the critique of pure reason-第158章

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conception；　but　to　imagine　the　existence　of　it。　But　the　word　belief

refers　only　to　the　guidance　which　an　idea　gives　me；　and　to　its

subjective　influence　on　the　conduct　of　my　reason；　which　forces　me　to

hold　it　fast；　though　I　may　not　be　in　a　position　to　give　a

speculative　account　of　it。

　　But　mere　doctrinal　belief　is；　to　some　extent；　wanting　in

stability。　We　often　quit　our　hold　of　it；　in　consequence　of　the

difficulties　which　occur　in　speculation；　though　in　the　end　we

inevitably　return　to　it　again。

　　It　is　quite　otherwise　with　moral　belief。　For　in　this　sphere　action

is　absolutely　necessary；　that　is；　I　must　act　in　obedience　to　the　moral

law　in　all　points。　The　end　is　here　incontrovertibly　established；　and

there　is　only　one　condition　possible；　according　to　the　best　of　my

perception；　under　which　this　end　can　harmonize　with　all　other　ends；

and　so　have　practical　validity…　namely；　the　existence　of　a　God　and

of　a　future　world。　I　know　also；　to　a　certainty；　that　no　one　can　be

acquainted　with　any　other　conditions　which　conduct　to　the　same　unity

of　ends　under　the　moral　law。　But　since　the　moral　precept　is；　at　the

same　time；　my　maxim　（as　reason　requires　that　it　should　be）；　I　am

irresistibly　constrained　to　believe　in　the　existence　of　God　and　in　a

future　life；　and　I　am　sure　that　nothing　can　make　me　waver　in　this

belief；　since　I　should　thereby　overthrow　my　moral　maxims；　the

renunciation　of　which　would　render　me　hateful　in　my　own　eyes。

　　Thus；　while　all　the　ambitious　attempts　of　reason　to　penetrate　beyond

the　limits　of　experience　end　in　disappointment；　there　is　still

enough　left　to　satisfy　us　in　a　practical　point　of　view。　No　one；　it

is　true；　will　be　able　to　boast　that　he　knows　that　there　is　a　God　and　a

future　life；　for；　if　he　knows　this；　be　is　just　the　man　whom　I　have

long　wished　to　find。　All　knowledge；　regarding　an　object　of　mere

reason；　can　be　communicated；　and　I　should　thus　be　enabled　to　hope　that

my　own　knowledge　would　receive　this　wonderful　extension；　through　the

instrumentality　of　his　instruction。　No；　my　conviction　is　not

logical；　but　moral　certainty；　and　since　it　rests　on　subjective　grounds

（of　the　moral　sentiment）；　I　must　not　even　say：　It　is　morally　certain

that　there　is　a　God；　etc。；　but：　I　am　morally　certain；　that　is；　my

belief　in　God　and　in　another　world　is　so　interwoven　with　my　moral

nature　that　I　am　under　as　little　apprehension　of　having　the　former

torn　from　me　as　of　losing　the　latter。

　　The　only　point　in　this　argument　that　may　appear　open　to　suspicion　is

that　this　rational　belief　presupposes　the　existence　of　moral

sentiments。　If　we　give　up　this　assumption；　and　take　a　man　who　is

entirely　indifferent　with　regard　to　moral　laws；　the　question　which

reason　proposes；　becomes　then　merely　a　problem　for　speculation　and

may；　indeed；　be　supported　by　strong　grounds　from　analogy；　but　not　by

such　as　will　compel　the　most　obstinate　scepticism　to　give　way。*　But　in

these　questions　no　man　is　free　from　all　interest。　For　though　the

want　of　good　sentiments　may　place　him　beyond　the　influence　of　moral

interests；　still　even　in　this　case　enough　may　be　left　to　make　him　fear

the　existence　of　God　and　a　future　life。　For　he　cannot　pretend　to　any

certainty　of　the　non…existence　of　God　and　of　a　future　life；　unless…

since　it　could　only　be　proved　by　mere　reason；　and　therefore

apodeictically…　he　is　prepared　to　establish　the　impossibility　of　both；

which　certainly　no　reasonable　man　would　undertake　to　do。　This　would　be

a　negative　belief；　which　could　not；　indeed；　produce　morality　and

good　sentiments；　but　still　could　produce　an　analogon　of　these；　by

operating　as　a　powerful　restraint　on　the　outbreak　of　evil

dispositions。



　　*The　human　mind　（as；　I　believe；　every　rational　being　must　of

necessity　do）　takes　a　natural　interest　in　morality；　although　this

interest　is　not　undivided；　and　may　not　be　practically　in

preponderance。　If　you　strengthen　and　increase　it；　you　will　find　the

reason　become　docile；　more　enlightened；　and　more　capable　of　uniting

the　speculative　interest　with　the　practical。　But　if　you　do　not　take

care　at　the　outset；　or　at　least　midway；　to　make　men　good；　you　will

never　force　them　into　an　honest　belief。



　　But；　it　will　be　said；　is　this　all　that　pure　reason　can　effect；　in

opening　up　prospects　beyond　the　limits　of　experience？　Nothing　more

than　two　articles　of　belief？　Common　sense　could　have　done　as　much　as

this；　without　taking　the　philosophers　to　counsel　in　the　matter！

　　I　shall　not　here　eulogize　philosophy　for　the　benefits　which　the

laborious　efforts　of　its　criticism　have　conferred　on　human　reason…

even　granting　that　its　merit　should　turn　out　in　the　end　to　be　only

negative…　for　on　this　point　something　more　will　be　said　in　the　next

section。　But；　I　ask；　do　you　require　that　that　knowledge　which　concerns

all　men；　should　transcend　the　common　understanding；　and　should　only　be

revealed　to　you　by　philosophers？　The　very　circumstance　which　has

called　forth　your　censure；　is　the　best　confirmation　of　the　correctness

of　our　previous　assertions；　since　it　discloses；　what　could　not　have

been　foreseen；　that　Nature　is　not　chargeable　with　any　partial

distribution　of　her　gifts　in　those　matters　which　concern　all　men

without　distinction　and　that；　in　respect　to　the　essential　ends　of

human　nature；　we　cannot　advance　further　with　the　help　of　the　highest

philosophy；　than　under　the　guidance　which　nature　has　vouchsafed　to　the

meanest　understanding。

　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　III。　The　Architectonic　of　Pure　Reason。



　　By　the　term　architectonic　I　mean　the　art　of　constructing　a　system。

Without　systematic　unity；　our　knowledge　cannot　become　science；　it　will

be　an　aggregate；　and　not　a　system。　Thus　architectonic　is　the

doctrine　of　the　scientific　in　cognition；　and　therefore　necessarily

forms　part　of　our　methodology。

　　Reason　cannot　permit　our　knowledge　to　remain　in　an　unconnected　and

rhapsodistic　state；　but　requires　that　the　sum　of　our　cognitions　should

constitute　a　system。　It　is　thus　alone　that　they　can　advance　the　ends

of　reason。　By　a　system　I　mean　the　unity　of　various　cognitions　under

one　idea。　This　idea　is　the　conception…　given　by　reason…　of　the　form　of

a　whole；　in　so　far　as　the　conception　determines　a　priori　not　only

the　limits　of　its　content；　but　the　place　which　each　of　its　parts　is　to

occupy。　The　scientific　idea　contains；　therefore；　the　end　and　the

form　of　the　whole　which　is　in　accordance　with　that　end。　The　unity　of

the　end；　to　which　all　the　parts　of　the　system　relate；　and　through

which　all　have　a　relation　to　each　other；　communicates　unity　to　the

whole　system；　so　that　the　absence　of　any　part　can　be　immediately

detected　from　our　knowledge　of　the　rest；　and　it　determines　a　priori

the　limits　of　the　system；　thus　excluding　all　contingent　or　arbitrary

additions。　The　whole　is　thus　an　organism　（articulatio）；　and　not　an

aggregate　（coacervatio）；　it　may　grow　from　within　（per

intussusceptionem）；　but　it　cannot　increase　by　external　additions

（per　appositionem）。　It　is；　thus；　like　an　animal　body；　the　growth　of

which　does　not　add　any　limb；　but；　without　changing　their

proportions；　makes　each　in　its　sphere　stronger　and　more　active。

　　We　require；　for　the　execution　of　the　idea　of　a　system；　a　schema；

that　is；　a　content　and　an　arrangement　of　parts　determined　a　priori

by　the　principle　which　the　aim　of　the　system　prescribes。　A　schema

which　is　not　projected　in　accordance　with　an　idea；　that　is；　from　the

standpoint　of　the　highest　aim　of　reason；　but　merely　empirically；　in

accordance　with　accidental　aims　and　purposes　（the　number　of　which

cannot　be　predetermined）；　can　give　us　nothing　more　than　technical

unity。　But　the　schema　which　is　originated　from　an　idea　（in　which

case　reason　presents　us　with　aims　a　priori；　and　does　not　look　for　them

to　experience）；　forms　the　basis　of　architectonical　unity。　A　science；

in　the　proper　acceptation　of　that　term。　cannot　be　formed

technically；　that　is；　from　observation　of　the　similarity　existing

between　different　objects；　and　the　purely　contingent　use　we