the critique of pure reason-第137章

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illusions　to　which　the　mind　is　subject　of　the　most　deceptive

character；　and　the　evil　consequences　of　error　of　no　inconsiderable

magnitude…　the　negative　element　in　knowledge；　which　is　useful　only

to　guard　us　against　error；　is　of　far　more　importance　than　much　of　that

positive　instruction　which　makes　additions　to　the　sum　of　our

knowledge。　The　restraint　which　is　employed　to　repress；　and　finally

to　extirpate　the　constant　inclination　to　depart　from　certain　rules；　is

termed　discipline。　It　is　distinguished　from　culture；　which　aims　at　the

formation　of　a　certain　degree　of　skill；　without　attempting　to

repress　or　to　destroy　any　other　mental　power；　already　existing。　In　the

cultivation　of　a　talent；　which　has　given　evidence　of　an　impulse

towards　self…development；　discipline　takes　a　negative；*　culture　and

doctrine　a　positive；　part。



　　*I　am　well　aware　that；　in　the　language　of　the　schools；　the　term

discipline　is　usually　employed　as　synonymous　with　instruction。　But

there　are　so　many　cases　in　which　it　is　necessary　to　distinguish　the

notion　of　the　former；　as　a　course　of　corrective　training；　from　that　of

the　latter；　as　the　communication　of　knowledge；　and　the　nature　of

things　itself　demands　the　appropriation　of　the　most　suitable

expressions　for　this　distinction；　that　it　is　my　desire　that　the　former

terms　should　never　be　employed　in　any　other　than　a　negative

signification。



　　That　natural　dispositions　and　talents　（such　as　imagination　and　with；

which　ask　a　free　and　unlimited　development；　require　in　many　respects

the　corrective　influence　of　discipline；　every　one　will　readily

grant。　But　it　may　well　appear　strange　that　reason；　whose　proper　duty

it　is　to　prescribe　rules　of　discipline　to　all　the　other　powers　of

the　mind；　should　itself　require　this　corrective。　It　has；　in　fact；

hitherto　escaped　this　humiliation；　only　because；　in　presence　of　its

magnificent　pretensions　and　high　position；　no　one　could　readily

suspect　it　to　be　capable　of　substituting　fancies　for　conceptions；

and　words　for　things。

　　Reason；　when　employed　in　the　field　of　experience；　does　not　stand

in　need　of　criticism；　because　its　principles　are　subjected　to　the

continual　test　of　empirical　observations。　Nor　is　criticism　requisite

in　the　sphere　of　mathematics；　where　the　conceptions　of　reason　must

always　be　presented　in　concreto　in　pure　intuition；　and　baseless　or

arbitrary　assertions　are　discovered　without　difficulty。　But　where

reason　is　not　held　in　a　plain　track　by　the　influence　of　empirical　or

of　pure　intuition；　that　is；　when　it　is　employed　in　the

transcendental　sphere　of　pure　conceptions；　it　stands　in　great　need

of　discipline；　to　restrain　its　propensity　to　overstep　the　limits　of

possible　experience　and　to　keep　it　from　wandering　into　error。　In　fact；

the　utility　of　the　philosophy　of　pure　reason　is　entirely　of　this

negative　character。　Particular　errors　may　be　corrected　by　particular

animadversions；　and　the　causes　of　these　errors　may　be　eradicated　by

criticism。　But　where　we　find；　as　in　the　case　of　pure　reason；　a

complete　system　of　illusions　and　fallacies；　closely　connected　with

each　other　and　depending　upon　grand　general　principles；　there　seems　to

be　required　a　peculiar　and　negative　code　of　mental　legislation；　which；

under　the　denomination　of　a　discipline；　and　founded　upon　the　nature　of

reason　and　the　objects　of　its　exercise；　shall　constitute　a　system　of

thorough　examination　and　testing；　which　no　fallacy　will　be　able　to

withstand　or　escape　from；　under　whatever　disguise　or　concealment　it

may　lurk。

　　But　the　reader　must　remark　that；　in　this　the　second　division　of

our　transcendental　Critique　the　discipline　of　pure　reason　is　not

directed　to　the　content；　but　to　the　method　of　the　cognition　of　pure

reason。　The　former　task　has　been　completed　in　the　doctrine　of

elements。　But　there　is　so　much　similarity　in　the　mode　of　employing　the

faculty　of　reason；　whatever　be　the　object　to　which　it　is　applied；

while；　at　the　same　time；　its　employment　in　the　transcendental　sphere

is　so　essentially　different　in　kind　from　every　other；　that；　without

the　warning　negative　influence　of　a　discipline　specially　directed　to

that　end；　the　errors　are　unavoidable　which　spring　from　the

unskillful　employment　of　the　methods　which　are　originated　by　reason

but　which　are　out　of　place　in　this　sphere。



　　　　　SECTION　I。　The　Discipline　of　Pure　Reason　in　the　Sphere

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Dogmatism。



　　The　science　of　mathematics　presents　the　most　brilliant　example　of

the　extension　of　the　sphere　of　pure　reason　without　the　aid　of

experience。　Examples　are　always　contagious；　and　they　exert　an　especial

influence　on　the　same　faculty；　which　naturally　flatters　itself　that　it

will　have　the　same　good　fortune　in　other　case　as　fell　to　its　lot　in

one　fortunate　instance。　Hence　pure　reason　hopes　to　be　able　to　extend

its　empire　in　the　transcendental　sphere　with　equal　success　and

security；　especially　when　it　applies　the　same　method　which　was

attended　with　such　brilliant　results　in　the　science　of　mathematics。　It

is；　therefore；　of　the　highest　importance　for　us　to　know　whether　the

method　of　arriving　at　demonstrative　certainty；　which　is　termed

mathematical；　be　identical　with　that　by　which　we　endeavour　to　attain

the　same　degree　of　certainty　in　philosophy；　and　which　is　termed　in

that　science　dogmatical。

　　Philosophical　cognition　is　the　cognition　of　reason　by　means　of

conceptions；　mathematical　cognition　is　cognition　by　means　of　the

construction　of　conceptions。　The　construction　of　a　conception　is　the

presentation　a　priori　of　the　intuition　which　corresponds　to　the

conception。　For　this　purpose　a　non…empirical　intuition　is　requisite；

which；　as　an　intuition；　is　an　individual　object；　while；　as　the

construction　of　a　conception　（a　general　representation）；　it　must　be

seen　to　be　universally　valid　for　all　the　possible　intuitions　which

rank　under　that　conception。　Thus　I　construct　a　triangle；　by　the

presentation　of　the　object　which　corresponds　to　this　conception；

either　by　mere　imagination；　in　pure　intuition；　or　upon　paper；　in

empirical　intuition；　in　both　cases　completely　a　priori；　without

borrowing　the　type　of　that　figure　from　any　experience。　The

individual　figure　drawn　upon　paper　is　empirical；　but　it　serves；

notwithstanding；　to　indicate　the　conception；　even　in　its　universality；

because　in　this　empirical　intuition　we　keep　our　eye　merely　on　the

act　of　the　construction　of　the　conception；　and　pay　no　attention　to　the

various　modes　of　determining　it；　for　example；　its　size；　the　length

of　its　sides；　the　size　of　its　angles；　these　not　in　the　least　affecting

the　essential　character　of　the　conception。

　　Philosophical　cognition；　accordingly；　regards　the　particular　only　in

the　general；　mathematical　the　general　in　the　particular；　nay；　in　the

individual。　This　is　done；　however；　entirely　a　priori　and　by　means　of

pure　reason；　so　that；　as　this　individual　figure　is　determined　under

certain　universal　conditions　of　construction；　the　object　of　the

conception；　to　which　this　individual　figure　corresponds　as　its　schema；

must　be　cogitated　as　universally　determined。

　　The　essential　difference　of　these　two　modes　of　cognition　consists；

therefore；　in　this　formal　quality；　it　does　not　regard　the　difference

of　the　matter　or　objects　of　both。　Those　thinkers　who　aim　at

distinguishing　philosophy　from　mathematics　by　asserting　that　the

former　has　to　do　with　quality　merely；　and　the　latter　with　quantity；

have　mistaken　the　effect　for　the　cause。　The　reason　why　mathematical

cognition　can　relate　only　to　quantity　is　to　be　found　in　its　form

alone。　For　it　is　the　conception　of　quantities　only　that　is　capable

of　being　constructed；　that　is；　presented　a　priori　in　intuition；

while　qualities　cannot　be　given　in　any　other　than　an　empirical

intuition。　Hence　the　cognition　of　qualities　by　reason　is　possible　only

through　conceptions。　No　one　can　find　an　intuition　which　shall

correspond　to　the　conception　of　reality；　except　in　experience；　it

cannot　be　presented　to　the　mind　a　p