the critique of pure reason-第117章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
to declare: There are certain subjects which cannot be annihilated
in thought。 But this is nothing more than saying: There exist subjects
which are absolutely necessary… the very hypothesis which you are
called upon to establish。 For I find myself unable to form the
slightest conception of a thing which when annihilated in thought with
all its predicates; leaves behind a contradiction; and contradiction
is the only criterion of impossibility in the sphere of pure a
priori conceptions。
Against these general considerations; the justice of which no one
can dispute; one argument is adduced; which is regarded as
furnishing a satisfactory demonstration from the fact。 It is
affirmed that there is one and only one conception; in which the
non…being or annihilation of the object is self…contradictory; and
this is the conception of an ens realissimum。 It possesses; you say;
all reality; and you feel yourselves justified in admitting the
possibility of such a being。 (This I am willing to grant for the
present; although the existence of a conception which is not
self…contradictory is far from being sufficient to prove the
possibility of an object。)* Now the notion of all reality embraces
in it that of existence; the notion of existence lies; therefore; in
the conception of this possible thing。 If this thing is annihilated in
thought; the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated;
which is self…contradictory。
*A conception is always possible; if it is not self…contradictory。
This is the logical criterion of possibility; distinguishing the
object of such a conception from the nihil negativum。 But it may be;
notwithstanding; an empty conception; unless the objective reality
of this synthesis; but which it is generated; is demonstrated; and a
proof of this kind must be based upon principles of possible
experience; and not upon the principle of analysis or contradiction。
This remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding; from
the possibility of a conception… which is logical… the possibility
of a thing… which is real。
I answer: It is absurd to introduce… under whatever term
disguised… into the conception of a thing; which is to be cogitated
solely in reference to its possibility; the conception of its
existence。 If this is admitted; you will have apparently gained the
day; but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tautology。 I ask;
is the proposition; this or that thing (which I am admitting to be
possible) exists; an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If the
former; there is no addition made to the subject of your thought by
the affirmation of its existence; but then the conception in your
minds is identical with the thing itself; or you have supposed the
existence of a thing to be possible; and then inferred its existence
from its internal possibility… which is but a miserable tautology。 The
word reality in the conception of the thing; and the word existence in
the conception of the predicate; will not help you out of the
difficulty。 For; supposing you were to term all positing of a thing
reality; you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates in
the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence; and
this you merely repeat in the predicate。 But if you confess; as
every reasonable person must; that every existential proposition is
synthetical; how can it be maintained that the predicate of
existence cannot be denied without contradiction?… a property which is
the characteristic of analytical propositions; alone。
I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this
sophistical mode of argumentation; by a strict definition of the
conception of existence; did not my own experience teach me that the
illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real
predicate (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing)
resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration。 A
logical predicate may be what you please; even the subject may be
predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a
judgement。 But the determination of a conception is a predicate; which
adds to and enlarges the conception。 It must not; therefore; be
contained in the conception。
Being is evidently not a real predicate; that is; a conception of
something which is added to the conception of some other thing。 It
is merely the positing of a thing; or of certain determinations in it。
Logically; it is merely the copula of a judgement。 The proposition;
God is omnipotent; contains two conceptions; which have a certain
object or content; the word is; is no additional predicate… it
merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject。 Now; if
I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being
one); and say: God is; or; There is a God; I add no new predicate to
the conception of God; I merely posit or affirm the existence of the
subject with all its predicates… I posit the object in relation to
my conception。 The content of both is the same; and there is no
addition made to the conception; which expresses merely the
possibility of the object; by my cogitating the object… in the
expression; it is… as absolutely given or existing。 Thus the real
contains no more than the possible。 A hundred real dollars contain
no more than a hundred possible dollars。 For; as the latter indicate
the conception; and the former the object; on the supposition that the
content of the former was greater than that of the latter; my
conception would not be an expression of the whole object; and would
consequently be an inadequate conception of it。 But in reckoning my
wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than
in a hundred possible dollars… that is; in the mere conception of
them。 For the real object… the dollars… is not analytically
contained in my conception; but forms a synthetical addition to my
conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state);
although this objective reality… this existence… apart from my
conceptions; does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid
hundred dollars。
By whatever and by whatever number of predicates… even to the
complete determination of it… I may cogitate a thing; I do not in
the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the
statement: This thing exists。 Otherwise; not exactly the same; but
something more than what was cogitated in my conception; would
exist; and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception
had real existence。 If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of
reality except one; the mode of reality which is absent is not added
to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing
exists; on the contrary; the thing exists… if it exist at all… with
the same defect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise not
that which was cogitated; but something different; exists。 Now; if I
cogitate a being as the highest reality; without defect or
imperfection; the question still remains… whether this being exists or
not? For; although no element is wanting in the possible real
content of my conception; there is a defect in its relation to my
mental state; that is; I am ignorant whether the cognition of the
object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori。 And
here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent。 If the
question regarded an object of sense merely; it would be impossible
for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing。 For
the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according
with the general conditions of experience; while the existence of
the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of
actual experience。 At the same time; this connection with the world of
experience does not in the least augment the conception; although a
possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind。
But if we cog