the critique of pure reason-第13章

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answer　to　the　following　questions：

　　How　is　pure　mathematical　science　possible？

　　How　is　pure　natural　science　possible？

　　Respecting　these　sciences；　as　they　do　certainly　exist；　it　may　with

propriety　be　asked；　how　they　are　possible？…　for　that　they　must　be

possible　is　shown　by　the　fact　of　their　really　existing。*　But　as　to

metaphysics；　the　miserable　progress　it　has　hitherto　made；　and　the　fact

that　of　no　one　system　yet　brought　forward；　far　as　regards　its　true

aim；　can　it　be　said　that　this　science　really　exists；　leaves　any　one　at

liberty　to　doubt　with　reason　the　very　possibility　of　its　existence。



　　*As　to　the　existence　of　pure　natural　science；　or　physics；　perhaps

many　may　still　express　doubts。　But　we　have　only　to　look　at　the

different　propositions　which　are　commonly　treated　of　at　the

commencement　of　proper　（empirical）　physical　science…　those；　for

example；　relating　to　the　permanence　of　the　same　quantity　of　matter；

the　vis　inertiae；　the　equality　of　action　and　reaction；　etc。…　to　be

soon　convinced　that　they　form　a　science　of　pure　physics　（physica　pura；

or　rationalis）；　which　well　deserves　to　be　separately　exposed　as　a

special　science；　in　its　whole　extent；　whether　that　be　great　or

confined。



　　Yet；　in　a　certain　sense；　this　kind　of　knowledge　must

unquestionably　be　looked　upon　as　given；　in　other　words；　metaphysics

must　be　considered　as　really　existing；　if　not　as　a　science；

nevertheless　as　a　natural　disposition　of　the　human　mind　（metaphysica

naturalis）。　For　human　reason；　without　any　instigations　imputable　to

the　mere　vanity　of　great　knowledge；　unceasingly　progresses；　urged　on

by　its　own　feeling　of　need；　towards　such　questions　as　cannot　be

answered　by　any　empirical　application　of　reason；　or　principles　derived

therefrom；　and　so　there　has　ever　really　existed　in　every　man　some

system　of　metaphysics。　It　will　always　exist；　so　soon　as　reason

awakes　to　the　exercise　of　its　power　of　speculation。　And　now　the

question　arises：　〃How　is　metaphysics；　as　a　natural　disposition；

possible？〃　In　other　words；　how；　from　the　nature　of　universal　human

reason；　do　those　questions　arise　which　pure　reason　proposes　to　itself；

and　which　it　is　impelled　by　its　own　feeling　of　need　to　answer　as

well　as　it　can？

　　But　as　in　all　the　attempts　hitherto　made　to　answer　the　questions

which　reason　is　prompted　by　its　very　nature　to　propose　to　itself；

for　example；　whether　the　world　had　a　beginning；　or　has　existed　from

eternity；　it　has　always　met　with　unavoidable　contradictions；　we　must

not　rest　satisfied　with　the　mere　natural　disposition　of　the　mind　to

metaphysics；　that　is；　with　the　existence　of　the　faculty　of　pure

reason；　whence；　indeed；　some　sort　of　metaphysical　system　always

arises；　but　it　must　be　possible　to　arrive　at　certainty　in　regard　to

the　question　whether　we　know　or　do　not　know　the　things　of　which

metaphysics　treats。　We　must　be　able　to　arrive　at　a　decision　on　the

subjects　of　its　questions；　or　on　the　ability　or　inability　of　reason　to

form　any　judgement　respecting　them；　and　therefore　either　to　extend

with　confidence　the　bounds　of　our　pure　reason；　or　to　set　strictly

defined　and　safe　limits　to　its　action。　This　last　question；　which

arises　out　of　the　above　universal　problem；　would　properly　run　thus：

〃How　is　metaphysics　possible　as　a　science？〃

　　Thus；　the　critique　of　reason　leads　at　last；　naturally　and

necessarily；　to　science；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　the　dogmatical　use　of

reason　without　criticism　leads　to　groundless　assertions；　against　which

others　equally　specious　can　always　be　set；　thus　ending　unavoidably

in　scepticism。

　　Besides；　this　science　cannot　be　of　great　and　formidable　prolixity；

because　it　has　not　to　do　with　objects　of　reason；　the　variety　of

which　is　inexhaustible；　but　merely　with　Reason　herself　and　her

problems；　problems　which　arise　out　of　her　own　bosom；　and　are　not

proposed　to　her　by　the　nature　of　outward　things；　but　by　her　own

nature。　And　when　once　Reason　has　previously　become　able　completely

to　understand　her　own　power　in　regard　to　objects　which　she　meets

with　in　experience；　it　will　be　easy　to　determine　securely　the　extent

and　limits　of　her　attempted　application　to　objects　beyond　the　confines

of　experience。

　　We　may　and　must；　therefore；　regard　the　attempts　hitherto　made　to

establish　metaphysical　science　dogmatically　as　non…existent。　For

what　of　analysis；　that　is；　mere　dissection　of　conceptions；　is

contained　in　one　or　other；　is　not　the　aim　of；　but　only　a　preparation

for　metaphysics　proper；　which　has　for　its　object　the　extension；　by

means　of　synthesis；　of　our　a　priori　knowledge。　And　for　this　purpose；

mere　analysis　is　of　course　useless；　because　it　only　shows　what　is

contained　in　these　conceptions；　but　not　how　we　arrive；　a　priori；　at

them；　and　this　it　is　her　duty　to　show；　in　order　to　be　able

afterwards　to　determine　their　valid　use　in　regard　to　all　objects　of

experience；　to　all　knowledge　in　general。　But　little　self…denial；

indeed；　is　needed　to　give　up　these　pretensions；　seeing　the　undeniable；

and　in　the　dogmatic　mode　of　procedure；　inevitable　contradictions　of

Reason　with　herself；　have　long　since　ruined　the　reputation　of　every

system　of　metaphysics　that　has　appeared　up　to　this　time。　It　will

require　more　firmness　to　remain　undeterred　by　difficulty　from

within；　and　opposition　from　without；　from　endeavouring；　by　a　method

quite　opposed　to　all　those　hitherto　followed；　to　further　the　growth

and　fruitfulness　of　a　science　indispensable　to　human　reason…　a　science

from　which　every　branch　it　has　borne　may　be　cut　away；　but　whose

roots　remain　indestructible。



　　VII。　Idea　and　Division　of　a　Particular　Science；　under　the

　　　　　　　Name　of　a　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。



　　From　all　that　has　been　said；　there　results　the　idea　of　a

particular　science；　which　may　be　called　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。

For　reason　is　the　faculty　which　furnishes　us　with　the　principles　of

knowledge　a　priori。　Hence；　pure　reason　is　the　faculty　which　contains

the　principles　of　cognizing　anything　absolutely　a　priori。　An　organon

of　pure　reason　would　be　a　compendium　of　those　principles　according

to　which　alone　all　pure　cognitions　a　priori　can　be　obtained。　The

completely　extended　application　of　such　an　organon　would　afford　us　a

system　of　pure　reason。　As　this；　however；　is　demanding　a　great　deal；

and　it　is　yet　doubtful　whether　any　extension　of　our　knowledge　be

here　possible；　or；　if　so；　in　what　cases；　we　can　regard　a　science　of

the　mere　criticism　of　pure　reason；　its　sources　and　limits；　as　the

propaedeutic　to　a　system　of　pure　reason。　Such　a　science　must　not　be

called　a　doctrine；　but　only　a　critique　of　pure　reason；　and　its　use；　in

regard　to　speculation；　would　be　only　negative；　not　to　enlarge　the

bounds　of；　but　to　purify；　our　reason；　and　to　shield　it　against

error…　which　alone　is　no　little　gain。　I　apply　the　term

transcendental　to　all　knowledge　which　is　not　so　much　occupied　with

objects　as　with　the　mode　of　our　cognition　of　these　objects；　so　far

as　this　mode　of　cognition　is　possible　a　priori。　A　system　of　such

conceptions　would　be　called　transcendental　philosophy。　But　this；

again；　is　still　beyond　the　bounds　of　our　present　essay。　For　as　such

a　science　must　contain　a　complete　exposition　not　only　of　our

synthetical　a　priori；　but　of　our　analytical　a　priori　knowledge；　it

is　of　too　wide　a　range　for　our　present　purpose；　because　we　do　not

require　to　carry　our　analysis　any　farther　than　is　necessary　to

understand；　in　their　full　extent；　the　principles　of　synthesis　a

priori；　with　which　alone　we　have　to　do。　This　investigation；　which　we

cannot　properly　call　a　doctrine；　but　only　a　transcendental　critique；

because　it　aims　not　at　the　enlargement；　but　at　the　correction　and

guidance；　of　our　knowledge；　and　is　to　serve　as　a　touchstone　of　the

worth　or　worthlessness　of　all　knowledge　a　priori；　is　the　sole　object

of　our　present　essay。　Such　a　critique　is　consequently；　as　far　as

possible；　a　preparation　for　an　organon；　and　if　this　new　organon　should

be　found　to　fail；　at　least　for　a　canon　of　pure