the critique of pure reason-第148章

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it　in　a　hypothesis；　otherwise；　we　should　be　basing　our　chain　of

reasoning　upon　mere　chimerical　fancies；　and　not　upon　conceptions　of

things。　Thus；　we　have　no　right　to　assume　the　existence　of　new

powers；　not　existing　in　nature…　for　example；　an　understanding　with　a

non…sensuous　intuition；　a　force　of　attraction　without　contact；　or　some

new　kind　of　substances　occupying　space；　and　yet　without　the　property

of　impenetrability…　and；　consequently；　we　cannot　assume　that　there

is　any　other　kind　of　community　among　substances　than　that　observable

in　experience；　any　kind　of　presence　than　that　in　space；　or　any　kind　of

duration　than　that　in　time。　In　one　word；　the　conditions　of　possible

experience　are　for　reason　the　only　conditions　of　the　possibility　of

things；　reason　cannot　venture　to　form；　independently　of　these

conditions；　any　conceptions　of　things；　because　such　conceptions；

although　not　self…contradictory；　are　without　object　and　without

application。

　　The　conceptions　of　reason　are；　as　we　have　already　shown；　mere　ideas；

and　do　not　relate　to　any　object　in　any　kind　of　experience。　At　the　same

time；　they　do　not　indicate　imaginary　or　possible　objects。　They　are

purely　problematical　in　their　nature　and；　as　aids　to　the　heuristic

exercise　of　the　faculties；　form　the　basis　of　the　regulative　principles

for　the　systematic　employment　of　the　understanding　in　the　field　of

experience。　If　we　leave　this　ground　of　experience；　they　become　mere

fictions　of　thought；　the　possibility　of　which　is　quite　indemonstrable；

and　they　cannot；　consequently；　be　employed　as　hypotheses　in　the

explanation　of　real　phenomena。　It　is　quite　admissible　to　cogitate

the　soul　as　simple；　for　the　purpose　of　enabling　ourselves　to　employ

the　idea　of　a　perfect　and　necessary　unity　of　all　the　faculties　of

the　mind　as　the　principle　of　all　our　inquiries　into　its　internal

phenomena；　although　we　cannot　cognize　this　unity　in　concreto。　But　to

assume　that　the　soul　is　a　simple　substance　（a　transcendental

conception）　would　be　enouncing　a　proposition　which　is　not　only

indemonstrable…　as　many　physical　hypotheses　are…　but　a　proposition

which　is　purely　arbitrary；　and　in　the　highest　degree　rash。　The

simple　is　never　presented　in　experience；　and；　if　by　substance　is

here　meant　the　permanent　object　of　sensuous　intuition；　the　possibility

of　a　simple　phenomenon　is　perfectly　inconceivable。　Reason　affords　no

good　grounds　for　admitting　the　existence　of　intelligible　beings；　or　of

intelligible　properties　of　sensuous　things；　although…　as　we　have　no

conception　either　of　their　possibility　or　of　their　impossibility…　it

will　always　be　out　of　our　power　to　affirm　dogmatically　that　they　do

not　exist。　In　the　explanation　of　given　phenomena；　no　other　things

and　no　other　grounds　of　explanation　can　be　employed　than　those　which

stand　in　connection　with　the　given　phenomena　according　to　the　known

laws　of　experience。　A　transcendental　hypothesis；　in　which　a　mere

idea　of　reason　is　employed　to　explain　the　phenomena　of　nature；　would

not　give　us　any　better　insight　into　a　phenomenon；　as　we　should　be

trying　to　explain　what　we　do　not　sufficiently　understand　from　known

empirical　principles；　by　what　we　do　not　understand　at　all。　The

principles　of　such　a　hypothesis　might　conduce　to　the　satisfaction　of

reason；　but　it　would　not　assist　the　understanding　in　its　application

to　objects。　Order　and　conformity　to　aims　in　the　sphere　of　nature

must　be　themselves　explained　upon　natural　grounds　and　according　to

natural　laws；　and　the　wildest　hypotheses；　if　they　are　only　physical；

are　here　more　admissible　than　a　hyperphysical　hypothesis；　such　as　that

of　a　divine　author。　For　such　a　hypothesis　would　introduce　the

principle　of　ignava　ratio；　which　requires　us　to　give　up　the　search　for

causes　that　might　be　discovered　in　the　course　of　experience　and　to

rest　satisfied　with　a　mere　idea。　As　regards　the　absolute　totality　of

the　grounds　of　explanation　in　the　series　of　these　causes；　this　can

be　no　hindrance　to　the　understanding　in　the　case　of　phenomena；

because；　as　they　are　to　us　nothing　more　than　phenomena；　we　have　no

right　to　look　for　anything　like　completeness　in　the　synthesis　of　the

series　of　their　conditions。

　　Transcendental　hypotheses　are　therefore　inadmissible；　and　we

cannot　use　the　liberty　of　employing；　in　the　absence　of　physical；

hyperphysical　grounds　of　explanation。　And　this　for　two　reasons；　first；

because　such　hypothesis　do　not　advance　reason；　but　rather　stop　it　in

its　progress；　secondly；　because　this　licence　would　render　fruitless

all　its　exertions　in　its　own　proper　sphere；　which　is　that　of

experience。　For；　when　the　explanation　of　natural　phenomena　happens

to　be　difficult；　we　have　constantly　at　hand　a　transcendental　ground　of

explanation；　which　lifts　us　above　the　necessity　of　investigating

nature；　and　our　inquiries　are　brought　to　a　close；　not　because　we

have　obtained　all　the　requisite　knowledge；　but　because　we　abut　upon

a　principle　which　is　incomprehensible　and　which；　indeed；　is　so　far

back　in　the　track　of　thought　as　to　contain　the　conception　of　the

absolutely　primal　being。

　　The　next　requisite　for　the　admissibility　of　a　hypothesis　is　its

sufficiency。　That　is；　it　must　determine　a　priori　the　consequences

which　are　given　in　experience　and　which　are　supposed　to　follow　from

the　hypothesis　itself。　If　we　require　to　employ　auxiliary　hypotheses；

the　suspicion　naturally　arises　that　they　are　mere　fictions；　because

the　necessity　for　each　of　them　requires　the　same　justification　as　in

the　case　of　the　original　hypothesis；　and　thus　their　testimony　is

invalid。　If　we　suppose　the　existence　of　an　infinitely　perfect　cause；

we　possess　sufficient　grounds　for　the　explanation　of　the　conformity　to

aims；　the　order　and　the　greatness　which　we　observe　in　the　universe；

but　we　find　ourselves　obliged；　when　we　observe　the　evil　in　the　world

and　the　exceptions　to　these　laws；　to　employ　new　hypothesis　in

support　of　the　original　one。　We　employ　the　idea　of　the　simple　nature

of　the　human　soul　as　the　foundation　of　all　the　theories　we　may　form　of

its　phenomena；　but　when　we　meet　with　difficulties　in　our　way；　when

we　observe　in　the　soul　phenomena　similar　to　the　changes　which　take

place　in　matter；　we　require　to　call　in　new　auxiliary　hypotheses。　These

may；　indeed；　not　be　false；　but　we　do　not　know　them　to　be　true；　because

the　only　witness　to　their　certitude　is　the　hypothesis　which　they

themselves　have　been　called　in　to　explain。

　　We　are　not　discussing　the　above…mentioned　assertions　regarding　the

immaterial　unity　of　the　soul　and　the　existence　of　a　Supreme　Being　as

dogmata；　which　certain　philosophers　profess　to　demonstrate　a　priori；

but　purely　as　hypotheses。　In　the　former　case；　the　dogmatist　must

take　care　that　his　arguments　possess　the　apodeictic　certainty　of　a

demonstration。　For　the　assertion　that　the　reality　of　such　ideas　is

probable　is　as　absurd　as　a　proof　of　the　probability　of　a　proposition

in　geometry。　Pure　abstract　reason；　apart　from　all　experience；　can

either　cognize　nothing　at　all；　and　hence　the　judgements　it　enounces

are　never　mere　opinions；　they　are　either　apodeictic　certainties；　or

declarations　that　nothing　can　be　known　on　the　subject。　Opinions　and

probable　judgements　on　the　nature　of　things　can　only　be　employed　to

explain　given　phenomena；　or　they　may　relate　to　the　effect；　in

accordance　with　empirical　laws；　of　an　actually　existing　cause。　In

other　words；　we　must　restrict　the　sphere　of　opinion　to　the　world　of

experience　and　nature。　Beyond　this　region　opinion　is　mere　invention；

unless　we　are　groping　about　for　the　truth　on　a　path　not　yet　fully

known；　and　have　some　hopes　of　stumbling　upon　it　by　chance。

　　But；　although　hypotheses　are　inadmissible　in　answers　to　the

questions　of　pure　speculative　reason；　they　may　be　employed　in　the

defence　of　these　answers。　That　is　to　say；　hypotheses　are　admissible　in

polemic；　but　not　in　the　sphere　of　dogmatism。　By　the　defence　of

statements　of　this　character；　I　do　not　mean　an　attempt　at

discovering　new　grounds　for　their　suppor