　（as　phenomena）；〃　or；　which　is　the　same　thing；　to

the　unity　of　the　understanding；　and　through　the　understanding　alone

can　changes　belong　to　an　experience；　as　the　synthetical　unity　of

phenomena。　Both　belong　to　the　class　of　dynamical　principles。　The

former　is　properly　a　consequence　of　the　principle　of　causality…　one　of

the　analogies　of　experience。　The　latter　belongs　to　the　principles　of

modality；　which　to　the　determination　of　causality　adds　the

conception　of　necessity；　which　is　itself；　however；　subject　to　a　rule

of　the　understanding。　The　principle　of　continuity　forbids　any　leap

in　the　series　of　phenomena　regarded　as　changes　（in　mundo　non　datur

saltus）；　and　likewise；　in　the　complex　of　all　empirical　intuitions　in

space；　any　break　or　hiatus　between　two　phenomena　（non　datur　hiatus）…

for　we　can　so　express　the　principle；　that　experience　can　admit　nothing

which　proves　the　existence　of　a　vacuum；　or　which　even　admits　it　as　a

part　of　an　empirical　synthesis。　For；　as　regards　a　vacuum　or　void；

which　we　may　cogitate　as　out　and　beyond　the　field　of　possible

experience　（the　world）；　such　a　question　cannot　come　before　the

tribunal　of　mere　understanding；　which　decides　only　upon　questions　that

concern　the　employment　of　given　phenomena　for　the　construction　of

empirical　cognition。　It　is　rather　a　problem　for　ideal　reason；　which

passes　beyond　the　sphere　of　a　possible　experience　and　aims　at

forming　a　judgement　of　that　which　surrounds　and　circumscribes　it；

and　the　proper　place　for　the　consideration　of　it　is　the　transcendental

dialectic。　These　four　propositions；　〃In　mundo　non　datur　hiatus；　non

datur　saltus；　non　datur　casus；　non　datur　fatum；〃　as　well　as　all

principles　of　transcendental　origin；　we　could　very　easily　exhibit　in

their　proper　order；　that　is；　in　conformity　with　the　order　of　the

categories；　and　assign　to　each　its　proper　place。　But　the　already

practised　reader　will　do　this　for　himself；　or　discover　the　clue　to

such　an　arrangement。　But　the　combined　result　of　all　is　simply　this；　to

admit　into　the　empirical　synthesis　nothing　which　might　cause　a　break

in　or　be　foreign　to　the　understanding　and　the　continuous　connection　of

all　phenomena；　that　is；　the　unity　of　the　conceptions　of　the

understanding。　For　in　the　understanding　alone　is　the　unity　of

experience；　in　which　all　perceptions　must　have　their　assigned　place；

possible。

　　Whether　the　field　of　possibility　be　greater　than　that　of　reality；

and　whether　the　field　of　the　latter　be　itself　greater　than　that　of

necessity；　are　interesting　enough　questions；　and　quite　capable　of

synthetic　solution；　questions；　however；　which　come　under　the

jurisdiction　of　reason　alone。　For　they　are　tantamount　to　asking

whether　all　things　as　phenomena　do　without　exception　belong　to　the

complex　and　connected　whole　of　a　single　experience；　of　which　every

given　perception　is　a　part　which　therefore　cannot　be　conjoined　with

any　other　phenomena…　or；　whether　my　perceptions　can　belong　to　more

than　one　possible　experience？　The　understanding　gives　to　experience；

according　to　the　subjective　and　formal　conditions；　of　sensibility　as

well　as　of　apperception；　the　rules　which　alone　make　this　experience

possible。　Other　forms　of　intuition　besides　those　of　space　and　time；

other　forms　of　understanding　besides　the　discursive　forms　of

thought；　or　of　cognition　by　means　of　conceptions；　we　can　neither

imagine　nor　make　intelligible　to　ourselves；　and　even　if　we　could；　they

would　still　not　belong　to　experience；　which　is　the　only　mode　of

cognition　by　which　objects　are　presented　to　us。　Whether　other

perceptions　besides　those　which　belong　to　the　total　of　our　possible

experience；　and　consequently　whether　some　other　sphere　of　matter

exists；　the　understanding　has　no　power　to　decide；　its　proper

occupation　being　with　the　synthesis　of　that　which　is　given。

Moreover；　the　poverty　of　the　usual　arguments　which　go　to　prove　the

existence　of　a　vast　sphere　of　possibility；　of　which　all　that　is　real

（every　object　of　experience）　is　but　a　small　part；　is　very

remarkable。　〃All　real　is　possible〃；　from　this　follows　naturally；

according　to　the　logical　laws　of　conversion；　the　particular

proposition：　〃Some　possible　is　real。〃　Now　this　seems　to　be

equivalent　to：　〃Much　is　possible　that　is　not　real。〃　No　doubt　it　does

seem　as　if　we　ought　to　consider　the　sum　of　the　possible　to　be

greater　than　that　of　the　real；　from　the　fact　that　something　must　be

added　to　the　former　to　constitute　the　latter。　But　this　notion　of

adding　to　the　possible　is　absurd。　For　that　which　is　not　in　the　sum

of　the　possible；　and　consequently　requires　to　be　added　to　it；　is

manifestly　impossible。　In　addition　to　accordance　with　the　formal

conditions　of　ex