the critique of pure reason-第145章

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Supreme　Being？　This　proposition　lies　out　of　the　field　of　possible

experience；　and；　therefore；　beyond　the　limits　of　human　cognition。

But　I　would　not　read　at；　all　the　answer　which　the　dogmatical

maintainer　of　the　good　cause　makes　to　his　opponent；　because　I　know

well　beforehand；　that　he　will　merely　attack　the　fallacious　grounds

of　his　adversary；　without　being　able　to　establish　his　own

assertions。　Besides；　a　new　illusory　argument；　in　the　construction　of

which　talent　and　acuteness　are　shown；　is　suggestive　of　new　ideas　and

new　trains　of　reasoning；　and　in　this　respect　the　old　and　everyday

sophistries　are　quite　useless。　Again；　the　dogmatical　opponent　of

religion　gives　employment　to　criticism；　and　enables　us　to　test　and

correct　its　principles；　while　there　is　no　occasion　for　anxiety　in

regard　to　the　influence　and　results　of　his　reasoning。

　　But；　it　will　be　said；　must　we　not　warn　the　youth　entrusted　to

academical　care　against　such　writings；　must　we　not　preserve　them

from　the　knowledge　of　these　dangerous　assertions；　until　their

judgement　is　ripened；　or　rather　until　the　doctrines　which　we　wish　to

inculcate　are　so　firmly　rooted　in　their　minds　as　to　withstand　all

attempts　at　instilling　the　contrary　dogmas；　from　whatever　quarter　they

may　come？

　　If　we　are　to　confine　ourselves　to　the　dogmatical　procedure　in　the

sphere　of　pure　reason；　and　find　ourselves　unable　to　settle　such

disputes　otherwise　than　by　becoming　a　party　in　them；　and　setting

counter…assertions　against　the　statements　advanced　by　our　opponents；

there　is　certainly　no　plan　more　advisable　for　the　moment；　but；　at

the　same　time；　none　more　absurd　and　inefficient　for　the　future；　than

this　retaining　of　the　youthful　mind　under　guardianship　for　a　time；　and

thus　preserving　it…　for　so　long　at　least…　from　seduction　into　error。

But　when；　at　a　later　period；　either　curiosity；　or　the　prevalent

fashion　of　thought　places　such　writings　in　their　hands；　will　the

so…called　convictions　of　their　youth　stand　firm？　The　young　thinker；

who　has　in　his　armoury　none　but　dogmatical　weapons　with　which　to

resist　the　attacks　of　his　opponent；　and　who　cannot　detect　the　latent

dialectic　which　lies　in　his　own　opinions　as　well　as　in　those　of　the

opposite　party；　sees　the　advance　of　illusory　arguments　and　grounds

of　proof　which　have　the　advantage　of　novelty；　against　as　illusory

grounds　of　proof　destitute　of　this　advantage；　and　which；　perhaps；

excite　the　suspicion　that　the　natural　credulity　of　his　youth　has

been　abused　by　his　instructors。　He　thinks　he　can　find　no　better

means　of　showing　that　he　has　out　grown　the　discipline　of　his

minority　than　by　despising　those　well…meant　warnings；　and；　knowing

no　system　of　thought　but　that　of　dogmatism；　he　drinks　deep　draughts　of

the　poison　that　is　to　sap　the　principles　in　which　his　early　years　were

trained。

　　Exactly　the　opposite　of　the　system　here　recommended　ought　to　be

pursued　in　academical　instruction。　This　can　only　be　effected；　however；

by　a　thorough　training　in　the　critical　investigation　of　pure　reason。

For；　in　order　to　bring　the　principles　of　this　critique　into　exercise

as　soon　as　possible；　and　to　demonstrate　their　perfect　even　in　the

presence　of　the　highest　degree　of　dialectical　illusion；　the　student

ought　to　examine　the　assertions　made　on　both　sides　of　speculative

questions　step　by　step；　and　to　test　them　by　these　principles。　It

cannot　be　a　difficult　task　for　him　to　show　the　fallacies　inherent　in

these　propositions；　and　thus　he　begins　early　to　feel　his　own　power

of　securing　himself　against　the　influence　of　such　sophistical

arguments；　which　must　finally　lose；　for　him；　all　their　illusory　power。

And；　although　the　same　blows　which　overturn　the　edifice　of　his

opponent　are　as　fatal　to　his　own　speculative　structures；　if　such　he

has　wished　to　rear；　he　need　not　feel　any　sorrow　in　regard　to　this

seeming　misfortune；　as　he　has　now　before　him　a　fair　prospect　into

the　practical　region　in　which　he　may　reasonably　hope　to　find　a　more

secure　foundation　for　a　rational　system。

　　There　is；　accordingly；　no　proper　polemic　in　the　sphere　of　pure

reason。　Both　parties　beat　the　air　and　fight　with　their　own　shadows；　as

they　pass　beyond　the　limits　of　nature；　and　can　find　no　tangible

point　of　attack…　no　firm　footing　for　their　dogmatical　conflict。

Fight　as　vigorously　as　they　may；　the　shadows　which　they　hew　down；

immediately　start　up　again；　like　the　heroes　in　Walhalla；　and　renew　the

bloodless　and　unceasing　contest。

　　But　neither　can　we　admit　that　there　is　any　proper　sceptical

employment　of　pure　reason；　such　as　might　be　based　upon　the　principle

of　neutrality　in　all　speculative　disputes。　To　excite　reason　against

itself；　to　place　weapons　in　the　hands　of　the　party　on　the　one　side

as　well　as　in　those　of　the　other；　and　to　remain　an　undisturbed　and

sarcastic　spectator　of　the　fierce　struggle　that　ensues；　seems；　from

the　dogmatical　point　of　view；　to　be　a　part　fitting　only　a　malevolent

disposition。　But；　when　the　sophist　evidences　an　invincible　obstinacy

and　blindness；　and　a　pride　which　no　criticism　can　moderate；　there　is

no　other　practicable　course　than　to　oppose　to　this　pride　and　obstinacy

similar　feelings　and　pretensions　on　the　other　side；　equally　well　or

ill　founded；　so　that　reason；　staggered　by　the　reflections　thus

forced　upon　it；　finds　it　necessary　to　moderate　its　confidence　in

such　pretensions　and　to　listen　to　the　advice　of　criticism。　But　we

cannot　stop　at　these　doubts；　much　less　regard　the　conviction　of　our

ignorance；　not　only　as　a　cure　for　the　conceit　natural　to　dogmatism；

but　as　the　settlement　of　the　disputes　in　which　reason　is　involved　with

itself。　On　the　contrary；　scepticism　is　merely　a　means　of　awakening

reason　from　its　dogmatic　dreams　and　exciting　it　to　a　more　careful

investigation　into　its　own　powers　and　pretensions。　But；　as

scepticism　appears　to　be　the　shortest　road　to　a　permanent　peace　in　the

domain　of　philosophy；　and　as　it　is　the　track　pursued　by　the　many　who

aim　at　giving　a　philosophical　colouring　to　their　contemptuous

dislike　of　all　inquiries　of　this　kind；　I　think　it　necessary　to　present

to　my　readers　this　mode　of　thought　in　its　true　light。



　　　　　Scepticism　not　a　Permanent　State　for　Human　Reason。



　　The　consciousness　of　ignorance…　unless　this　ignorance　is

recognized　to　be　absolutely　necessary　ought；　instead　of　forming　the

conclusion　of　my　inquiries；　to　be　the　strongest　motive　to　the

pursuit　of　them。　All　ignorance　is　either　ignorance　of　things　or　of　the

limits　of　knowledge。　If　my　ignorance　is　accidental　and　not

necessary；　it　must　incite　me；　in　the　first　case；　to　a　dogmatical

inquiry　regarding　the　objects　of　which　I　am　ignorant；　in　the　second；

to　a　critical　investigation　into　the　bounds　of　all　possible　knowledge。

But　that　my　ignorance　is　absolutely　necessary　and　unavoidable；　and

that　it　consequently　absolves　from　the　duty　of　all　further

investigation；　is　a　fact　which　cannot　be　made　out　upon　empirical

grounds…　from　observation…　but　upon　critical　grounds　alone；　that　is；

by　a　thoroughgoing　investigation　into　the　primary　sources　of

cognition。　It　follows　that　the　determination　of　the　bounds　of　reason

can　be　made　only　on　a　priori　grounds；　while　the　empirical　limitation

of　reason；　which　is　merely　an　indeterminate　cognition　of　an

ignorance　that　can　never　be　completely　removed；　can　take　place　only

a　posteriori。　In　other　words；　our　empirical　knowledge　is　limited　by

that　which　yet　remains　for　us　to　know。　The　former　cognition　of　our

ignorance；　which　is　possible　only　on　a　rational　basis；　is　a　science；

the　latter　is　merely　a　perception；　and　we　cannot　say　how　far　the

inferences　drawn　from　it　may　extend。　If　I　regard　the　earth；　as　it

really　appears　to　my　senses；　as　a　flat　surface；　I　am　ignorant　how

far　this　surface　extends。　But　experience　teaches　me　that；　how　far

soever　I　go；　I　always　see　before　me　a　space　in　which　I　can　proceed

farther；　and　thus　I　know　the　limits…　merely　visual…　of　my　actual

knowledge　of　the　earth；　although　I　am　ignorant　of　the　limits　of　the

earth