the critique of pure reason-第20章

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make　its　validity　apparent；　and　also　to　illustrate　what　has　been

said　in　SS　3。

　　Suppose；　then；　that　space　and　time　are　in　themselves　objective；

and　conditions　of　the…　possibility　of　objects　as　things　in　themselves。

In　the　first　place；　it　is　evident　that　both　present　us；　with　very　many

apodeictic　and　synthetic　propositions　a　priori；　but　especially

space…　and　for　this　reason　we　shall　prefer　it　for　investigation　at

present。　As　the　propositions　of　geometry　are　cognized　synthetically

a　priori；　and　with　apodeictic　certainty；　I　inquire：　Whence　do　you

obtain　propositions　of　this　kind；　and　on　what　basis　does　the

understanding　rest；　in　order　to　arrive　at　such　absolutely　necessary

and　universally　valid　truths？

　　There　is　no　other　way　than　through　intuitions　or　conceptions；　as

such；　and　these　are　given　either　a　priori　or　a　posteriori。　The　latter；

namely；　empirical　conceptions；　together　with　the　empirical　intuition

on　which　they　are　founded；　cannot　afford　any　synthetical

proposition；　except　such　as　is　itself　also　empirical；　that　is；　a

proposition　of　experience。　But　an　empirical　proposition　cannot　possess

the　qualities　of　necessity　and　absolute　universality；　which；

nevertheless；　are　the　characteristics　of　all　geometrical　propositions。

As　to　the　first　and　only　means　to　arrive　at　such　cognitions；　namely；

through　mere　conceptions　or　intuitions　a　priori；　it　is　quite　clear

that　from　mere　conceptions　no　synthetical　cognitions；　but　only

analytical　ones；　can　be　obtained。　Take；　for　example；　the

proposition：　〃Two　straight　lines　cannot　enclose　a　space；　and　with

these　alone　no　figure　is　possible；〃　and　try　to　deduce　it　from　the

conception　of　a　straight　line　and　the　number　two；　or　take　the

proposition：　〃It　is　possible　to　construct　a　figure　with　three　straight

lines；〃　and　endeavour；　in　like　manner；　to　deduce　it　from　the　mere

conception　of　a　straight　line　and　the　number　three。　All　your

endeavours　are　in　vain；　and　you　find　yourself　forced　to　have

recourse　to　intuition；　as；　in　fact；　geometry　always　does。　You

therefore　give　yourself　an　object　in　intuition。　But　of　what　kind　is

this　intuition？　Is　it　a　pure　a　priori；　or　is　it　an　empirical

intuition？　If　the　latter；　then　neither　an　universally　valid；　much　less

an　apodeictic　proposition　can　arise　from　it；　for　experience　never

can　give　us　any　such　proposition。　You　must；　therefore；　give　yourself

an　object　a　priori　in　intuition；　and　upon　that　ground　your　synthetical

proposition。　Now　if　there　did　not　exist　within　you　a　faculty　of

intuition　a　priori；　if　this　subjective　condition　were　not　in　respect

to　its　form　also　the　universal　condition　a　priori　under　which　alone

the　object　of　this　external　intuition　is　itself　possible；　if　the

object　（that　is；　the　triangle）　were　something　in　itself；　without

relation　to　you　the　subject；　how　could　you　affirm　that　that　which　lies

necessarily　in　your　subjective　conditions　in　order　to　construct　a

triangle；　must　also　necessarily　belong　to　the　triangle　in　itself？

For　to　your　conceptions　of　three　lines；　you　could　not　add　anything　new

（that　is；　the　figure）；　which；　therefore；　must　necessarily　be　found

in　the　object；　because　the　object　is　given　before　your　cognition；

and　not　by　means　of　it。　If；　therefore；　space　（and　time　also）　were

not　a　mere　form　of　your　intuition；　which　contains　conditions　a　priori；

under　which　alone　things　can　become　external　objects　for　you；　and

without　which　subjective　conditions　the　objects　are　in　themselves

nothing；　you　could　not　construct　any　synthetical　proposition

whatsoever　regarding　external　objects。　It　is　therefore　not　merely

possible　or　probable；　but　indubitably　certain；　that　space　and　time；　as

the　necessary　conditions　of　all　our　external　and　internal

experience；　are　merely　subjective　conditions　of　all　our　intuitions；　in

relation　to　which　all　objects　are　therefore　mere　phenomena；　and　not

things　in　themselves；　presented　to　us　in　this　particular　manner。　And

for　this　reason；　in　respect　to　the　form　of　phenomena；　much　may　be　said

a　priori；　whilst　of　the　thing　in　itself；　which　may　lie　at　the

foundation　of　these　phenomena；　it　is　impossible　to　say　anything。

　　II。　In　confirmation　of　this　theory　of　the　ideality　of　the　external

as　well　as　internal　sense；　consequently　of　all　objects　of　sense；　as

mere　phenomena；　we　may　especially　remark　that　all　in　our　cognition

that　belongs　to　intuition　contains　nothing　more　than　mere　relations。

（The　feelings　of　pain　and　pleasure；　and　the　will；　which　are　not

cognitions；　are　excepted。）　The　relations；　to　wit；　of　place　in　an

intuition　（extension）；　change　of　place　（motion）；　and　laws　according　to

which　this　change　is　determined　（moving　forces）。　That；　however；

which　is　present　in　this　or　that　place；　or　any　operation　going　on；

or　result　taking　place　in　the　things　themselves；　with　the　exception　of

change　of　place；　is　not　given　to　us　by　intuition。　Now　by　means　of　mere

relations；　a　thing　cannot　be　known　in　itself；　and　it　may　therefore

be　fairly　concluded；　that；　as　through　the　external　sense　nothing　but

mere　representations　of　relations　are　given　us；　the　said　external

sense　in　its　representation　can　contain　only　the　relation　of　the

object　to　the　subject；　but　not　the　essential　nature　of　the　object　as　a

thing　in　itself。

　　The　same　is　the　case　with　the　internal　intuition；　not　only

because；　in　the　internal　intuition；　the　representation　of　the　external

senses　constitutes　the　material　with　which　the　mind　is　occupied；　but

because　time；　in　which　we　place；　and　which　itself　antecedes　the

consciousness　of；　these　representations　in　experience；　and　which；　as

the　formal　condition　of　the　mode　according　to　which　objects　are　placed

in　the　mind；　lies　at　the　foundation　of　them；　contains　relations　of　the

successive；　the　coexistent；　and　of　that　which　always　must　be

coexistent　with　succession；　the　permanent。　Now　that　which；　as

representation；　can　antecede　every　exercise　of　thought　（of　an　object）；

is　intuition；　and　when　it　contains　nothing　but　relations；　it　is　the

form　of　the　intuition；　which；　as　it　presents　us　with　no

representation；　except　in　so　far　as　something　is　placed　in　the　mind；

can　be　nothing　else　than　the　mode　in　which　the　mind　is　affected　by　its

own　activity；　to　wit…　its　presenting　to　itself　representations；

consequently　the　mode　in　which　the　mind　is　affected　by　itself；　that

is；　it　can　be　nothing　but　an　internal　sense　in　respect　to　its　form。

Everything　that　is　represented　through　the　medium　of　sense　is　so　far

phenomenal；　consequently；　we　must　either　refuse　altogether　to　admit　an

internal　sense；　or　the　subject；　which　is　the　object　of　that　sense；

could　only　be　represented　by　it　as　phenomenon；　and　not　as　it　would

judge　of　itself；　if　its　intuition　were　pure　spontaneous　activity；　that

is；　were　intellectual。　The　difficulty　here　lies　wholly　in　the

question：　How　can　the　subject　have　an　internal　intuition　of　itself？

But　this　difficulty　is　common　to　every　theory。　The　consciousness　of

self　（apperception）　is　the　simple　representation　of　the　〃ego〃；　and

if　by　means　of　that　representation　alone；　all　the　manifold

representations　in　the　subject　were　spontaneously　given；　then　our

internal　intuition　would　be　intellectual。　This　consciousness　in　man

requires　an　internal　perception　of　the　manifold　representations

which　are　previously　given　in　the　subject；　and　the　manner　in　which

these　representations　are　given　in　the　mind　without　spontaneity；　must；

on　account　of　this　difference　（the　want　of　spontaneity）；　be　called

sensibility。　If　the　faculty　of　self…consciousness　is　to　apprehend　what

lies　in　the　mind；　it　must　all　act　that　and　can　in　this　way　alone

produce　an　intuition　of　self。　But　the　form　of　this　intuition；　which

lies　in　the　original　constitution　of　the　mind；　determines；　in　the

representation　of　time；　the　manner　in　which　the　manifold

representations　are　to　combine　themselves　in　the　mind；　since　the

subject　intuites　itself；　not　as　it　would　represent　itself

immediately　and　spontaneously；　but　according　to　the　manner　in　which

the　mind　is　in