the critique of pure reason-第31章

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the　understanding　itself　might；　perhaps；　by　means　of　these

conceptions；　be　the　author　of　the　experience　in　which　its　objects　were

presented　to　it…　he　was　forced　to　drive　these　conceptions　from

experience；　that　is；　from　a　subjective　necessity　arising　from　repeated

association　of　experiences　erroneously　considered　to　be　objective…

in　one　word；　from　habit。　But　he　proceeded　with　perfect　consequence　and

declared　it　to　be　impossible；　with　such　conceptions　and　the　principles

arising　from　them；　to　overstep　the　limits　of　experience。　The　empirical

derivation；　however；　which　both　of　these　philosophers　attributed　to

these　conceptions；　cannot　possibly　be　reconciled　with　the　fact　that　we

do　possess　scientific　a　priori　cognitions；　namely；　those　of　pure

mathematics　and　general　physics。

　　The　former　of　these　two　celebrated　men　opened　a　wide　door　to

extravagance…　（for　if　reason　has　once　undoubted　right　on　its　side；

it　will　not　allow　itself　to　be　confined　to　set　limits；　by　vague

recommendations　of　moderation）；　the　latter　gave　himself　up　entirely　to

scepticism…　a　natural　consequence；　after　having　discovered；　as　he

thought；　that　the　faculty　of　cognition　was　not　trustworthy。　We　now

intend　to　make　a　trial　whether　it　be　not　possible　safely　to　conduct

reason　between　these　two　rocks；　to　assign　her　determinate　limits；

and　yet　leave　open　for　her　the　entire　sphere　of　her　legitimate

activity。

　　I　shall　merely　premise　an　explanation　of　what　the　categories　are。

They　are　conceptions　of　an　object　in　general；　by　means　of　which　its

intuition　is　contemplated　as　determined　in　relation　to　one　of　the

logical　functions　of　judgement。　The　following　will　make　this　plain。

The　function　of　the　categorical　judgement　is　that　of　the　relation　of

subject　to　predicate；　for　example；　in　the　proposition：　〃All　bodies　are

divisible。〃　But　in　regard　to　the　merely　logical　use　of　the

understanding；　it　still　remains　undetermined　to　which　Of　these　two

conceptions　belongs　the　function　Of　subject　and　to　which　that　of

predicate。　For　we　could　also　say：　〃Some　divisible　is　a　body。〃　But

the　category　of　substance；　when　the　conception　of　a　body　is　brought

under　it；　determines　that；　and　its　empirical　intuition　in　experience

must　be　contemplated　always　as　subject　and　never　as　mere　predicate。

And　so　with　all　the　other　categories。



　　SECTION　II　Transcendental　Deduction　of　the　pure　Conceptions　of

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　the　Understanding。　SS　11



　　Of　the　Possibility　of　a　Conjunction　of　the　manifold　representations

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　given　by　Sense。



　　The　manifold　content　in　our　representations　can　be　given　in　an

intuition　which　is　merely　sensuous…　in　other　words；　is　nothing　but

susceptibility；　and　the　form　of　this　intuition　can　exist　a　priori　in

our　faculty　of　representation；　without　being　anything　else　but　the

mode　in　which　the　subject　is　affected。　But　the　conjunction

（conjunctio）　of　a　manifold　in　intuition　never　can　be　given　us　by　the

senses；　it　cannot　therefore　be　contained　in　the　pure　form　of

sensuous　intuition；　for　it　is　a　spontaneous　act　of　the　faculty　of

representation。　And　as　we　must；　to　distinguish　it　from　sensibility；

entitle　this　faculty　understanding；　so　all　conjunction　whether

conscious　or　unconscious；　be　it　of　the　manifold　in　intuition；　sensuous

or　non…sensuous；　or　of　several　conceptions…　is　an　act　of　the

understanding。　To　this　act　we　shall　give　the　general　appellation　of

synthesis；　thereby　to　indicate；　at　the　same　time；　that　we　cannot

represent　anything　as　conjoined　in　the　object　without　having

previously　conjoined　it　ourselves。　Of　all　mental　notions；　that　of

conjunction　is　the　only　one　which　cannot　be　given　through　objects；　but

can　be　originated　only　by　the　subject　itself；　because　it　is　an　act

of　its　purely　spontaneous　activity。　The　reader　will　easily　enough

perceive　that　the　possibility　of　conjunction　must　be　grounded　in　the

very　nature　of　this　act；　and　that　it　must　be　equally　valid　for　all

conjunction；　and　that　analysis；　which　appears　to　be　its　contrary；

must；　nevertheless；　always　presuppose　it；　for　where　the

understanding　has　not　previously　conjoined；　it　cannot　dissect　or

analyse；　because　only　as　conjoined　by　it；　must　that　which　is　to　be

analysed　have　been　given　to　our　faculty　of　representation。

　　But　the　conception　of　conjunction　includes；　besides　the　conception

of　the　manifold　and　of　the　synthesis　of　it；　that　of　the　unity　of　it

also。　Conjunction　is　the　representation　of　the　synthetical　unity　of

the　manifold。*　This　idea　of　unity；　therefore；　cannot　arise　out　of　that

of　conjunction；　much　rather　does　that　idea；　by　combining　itself　with

the　representation　of　the　manifold；　render　the　conception　of

conjunction　possible。　This　unity；　which　a　priori　precedes　all

conceptions　of　conjunction；　is　not　the　category　of　unity　（SS　6）；　for

all　the　categories　are　based　upon　logical　functions　of　judgement；

and　in　these　functions　we　already　have　conjunction；　and　consequently

unity　of　given　conceptions。　It　is　therefore　evident　that　the

category　of　unity　presupposes　conjunction。　We　must　therefore　look

still　higher　for　this　unity　（as　qualitative；　SS　8）；　in　that；　namely；

which　contains　the　ground　of　the　unity　of　diverse　conceptions　in

judgements；　the　ground；　consequently；　of　the　possibility　of　the

existence　of　the　understanding；　even　in　regard　to　its　logical　use。



　　*Whether　the　representations　are　in　themselves　identical；　and

consequently　whether　one　can　be　thought　analytically　by　means　of　and

through　the　other；　is　a　question　which　we　need　not　at　present

consider。　Our　Consciousness　of　the　one；　when　we　speak　of　the　manifold；

is　always　distinguishable　from　our　consciousness　of　the　other；　and

it　is　only　respecting　the　synthesis　of　this　（possible）　consciousness

that　we　here　treat。



　　　　Of　the　Originally　Synthetical　Unity　of　Apperception。　SS　12



　　The　〃I　think〃　must　accompany　all　my　representations；　for　otherwise

something　would　be　represented　in　me　which　could　not　be　thought；　in

other　words；　the　representation　would　either　be　impossible；　or　at

least　be；　in　relation　to　me；　nothing。　That　representation　which　can　be

given　previously　to　all　thought　is　called　intuition。　All　the　diversity

or　manifold　content　of　intuition；　has；　therefore；　a　necessary　relation

to　the　'I　think；〃　in　the　subject　in　which　this　diversity　is　found。　But

this　representation；　〃I　think；〃　is　an　act　of　spontaneity；　that　is　to

say；　it　cannot　be　regarded　as　belonging　to　mere　sensibility。　I　call　it

pure　apperception；　in　order　to　distinguish　it　from　empirical；　or

primitive　apperception；　because　it　is　self…consciousness　which；　whilst

it　gives　birth　to　the　representation〃　I　think；〃　must　necessarily　be

capable　of　accompanying　all　our　representations。　It　is　in　all　acts

of　consciousness　one　and　the　same；　and　unaccompanied　by　it；　no

representation　can　exist　for　me。　The　unity　of　this　apperception　I　call

the　transcendental　unity　of　self…consciousness；　in　order　to　indicate

the　possibility　of　a　priori　cognition　arising　from　it。　For　the

manifold　representations　which　are　given　in　an　intuition　would　not　all

of　them　be　my　representations；　if　they　did　not　all　belong　to　one

self…consciousness；　that　is；　as　my　representations　（even　although　I　am

not　conscious　of　them　as　such）；　they　must　conform　to　the　condition

under　which　alone　they　can　exist　together　in　a　common

self…consciousness；　because　otherwise　they　would　not　all　without

exception　belong　to　me。　From　this　primitive　conjunction　follow　many

important　results。

　　For　example；　this　universal　identity　of　the　apperception　of　the

manifold　given　in　intuition　contains　a　synthesis　of　representations

and　is　possible　only　by　means　of　the　consciousness　of　this

synthesis。　For　the　empirical　consciousness　which　accompanies　different

representations　is　in　itself　fragmentary　and　disunited；　and　without

relation　to　the　identity　of　the　subject。　This　relation；　then；　does　not

exist　because　I　accompany　every　representation　with　consciousness；　but

because　I　join　one　r