the critique of pure reason-第135章

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is　always　possible　to　answer　all　the　questions　which　pure　reason　may

raise；　and　that　the　plea　of　the　limited　nature　of　our　cognition；　which

is　unavoidable　and　proper　in　many　questions　regarding　natural

phenomena；　cannot　in　this　case　be　admitted；　because　the　questions

raised　do　not　relate　to　the　nature　of　things；　but　are　necessarily

originated　by　the　nature　of　reason　itself；　and　relate　to　its　own

internal　constitution。　We　can　now　establish　this　assertion；　which　at

first　sight　appeared　so　rash；　in　relation　to　the　two　questions　in

which　reason　takes　the　greatest　interest；　and　thus　complete　our

discussion　of　the　dialectic　of　pure　reason。

　　If；　then；　the　question　is　asked；　in　relation　to　transcendental

theology；*　first；　whether　there　is　anything　distinct　from　the　world；

which　contains　the　ground　of　cosmical　order　and　connection　according

to　general　laws？　The　answer　is：　Certainly。　For　the　world　is　a　sum　of

phenomena；　there　must；　therefore；　be　some　transcendental　basis　of

these　phenomena；　that　is；　a　basis　cogitable　by　the　pure

understanding　alone。　If；　secondly；　the　question　is　asked　whether

this　being　is　substance；　whether　it　is　of　the　greatest　reality；

whether　it　is　necessary；　and　so　forth？　I　answer　that　this　question

is　utterly　without　meaning。　For　all　the　categories　which　aid　me　in

forming　a　conception　of　an　object　cannot　be　employed　except　in　the

world　of　sense；　and　are　without　meaning　when　not　applied　to　objects　of

actual　or　possible　experience。　Out　of　this　sphere；　they　are　not

properly　conceptions；　but　the　mere　marks　or　indices　of　conceptions；

which　we　may　admit；　although　they　cannot；　without　the　help　of

experience；　help　us　to　understand　any　subject　or　thing。　If；　thirdly；

the　question　is　whether　we　may　not　cogitate　this　being；　which　is

distinct　from　the　world；　in　analogy　with　the　objects　of　experience？

The　answer　is：　Undoubtedly；　but　only　as　an　ideal；　and　not　as　a　real

object。　That　is；　we　must　cogitate　it　only　as　an　unknown　substratum

of　the　systematic　unity；　order；　and　finality　of　the　world…　a　unity

which　reason　must　employ　as　the　regulative　principle　of　its

investigation　of　nature。　Nay；　more；　we　may　admit　into　the　idea　certain

anthropomorphic　elements；　which　are　promotive　of　the　interests　of　this

regulative　principle。　For　it　is　no　more　than　an　idea；　which　does　not

relate　directly　to　a　being　distinct　from　the　world；　but　to　the

regulative　principle　of　the　systematic　unity　of　the　world；　by　means；

however；　of　a　schema　of　this　unity…　the　schema　of　a　Supreme

Intelligence；　who　is　the　wisely…designing　author　of　the　universe。　What

this　basis　of　cosmical　unity　may　be　in　itself；　we　know　not…　we

cannot　discover　from　the　idea；　we　merely　know　how　we　ought　to　employ

the　idea　of　this　unity；　in　relation　to　the　systematic　operation　of

reason　in　the　sphere　of　experience。



　　*After　what　has　been　said　of　the　psychological　idea　of　the　ego　and

its　proper　employment　as　a　regulative　principle　of　the　operations　of

reason；　I　need　not　enter　into　details　regarding　the　transcendental

illusion　by　which　the　systematic　unity　of　all　the　various　phenomena　of

the　internal　sense　is　hypostatized。　The　procedure　is　in　this　case　very

similar　to　that　which　has　been　discussed　in　our　remarks　on　the

theological　ideal。



　　But；　it　will　be　asked　again；　can　we　on　these　grounds；　admit　the

existence　of　a　wise　and　omnipotent　author　of　the　world？　Without　doubt；

and　not　only　so；　but　we　must　assume　the　existence　of　such　a　being。　But

do　we　thus　extend　the　limits　of　our　knowledge　beyond　the　field　of

possible　experience？　By　no　means。　For　we　have　merely　presupposed　a

something；　of　which　we　have　no　conception；　which　we　do　not　know　as

it　is　in　itself；　but；　in　relation　to　the　systematic　disposition　of　the

universe；　which　we　must　presuppose　in　all　our　observation　of　nature；

we　have　cogitated　this　unknown　being　in　analogy　with　an　intelligent

existence　（an　empirical　conception）；　that　is　to　say；　we　have　endowed

it　with　those　attributes；　which；　judging　from　the　nature　of　our　own

reason；　may　contain　the　ground　of　such　a　systematic　unity。　This　idea

is　therefore　valid　only　relatively　to　the　employment　in　experience

of　our　reason。　But　if　we　attribute　to　it　absolute　and　objective

validity；　we　overlook　the　fact　that　it　is　merely　an　ideal　being　that

we　cogitate；　and；　by　setting　out　from　a　basis　which　is　not

determinable　by　considerations　drawn　from　experience；　we　place

ourselves　in　a　position　which　incapacitates　us　from　applying　this

principle　to　the　empirical　employment　of　reason。

　　But；　it　will　be　asked　further；　can　I　make　any　use　of　this　conception

and　hypothesis　in　my　investigations　into　the　world　and　nature？　Yes；

for　this　very　purpose　was　the　idea　established　by　reason　as　a

fundamental　basis。　But　may　I　regard　certain　arrangements；　which　seemed

to　have　been　made　in　conformity　with　some　fixed　aim；　as　the

arrangements　of　design；　and　look　upon　them　as　proceeding　from　the

divine　will；　with　the　intervention；　however；　of　certain　other

particular　arrangements　disposed　to　that　end？　Yes；　you　may　do　so；

but　at　the　same　time　you　must　regard　it　as　indifferent；　whether　it

is　asserted　that　divine　wisdom　has　disposed　all　things　in　conformity

with　his　highest　aims；　or　that　the　idea　of　supreme　wisdom　is　a

regulative　principle　in　the　investigation　of　nature；　and　at　the　same

time　a　principle　of　the　systematic　unity　of　nature　according　to

general　laws；　even　in　those　cases　where　we　are　unable　to　discover　that

unity。　In　other　words；　it　must　be　perfectly　indifferent　to　you　whether

you　say；　when　you　have　discovered　this　unity：　God　has　wisely　willed　it

so；　or：　Nature　has　wisely　arranged　this。　For　it　was　nothing　but　the

systematic　unity；　which　reason　requires　as　a　basis　for　the

investigation　of　nature；　that　justified　you　in　accepting　the　idea　of　a

supreme　intelligence　as　a　schema　for　a　regulative　principle；　and；

the　farther　you　advance　in　the　discovery　of　design　and　finality；　the

more　certain　the　validity　of　your　idea。　But；　as　the　whole　aim　of

this　regulative　principle　was　the　discovery　of　a　necessary　and

systematic　unity　in　nature；　we　have；　in　so　far　as　we　attain　this；　to

attribute　our　success　to　the　idea　of　a　Supreme　Being；　while；　at　the

same　time；　we　cannot；　without　involving　ourselves　in　contradictions；

overlook　the　general　laws　of　nature；　as　it　was　in　reference　to　them

alone　that　this　idea　was　employed。　We　cannot；　I　say；　overlook　the

general　laws　of　nature；　and　regard　this　conformity　to　aims

observable　in　nature　as　contingent　or　hyperphysical　in　its　origin；

inasmuch　as　there　is　no　ground　which　can　justify　us　in　the　admission

of　a　being　with　such　properties　distinct　from　and　above　nature。　All

that　we　are　authorized　to　assert　is　that　this　idea　may　be　employed

as　a　principle；　and　that　the　properties　of　the　being　which　is

assumed　to　correspond　to　it　may　be　regarded　as　systematically

connected　in　analogy　with　the　causal　determination　of　phenomena。

　　For　the　same　reasons　we　are　justified　in　introducing　into　the　idea

of　the　supreme　cause　other　anthropomorphic　elements　（for　without　these

we　could　not　predicate　anything　of　it）；　we　may　regard　it　as

allowable　to　cogitate　this　cause　as　a　being　with　understanding；　the

feelings　of　pleasure　and　displeasure；　and　faculties　of　desire　and　will

corresponding　to　these。　At　the　same　time；　we　may　attribute　to　this

being　infinite　perfection…　a　perfection　which　necessarily　transcends

that　which　our　knowledge　of　the　order　and　design　in　the　world

authorize　us　to　predicate　of　it。　For　the　regulative　law　of

systematic　unity　requires　us　to　study　nature　on　the　supposition　that

systematic　and　final　unity　in　infinitum　is　everywhere　discoverable；

even　in　the　highest　diversity。　For；　although　we　may　discover　little　of

this　cosmical　perfection；　it　belongs　to　the　legislative　prerogative　of

reason　to　require　us　always　to　seek　for　and　to　expect　it；　while　it

must　always　be　beneficial　to　institute　all　inquiries　into　nature　in

accordance　with　this　principl