the critique of pure reason-第2章

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therefore；　if　the　if　the　principle　presented　by　it　prove　to　be

insufficient　for　the　solution　of　even　a　single　one　of　those

questions　to　which　the　very　nature　of　reason　gives　birth；　we　must

reject　it；　as　we　could　not　be　perfectly　certain　of　its　sufficiency

in　the　case　of　the　others。

　　While　I　say　this；　I　think　I　see　upon　the　countenance　of　the　reader

signs　of　dissatisfaction　mingled　with　contempt；　when　he　hears

declarations　which　sound　so　boastful　and　extravagant；　and　yet　they　are

beyond　comparison　more　moderate　than　those　advanced　by　the　commonest

author　of　the　commonest　philosophical　programme；　in　which　the

dogmatist　professes　to　demonstrate　the　simple　nature　of　the　soul；　or

the　necessity　of　a　primal　being。　Such　a　dogmatist　promises　to　extend

human　knowledge　beyond　the　limits　of　possible　experience；　while　I

humbly　confess　that　this　is　completely　beyond　my　power。　Instead　of　any

such　attempt；　I　confine　myself　to　the　examination　of　reason　alone

and　its　pure　thought；　and　I　do　not　need　to　seek　far　for　the

sum…total　of　its　cognition；　because　it　has　its　seat　in　my　own　mind。

Besides；　common　logic　presents　me　with　a　complete　and　systematic

catalogue　of　all　the　simple　operations　of　reason；　and　it　is　my　task　to

answer　the　question　how　far　reason　can　go；　without　the　material

presented　and　the　aid　furnished　by　experience。

　　So　much　for　the　completeness　and　thoroughness　necessary　in　the

execution　of　the　present　task。　The　aims　set　before　us　are　not

arbitrarily　proposed；　but　are　imposed　upon　us　by　the　nature　of

cognition　itself。

　　The　above　remarks　relate　to　the　matter　of　our　critical　inquiry。　As

regards　the　form；　there　are　two　indispensable　conditions；　which　any

one　who　undertakes　so　difficult　a　task　as　that　of　a　critique　of　pure

reason；　is　bound　to　fulfil。　These　conditions　are　certitude　and

clearness。

　　As　regards　certitude；　I　have　fully　convinced　myself　that；　in　this

sphere　of　thought；　opinion　is　perfectly　inadmissible；　and　that

everything　which　bears　the　least　semblance　of　an　hypothesis　must　be

excluded；　as　of　no　value　in　such　discussions。　For　it　is　a　necessary

condition　of　every　cognition　that　is　to　be　established　upon　a　priori

grounds　that　it　shall　be　held　to　be　absolutely　necessary；　much　more　is

this　the　case　with　an　attempt　to　determine　all　pure　a　priori

cognition；　and　to　furnish　the　standard…　and　consequently　an　example…

of　all　apodeictic　（philosophical）　certitude。　Whether　I　have

succeeded　in　what　I　professed　to　do；　it　is　for　the　reader　to

determine；　it　is　the　author's　business　merely　to　adduce　grounds　and

reasons；　without　determining　what　influence　these　ought　to　have　on　the

mind　of　his　judges。　But；　lest　anything　he　may　have　said　may　become　the

innocent　cause　of　doubt　in　their　minds；　or　tend　to　weaken　the　effect

which　his　arguments　might　otherwise　produce…　he　may　be　allowed　to

point　out　those　passages　which　may　occasion　mistrust　or　difficulty；

although　these　do　not　concern　the　main　purpose　of　the　present　work。　He

does　this　solely　with　the　view　of　removing　from　the　mind　of　the　reader

any　doubts　which　might　affect　his　judgement　of　the　work　as　a　whole；

and　in　regard　to　its　ultimate　aim。

　　I　know　no　investigations　more　necessary　for　a　full　insight　into

the　nature　of　the　faculty　which　we　call　understanding；　and　at　the　same

time　for　the　determination　of　the　rules　and　limits　of　its　use；　than

those　undertaken　in　the　second　chapter　of　the　〃Transcendental

Analytic；〃　under　the　title　of　〃Deduction　of　the　Pure　Conceptions　of

the　Understanding〃；　and　they　have　also　cost　me　by　far　the　greatest

labour…　labour　which；　I　hope；　will　not　remain　uncompensated。　The

view　there　taken；　which　goes　somewhat　deeply　into　the　subject；　has　two

sides；　The　one　relates　to　the　objects　of　the　pure　understanding；　and

is　intended　to　demonstrate　and　to　render　comprehensible　the

objective　validity　of　its　a　priori　conceptions；　and　it　forms　for

this　reason　an　essential　part　of　the　Critique。　The　other　considers　the

pure　understanding　itself；　its　possibility　and　its　powers　of

cognition…　that　is；　from　a　subjective　point　of　view；　and；　although

this　exposition　is　of　great　importance；　it　does　not　belong　essentially

to　the　main　purpose　of　the　work；　because　the　grand　question　is　what

and　how　much　can　reason　and　understanding；　apart　from　experience；

cognize；　and　not；　how　is　the　faculty　of　thought　itself　possible？　As

the　latter　is　an；　inquiry　into　the　cause　of　a　given　effect；　and　has

thus　in　it　some　semblance　of　an　hypothesis　（although；　as　I　shall

show　on　another　occasion；　this　is　really　not　the　fact）；　it　would

seem　that；　in　the　present　instance；　I　had　allowed　myself　to　enounce

a　mere　opinion；　and　that　the　reader　must　therefore　be　at　liberty　to

hold　a　different　opinion。　But　I　beg　to　remind　him　that；　if　my

subjective　deduction　does　not　produce　in　his　mind　the　conviction　of

its　certitude　at　which　I　aimed；　the　objective　deduction；　with　which

alone　the　present　work　is　properly　concerned；　is　in　every　respect

satisfactory。

　　As　regards　clearness；　the　reader　has　a　right　to　demand；　in　the　first

place；　discursive　or　logical　clearness；　that　is；　on　the　basis　of

conceptions；　and；　secondly；　intuitive　or　aesthetic　clearness；　by　means

of　intuitions；　that　is；　by　examples　or　other　modes　of　illustration

in　concreto。　I　have　done　what　I　could　for　the　first　kind　of

intelligibility。　This　was　essential　to　my　purpose；　and　it　thus

became　the　accidental　cause　of　my　inability　to　do　complete　justice

to　the　second　requirement。　I　have　been　almost　always　at　a　loss；　during

the　progress　of　this　work；　how　to　settle　this　question。　Examples　and

illustrations　always　appeared　to　me　necessary；　and；　in　the　first

sketch　of　the　Critique；　naturally　fell　into　their　proper　places。　But　I

very　soon　became　aware　of　the　magnitude　of　my　task；　and　the　numerous

problems　with　which　I　should　be　engaged；　and；　as　I　perceived　that　this

critical　investigation　would；　even　if　delivered　in　the　driest

scholastic　manner；　be　far　from　being　brief；　I　found　it　unadvisable

to　enlarge　it　still　more　with　examples　and　explanations；　which　are

necessary　only　from　a　popular　point　of　view。　I　was　induced　to　take

this　course　from　the　consideration　also　that　the　present　work　is　not

intended　for　popular　use；　that　those　devoted　to　science　do　not　require

such　helps；　although　they　are　always　acceptable；　and　that　they　would

have　materially　interfered　with　my　present　purpose。　Abbe　Terrasson

remarks　with　great　justice　that；　if　we　estimate　the　size　of　a　work；

not　from　the　number　of　its　pages；　but　from　the　time　which　we　require

to　make　ourselves　master　of　it；　it　may　be　said　of　many　a　book　that

it　would　be　much　shorter；　if　it　were　not　so　short。　On　the　other

hand；　as　regards　the　comprehensibility　of　a　system　of　speculative

cognition；　connected　under　a　single　principle；　we　may　say　with　equal

justice：　many　a　book　would　have　been　much　clearer；　if　it　had　not

been　intended　to　be　so　very　clear。　For　explanations　and　examples；

and　other　helps　to　intelligibility；　aid　us　in　the　comprehension　of

parts；　but　they　distract　the　attention；　dissipate　the　mental　power

of　the　reader；　and　stand　in　the　way　of　his　forming　a　clear

conception　of　the　whole；　as　he　cannot　attain　soon　enough　to　a　survey

of　the　system；　and　the　colouring　and　embellishments　bestowed　upon　it

prevent　his　observing　its　articulation　or　organization…　which　is　the

most　important　consideration　with　him；　when　he　comes　to　judge　of　its

unity　and　stability。

　　The　reader　must　naturally　have　a　strong　inducement　to　co…operate

with　the　present　author；　if　he　has　formed　the　intention　of　erecting

a　complete　and　solid　edifice　of　metaphysical　science；　according　to　the

plan　now　laid　before　him。　Metaphysics；　as　here　represented；　is　the

only　science　which　admits　of　completion…　and　with　little　labour；　if　it

is　united；　in　a　short　time；　so　that　nothing　will　be　left　to　future

generations　except　the　task　of　illustrating　and　applying　it

didactically。　For　this　science　is　nothing　more　than　the　in