the critique of pure reason-第156章

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inseparably　connected　with　the　internal　possibility　of　things。　This

gives　rise　to　a　transcendental　theology；　which　takes　the　ideal　of

the　highest　ontological　perfection　as　a　principle　of　systematic　unity；

and　this　principle　connects　all　things　according　to　universal　and

necessary　natural　laws；　because　all　things　have　their　origin　in　the

absolute　necessity　of　the　one　only　Primal　Being。

　　What　use　can　we　make　of　our　understanding；　even　in　respect　of

experience；　if　we　do　not　propose　ends　to　ourselves？　But　the　highest

ends　are　those　of　morality；　and　it　is　only　pure　reason　that　can　give

us　the　knowledge　of　these。　Though　supplied　with　these；　and　putting

ourselves　under　their　guidance；　we　can　make　no　teleological　use　of　the

knowledge　of　nature；　as　regards　cognition；　unless　nature　itself　has

established　teleological　unity。　For　without　this　unity　we　should　not

even　possess　reason；　because　we　should　have　no　school　for　reason；

and　no　cultivation　through　objects　which　afford　the　materials　for

its　conceptions。　But　teleological　unity　is　a　necessary　unity；　and

founded　on　the　essence　of　the　individual　will　itself。　Hence　this　will；

which　is　the　condition　of　the　application　of　this　unity　in　concreto；

must　be　so　likewise。　In　this　way　the　transcendental　enlargement　of　our

rational　cognition　would　be；　not　the　cause；　but　merely　the　effect　of

the　practical　teleology　which　pure　reason　imposes　upon　us。

　　Hence；　also；　we　find　in　the　history　of　human　reason　that；　before　the

moral　conceptions　were　sufficiently　purified　and　determined；　and

before　men　had　attained　to　a　perception　of　the　systematic　unity　of

ends　according　to　these　conceptions　and　from　necessary　principles；　the

knowledge　of　nature；　and　even　a　considerable　amount　of　intellectual

culture　in　many　other　sciences；　could　produce　only　rude　and　vague

conceptions　of　the　Deity；　sometimes　even　admitting　of　an　astonishing

indifference　with　regard　to　this　question　altogether。　But　the　more

enlarged　treatment　of　moral　ideas；　which　was　rendered　necessary　by　the

extreme　pure　moral　law　of　our　religion；　awakened　the　interest；　and

thereby　quickened　the　perceptions　of　reason　in　relation　to　this

object。　In　this　way；　and　without　the　help　either　of　an　extended

acquaintance　with　nature；　or　of　a　reliable　transcendental　insight　（for

these　have　been　wanting　in　all　ages）；　a　conception　of　the　Divine　Being

was　arrived　at；　which　we　now　bold　to　be　the　correct　one；　not　because

speculative　reason　convinces　us　of　its　correctness；　but　because　it

accords　with　the　moral　principles　of　reason。　Thus　it　is　to　pure

reason；　but　only　in　its　practical　use；　that　we　must　ascribe　the

merit　of　having　connected　with　our　highest　interest　a　cognition；　of

which　mere　speculation　was　able　only　to　form　a　conjecture；　but　the

validity　of　which　it　was　unable　to　establish…　and　of　having　thereby

rendered　it；　not　indeed　a　demonstrated　dogma；　but　a　hypothesis

absolutely　necessary　to　the　essential　ends　of　reason。

　　But　if　practical　reason　has　reached　this　elevation；　and　has　attained

to　the　conception　of　a　sole　Primal　Being　as　the　supreme　good；　it

must　not；　therefore；　imagine　that　it　has　transcended　the　empirical

conditions　of　its　application；　and　risen　to　the　immediate　cognition　of

new　objects；　it　must　not　presume　to　start　from　the　conception　which　it

has　gained；　and　to　deduce　from　it　the　moral　laws　themselves。　For　it

was　these　very　laws；　the　internal　practical　necessity　of　which　led

us　to　the　hypothesis　of　an　independent　cause；　or　of　a　wise　ruler　of

the　universe；　who　should　give　them　effect。　Hence　we　are　not　entitled

to　regard　them　as　accidental　and　derived　from　the　mere　will　of　the

ruler；　especially　as　we　have　no　conception　of　such　a　will；　except　as

formed　in　accordance　with　these　laws。　So　far；　then；　as　practical

reason　has　the　right　to　conduct　us；　we　shall　not　look　upon　actions

as　binding　on　us；　because　they　are　the　commands　of　God；　but　we　shall

regard　them　as　divine　commands；　because　we　are　internally　bound　by

them。　We　shall　study　freedom　under　the　teleological　unity　which

accords　with　principles　of　reason；　we　shall　look　upon　ourselves　as

acting　in　conformity　with　the　divine　will　only　in　so　far　as　we　hold

sacred　the　moral　law　which　reason　teaches　us　from　the　nature　of

actions　themselves；　and　we　shall　believe　that　we　can　obey　that　will

only　by　promoting　the　weal　of　the　universe　in　ourselves　and　in　others。

Moral　theology　is；　therefore；　only　of　immanent　use。　It　teaches　us　to

fulfil　our　destiny　here　in　the　world；　by　placing　ourselves　in

harmony　with　the　general　system　of　ends；　and　warns　us　against　the

fanaticism；　nay；　the　crime　of　depriving　reason　of　its　legislative

authority　in　the　moral　conduct　of　life；　for　the　purpose　of　directly

connecting　this　authority　with　the　idea　of　the　Supreme　Being。　For　this

would　be；　not　an　immanent；　but　a　transcendent　use　of　moral　theology；

and；　like　the　transcendent　use　of　mere　speculation；　would　inevitably

pervert　and　frustrate　the　ultimate　ends　of　reason。



　　　　　　　SECTION　III。　Of　Opinion；　Knowledge；　and　Belief。



　　The　holding　of　a　thing　to　be　true　is　a　phenomenon　in　our

understanding　which　may　rest　on　objective　grounds；　but　requires；　also；

subjective　causes　in　the　mind　of　the　person　judging。　If　a　judgement　is

valid　for　every　rational　being；　then　its　ground　is　objectively

sufficient；　and　it　is　termed　a　conviction。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　it

has　its　ground　in　the　particular　character　of　the　subject；　it　is

termed　a　persuasion。

　　Persuasion　is　a　mere　illusion；　the　ground　of　the　judgement；　which

lies　solely　in　the　subject；　being　regarded　as　objective。　Hence　a

judgement　of　this　kind　has　only　private　validity…　is　only　valid　for

the　individual　who　judges；　and　the　holding　of　a　thing　to　be　true　in

this　way　cannot　be　communicated。　But　truth　depends　upon　agreement　with

the　object；　and　consequently　the　judgements　of　all　understandings；

if　true；　must　be　in　agreement　with　each　other　（consentientia　uni

tertio　consentiunt　inter　se）。　Conviction　may；　therefore；　be

distinguished；　from　an　external　point　of　view；　from　persuasion；　by　the

possibility　of　communicating　it　and　by　showing　its　validity　for　the

reason　of　every　man；　for　in　this　case　the　presumption；　at　least；

arises　that　the　agreement　of　all　judgements　with　each　other；　in

spite　of　the　different　characters　of　individuals；　rests　upon　the

common　ground　of　the　agreement　of　each　with　the　object；　and　thus　the

correctness　of　the　judgement　is　established。

　　Persuasion；　accordingly；　cannot　be　subjectively　distinguished　from

conviction；　that　is；　so　long　as　the　subject　views　its　judgement　simply

as　a　phenomenon　of　its　own　mind。　But　if　we　inquire　whether　the　grounds

of　our　judgement；　which　are　valid　for　us；　produce　the　same　effect　on

the　reason　of　others　as　on　our　own；　we　have　then　the　means；　though

only　subjective　means；　not；　indeed；　of　producing　conviction；　but　of

detecting　the　merely　private　validity　of　the　judgement；　in　other

words；　of　discovering　that　there　is　in　it　the　element　of　mere

persuasion。

　　If　we　can；　in　addition　to　this；　develop　the　subjective　causes　of　the

judgement；　which　we　have　taken　for　its　objective　grounds；　and　thus

explain　the　deceptive　judgement　as　a　phenomenon　in　our　mind；　apart

altogether　from　the　objective　character　of　the　object；　we　can　then

expose　the　illusion　and　need　be　no　longer　deceived　by　it；　although；　if

its　subjective　cause　lies　in　our　nature；　we　cannot　hope　altogether

to　escape　its　influence。

　　I　can　only　maintain；　that　is；　affirm　as　necessarily　valid　for

every　one；　that　which　produces　conviction。　Persuasion　I　may　keep　for

myself；　if　it　is　agreeable　to　me；　but　I　cannot；　and　ought　not；　to

attempt　to　impose　it　as　binding　upon　others。

　　Holding　for　true；　or　the　subjective　validity　of　a　judgement　in

relation　to　conviction　（which　is；　at　the　same　time；　objectively

valid）；　has　the　three　following　degrees：　opinion；　belief；　and

knowledge。　Opinion　is　a　consciously　insufficient　judgement；

subjectively　as　well　as　objecti