the critique of pure reason-第159章

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technically；　that　is；　from　observation　of　the　similarity　existing

between　different　objects；　and　the　purely　contingent　use　we　make　of

our　knowledge　in　concreto　with　reference　to　all　kinds　of　arbitrary

external　aims；　its　constitution　must　be　framed　on　architectonical

principles；　that　is；　its　parts　must　be　shown　to　possess　an　essential

affinity；　and　be　capable　of　being　deduced　from　one　supreme　and

internal　aim　or　end；　which　forms　the　condition　of　the　possibility　of

the　scientific　whole。　The　schema　of　a　science　must　give　a　priori　the

plan　of　it　（monogramma）；　and　the　division　of　the　whole　into　parts；

in　conformity　with　the　idea　of　the　science；　and　it　must　also

distinguish　this　whole　from　all　others；　according　to　certain

understood　principles。

　　No　one　will　attempt　to　construct　a　science；　unless　he　have　some　idea

to　rest　on　as　a　proper　basis。　But；　in　the　elaboration　of　the

science；　he　finds　that　the　schema；　nay；　even　the　definition　which　he

at　first　gave　of　the　science；　rarely　corresponds　with　his　idea；　for

this　idea　lies；　like　a　germ；　in　our　reason；　its　parts　undeveloped

and　hid　even　from　microscopical　observation。　For　this　reason；　we　ought

to　explain　and　define　sciences；　not　according　to　the　description　which

the　originator　gives　of　them；　but　according　to　the　idea　which　we

find　based　in　reason　itself；　and　which　is　suggested　by　the　natural

unity　of　the　parts　of　the　science　already　accumulated。　For　it　will

of　ten　be　found　that　the　originator　of　a　science　and　even　his　latest

successors　remain　attached　to　an　erroneous　idea；　which　they　cannot

render　clear　to　themselves；　and　that　they　thus　fail　in　determining　the

true　content；　the　articulation　or　systematic　unity；　and　the　limits

of　their　science。

　　It　is　unfortunate　that；　only　after　having　occupied　ourselves　for　a

long　time　in　the　collection　of　materials；　under　the　guidance　of　an

idea　which　lies　undeveloped　in　the　mind；　but　not　according　to　any

definite　plan　of　arrangement…　nay；　only　after　we　have　spent　much

time　and　labour　in　the　technical　disposition　of　our　materials；　does　it

become　possible　to　view　the　idea　of　a　science　in　a　clear　light；　and　to

project；　according　to　architectonical　principles；　a　plan　of　the　whole；

in　accordance　with　the　aims　of　reason。　Systems　seem；　like　certain

worms；　to　be　formed　by　a　kind　of　generatio　aequivoca…　by　the　mere

confluence　of　conceptions；　and　to　gain　completeness　only　with　the

progress　of　time。　But　the　schema　or　germ　of　all　lies　in　reason；　and

thus　is　not　only　every　system　organized　according　to　its　own　idea；　but

all　are　united　into　one　grand　system　of　human　knowledge；　of　which　they

form　members。　For　this　reason；　it　is　possible　to　frame　an

architectonic　of　all　human　cognition；　the　formation　of　which；　at　the

present　time；　considering　the　immense　materials　collected　or　to　be

found　in　the　ruins　of　old　systems；　would　not　indeed　be　very　difficult。

Our　purpose　at　present　is　merely　to　sketch　the　plan　of　the

architectonic　of　all　cognition　given　by　pure　reason；　and　we　begin　from

the　point　where　the　main　root　of　human　knowledge　divides　into　two；　one

of　which　is　reason。　By　reason　I　understand　here　the　whole　higher

faculty　of　cognition；　the　rational　being　placed　in　contradistinction

to　the　empirical。

　　If　I　make　complete　abstraction　of　the　content　of　cognition；

objectively　considered；　all　cognition　is；　from　a　subjective　point　of

view；　either　historical　or　rational。　Historical　cognition　is

cognitio　ex　datis；　rational；　cognitio　ex　principiis。　Whatever　may　be

the　original　source　of　a　cognition；　it　is；　in　relation　to　the　person

who　possesses　it；　merely　historical；　if　he　knows　only　what　has　been

given　him　from　another　quarter；　whether　that　knowledge　was

communicated　by　direct　experience　or　by　instruction。　Thus　the　Person

who　has　learned　a　system　of　philosophy…　say　the　Wolfian…　although　he

has　a　perfect　knowledge　of　all　the　principles；　definitions；　and

arguments　in　that　philosophy；　as　well　as　of　the　divisions　that　have

been　made　of　the　system；　possesses　really　no　more　than　an　historical

knowledge　of　the　Wolfian　system；　he　knows　only　what　has　been　told　him；

his　judgements　are　only　those　which　he　has　received　from　his　teachers。

Dispute　the　validity　of　a　definition；　and　he　is　completely　at　a　loss

to　find　another。　He　has　formed　his　mind　on　another's；　but　the

imitative　faculty　is　not　the　productive。　His　knowledge　has　not　been

drawn　from　reason；　and　although；　objectively　considered；　it　is

rational　knowledge；　subjectively；　it　is　merely　historical。　He　has

learned　this　or　that　philosophy　and　is　merely　a　plaster　cast　of　a

living　man。　Rational　cognitions　which　are　objective；　that　is；　which

have　their　source　in　reason；　can　be　so　termed　from　a　subjective

point　of　view；　only　when　they　have　been　drawn　by　the　individual

himself　from　the　sources　of　reason；　that　is；　from　principles；　and　it

is　in　this　way　alone　that　criticism；　or　even　the　rejection　of　what　has

been　already　learned；　can　spring　up　in　the　mind。

　　All　rational　cognition　is；　again；　based　either　on　conceptions；　or　on

the　construction　of　conceptions。　The　former　is　termed　philosophical；

the　latter　mathematical。　I　have　already　shown　the　essential　difference

of　these　two　methods　of　cognition　in　the　first　chapter。　A　cognition

may　be　objectively　philosophical　and　subjectively　historical…　as　is

the　case　with　the　majority　of　scholars　and　those　who　cannot　look

beyond　the　limits　of　their　system；　and　who　remain　in　a　state　of

pupilage　all　their　lives。　But　it　is　remarkable　that　mathematical

knowledge；　when　committed　to　memory；　is　valid；　from　the　subjective

point　of　view；　as　rational　knowledge　also；　and　that　the　same

distinction　cannot　be　drawn　here　as　in　the　case　of　philosophical

cognition。　The　reason　is　that　the　only　way　of　arriving　at　this

knowledge　is　through　the　essential　principles　of　reason；　and　thus　it

is　always　certain　and　indisputable；　because　reason　is　employed　in

concreto…　but　at　the　same　time　a　priori…　that　is；　in　pure　and；

therefore；　infallible　intuition；　and　thus　all　causes　of　illusion　and

error　are　excluded。　Of　all　the　a　priori　sciences　of　reason；　therefore；

mathematics　alone　can　be　learned。　Philosophy…　unless　it　be　in　an

historical　manner…　cannot　be　learned；　we　can　at　most　learn　to

philosophize。

　　Philosophy　is　the　system　of　all　philosophical　cognition。　We　must　use

this　term　in　an　objective　sense；　if　we　understand　by　it　the

archetype　of　all　attempts　at　philosophizing；　and　the　standard　by　which

all　subjective　philosophies　are　to　be　judged。　In　this　sense；

philosophy　is　merely　the　idea　of　a　possible　science；　which　does　not

exist　in　concreto；　but　to　which　we　endeavour　in　various　ways　to

approximate；　until　we　have　discovered　the　right　path　to　pursue…　a　path

overgrown　by　the　errors　and　illusions　of　sense…　and　the　image　we

have　hitherto　tried　in　vain　to　shape　has　become　a　perfect　copy　of

the　great　prototype。　Until　that　time；　we　cannot　learn　philosophy…　it

does　not　exist；　if　it　does；　where　is　it；　who　possesses　it；　and　how

shall　we　know　it？　We　can　only　learn　to　philosophize；　in　other　words；

we　can　only　exercise　our　powers　of　reasoning　in　accordance　with

general　principles；　retaining　at　the　same　time；　the　right　of

investigating　the　sources　of　these　principles；　of　testing；　and　even　of

rejecting　them。

　　Until　then；　our　conception　of　philosophy　is　only　a　scholastic

conception…　a　conception；　that　is；　of　a　system　of　cognition　which　we

are　trying　to　elaborate　into　a　science；　all　that　we　at　present　know

being　the　systematic　unity　of　this　cognition；　and　consequently　the

logical　completeness　of　the　cognition　for　the　desired　end。　But　there

is　also　a　cosmical　conception　（conceptus　cosmicus）　of　philosophy；

which　has　always　formed　the　true　basis　of　this　term；　especially　when

philosophy　was　personified　and　presented　to　us　in　the　ideal　of　a

philosopher。　In　this　view　philosophy　is　the　science　of　the　relation　of

all　cognition　to　the　ultimate　and　essential　aims　of　human　reason

（teleologia　rationis