the critique of pure reason-第23章

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geometrical　determination　of　space；　a　transcendental　Representation；

but　only　the　knowledge　that　such　a　representation　is　not　of

empirical　origin；　and　the　possibility　of　its　relating　to　objects　of

experience；　although　itself　a　priori；　can　be　called　transcendental。　So

also；　the　application　of　space　to　objects　in　general　would　be

transcendental；　but　if　it　be　limited　to　objects　of　sense　it　is

empirical。　Thus；　the　distinction　of　the　transcendental　and　empirical

belongs　only　to　the　critique　of　cognitions；　and　does　not　concern　the

relation　of　these　to　their　object。

　　Accordingly；　in　the　expectation　that　there　may　perhaps　be

conceptions　which　relate　a　priori　to　objects；　not　as　pure　or

sensuous　intuitions；　but　merely　as　acts　of　pure　thought　（which　are

therefore　conceptions；　but　neither　of　empirical　nor　aesthetical

origin）…　in　this　expectation；　I　say；　we　form　to　ourselves；　by

anticipation；　the　idea　of　a　science　of　pure　understanding　and　rational

cognition；　by　means　of　which　we　may　cogitate　objects　entirely　a

priori。　A　science　of　this　kind；　which　should　determine　the　origin；　the

extent；　and　the　objective　validity　of　such　cognitions；　must　be

called　transcendental　logic；　because　it　has　not；　like　general　logic；

to　do　with　the　laws　of　understanding　and　reason　in　relation　to

empirical　as　well　as　pure　rational　cognitions　without　distinction；　but

concerns　itself　with　these　only　in　an　a　priori　relation　to　objects。



　　III。　Of　the　Division　of　General　Logic　into　Analytic　and　Dialectic。



　　The　old　question　with　which　people　sought　to　push　logicians　into　a

corner；　so　that　they　must　either　have　recourse　to　pitiful　sophisms

or　confess　their　ignorance；　and　consequently　the　vanity　of　their　whole

art；　is　this：　〃What　is　truth？〃　The　definition　of　the　word　truth；　to

wit；　〃the　accordance　of　the　cognition　with　its　object；〃　is　presupposed

in　the　question；　but　we　desire　to　be　told；　in　the　answer　to　it；　what

is　the　universal　and　secure　criterion　of　the　truth　of　every　cognition。

　　To　know　what　questions　we　may　reasonably　propose　is　in　itself　a

strong　evidence　of　sagacity　and　intelligence。　For　if　a　question　be

in　itself　absurd　and　unsusceptible　of　a　rational　answer；　it　is

attended　with　the　danger…　not　to　mention　the　shame　that　falls　upon　the

person　who　proposes　it…　of　seducing　the　unguarded　listener　into　making

absurd　answers；　and　we　are　presented　with　the　ridiculous　spectacle

of　one　（as　the　ancients　said）　〃milking　the　he…goat；　and　the　other

holding　a　sieve。〃

　　If　truth　consists　in　the　accordance　of　a　cognition　with　its

object；　this　object　must　be；　ipso　facto；　distinguished　from　all

others；　for　a　cognition　is　false　if　it　does　not　accord　with　the　object

to　which　it　relates；　although　it　contains　something　which　may　be

affirmed　of　other　objects。　Now　an　universal　criterion　of　truth　would

be　that　which　is　valid　for　all　cognitions；　without　distinction　of

their　objects。　But　it　is　evident　that　since；　in　the　case　of　such　a

criterion；　we　make　abstraction　of　all　the　content　of　a　cognition　（that

is；　of　all　relation　to　its　object）；　and　truth　relates　precisely　to

this　content；　it　must　be　utterly　absurd　to　ask　for　a　mark　of　the　truth

of　this　content　of　cognition；　and　that；　accordingly；　a　sufficient；　and

at　the　same　time　universal；　test　of　truth　cannot　possibly　be　found。　As

we　have　already　termed　the　content　of　a　cognition　its　matter；　we　shall

say：　〃Of　the　truth　of　our　cognitions　in　respect　of　their　matter；　no

universal　test　can　be　demanded；　because　such　a　demand　is

self…contradictory。〃

　　On　the　other　hand；　with　regard　to　our　cognition　in　respect　of　its

mere　form　（excluding　all　content）；　it　is　equally　manifest　that

logic；　in　so　far　as　it　exhibits　the　universal　and　necessary　laws　of

the　understanding；　must　in　these　very　laws　present　us　with　criteria　of

truth。　Whatever　contradicts　these　rules　is　false；　because　thereby

the　understanding　is　made　to　contradict　its　own　universal　laws　of

thought；　that　is；　to　contradict　itself。　These　criteria；　however；　apply

solely　to　the　form　of　truth；　that　is；　of　thought　in　general；　and　in　so

far　they　are　perfectly　accurate；　yet　not　sufficient。　For　although　a

cognition　may　be　perfectly　accurate　as　to　logical　form；　that　is；　not

self…contradictory；　it　is　notwithstanding　quite　possible　that　it　may

not　stand　in　agreement　with　its　object。　Consequently；　the　merely

logical　criterion　of　truth；　namely；　the　accordance　of　a　cognition　with

the　universal　and　formal　laws　of　understanding　and　reason；　is

nothing　more　than　the　conditio　sine　qua　non；　or　negative　condition

of　all　truth。　Farther　than　this　logic　cannot　go；　and　the　error　which

depends　not　on　the　form；　but　on　the　content　of　the　cognition；　it　has

no　test　to　discover。

　　General　logic；　then；　resolves　the　whole　formal　business　of

understanding　and　reason　into　its　elements；　and　exhibits　them　as

principles　of　all　logical　judging　of　our　cognitions。　This　part　of

logic　may；　therefore；　be　called　analytic；　and　is　at　least　the　negative

test　of　truth；　because　all　cognitions　must　first　of　an　be　estimated

and　tried　according　to　these　laws　before　we　proceed　to　investigate

them　in　respect　of　their　content；　in　order　to　discover　whether　they

contain　positive　truth　in　regard　to　their　object。　Because；　however；

the　mere　form　of　a　cognition；　accurately　as　it　may　accord　with　logical

laws；　is　insufficient　to　supply　us　with　material　（objective）　truth；　no

one；　by　means　of　logic　alone；　can　venture　to　predicate　anything　of

or　decide　concerning　objects；　unless　he　has　obtained；　independently　of

logic；　well…grounded　information　about　them；　in　order　afterwards　to

examine；　according　to　logical　laws；　into　the　use　and　connection；　in

a　cohering　whole；　of　that　information；　or；　what　is　still　better；

merely　to　test　it　by　them。　Notwithstanding；　there　lies　so　seductive

a　charm　in　the　possession　of　a　specious　art　like　this…　an　art　which

gives　to　all　our　cognitions　the　form　of　the　understanding；　although

with　respect　to　the　content　thereof　we　may　be　sadly　deficient…　that

general　logic；　which　is　merely　a　canon　of　judgement；　has　been　employed

as　an　organon　for　the　actual　production；　or　rather　for　the　semblance

of　production；　of　objective　assertions；　and　has　thus　been　grossly

misapplied。　Now　general　logic；　in　its　assumed　character　of　organon；　is

called　dialectic。

　　Different　as　are　the　significations　in　which　the　ancients　used

this　term　for　a　science　or　an　art；　we　may　safely　infer；　from　their

actual　employment　of　it；　that　with　them　it　was　nothing　else　than　a

logic　of　illusion…　a　sophistical　art　for　giving　ignorance；　nay；　even

intentional　sophistries；　the　colouring　of　truth；　in　which　the

thoroughness　of　procedure　which　logic　requires　was　imitated；　and　their

topic　employed　to　cloak　the　empty　pretensions。　Now　it　may　be　taken

as　a　safe　and　useful　warning；　that　general　logic；　considered　as　an

organon；　must　always　be　a　logic　of　illusion；　that　is；　be

dialectical；　for；　as　it　teaches　us　nothing　whatever　respecting　the

content　of　our　cognitions；　but　merely　the　formal　conditions　of　their

accordance　with　the　understanding；　which　do　not　relate　to　and　are

quite　indifferent　in　respect　of　objects；　any　attempt　to　employ　it　as

an　instrument　（organon）　in　order　to　extend　and　enlarge　the　range　of

our　knowledge　must　end　in　mere　prating；　any　one　being　able　to　maintain

or　oppose；　with　some　appearance　of　truth；　any　single　assertion

whatever。

　　Such　instruction　is　quite　unbecoming　the　dignity　of　philosophy。

For　these　reasons　we　have　chosen　to　denominate　this　part　of　logic

dialectic；　in　the　sense　of　a　critique　of　dialectical　illusion；　and

we　wish　the　term　to　be　so　understood　in　this　place。



　　IV。　Of　the　Division　of　Transcendental　Logic　into　Transcendental

　　　　　　Analytic　and　Dialectic。



　　In　transcendental　logic　we　isolate　the　understanding　（as　in

transcendental　aesthetic　the　sensibility）　and　select　from　our

cognition　merely　that　part　of　thought　which　has　its　origin　in　the

understanding　alone。　The　exercise　of　this　pu