the critique of pure reason-第112章

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assume　the　existence　of　a　self…subsistent　reality　out　of　the　field

of　experience；　and　are　therefore　obliged　to　regard　phenomena　as　merely

a　contingent　mode　of　representing　intelligible　objects　employed　by

beings　which　are　themselves　intelligences…　no　other　course　remains　for

us　than　to　follow　an　alogy　and　employ　the　same　mode　in　forming　some

conception　of　intelligible　things；　of　which　we　have　not　the　least

knowledge；　which　nature　taught　us　to　use　in　the　formation　of　empirical

conceptions。　Experience　made　us　acquainted　with　the　contingent。　But　we

are　at　present　engaged　in　the　discussion　of　things　which　are　not

objects　of　experience；　and　must；　therefore；　deduce　our　knowledge　of

them　from　that　which　is　necessary　absolutely　and　in　itself；　that　is；

from　pure　conceptions。　Hence　the　first　step　which　we　take　out　of　the

world　of　sense　obliges　us　to　begin　our　system　of　new　cognition　with

the　investigation　of　a　necessary　being；　and　to　deduce　from　our

conceptions　of　it　all　our　conceptions　of　intelligible　things。　This

we　propose　to　attempt　in　the　following　chapter。

　　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　III。　The　Ideal　of　Pure　Reason。



　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I。　Of　the　Ideal　in　General。



　　We　have　seen　that　pure　conceptions　do　not　present　objects　to　the

mind；　except　under　sensuous　conditions；　because　the　conditions　of

objective　reality　do　not　exist　in　these　conceptions；　which　contain；　in

fact；　nothing　but　the　mere　form　of　thought。　They　may；　however；　when

applied　to　phenomena；　be　presented　in　concreto；　for　it　is　phenomena

that　present　to　them　the　materials　for　the　formation　of　empirical

conceptions；　which　are　nothing　more　than　concrete　forms　of　the

conceptions　of　the　understanding。　But　ideas　are　still　further

removed　from　objective　reality　than　categories；　for　no　phenomenon

can　ever　present　them　to　the　human　mind　in　concreto。　They　contain　a

certain　perfection；　attainable　by　no　possible　empirical　cognition；　and

they　give　to　reason　a　systematic　unity；　to　which　the　unity　of

experience　attempts　to　approximate；　but　can　never　completely　attain。

　　But　still　further　removed　than　the　idea　from　objective　reality　is

the　Ideal；　by　which　term　I　understand　the　idea；　not　in　concreto；　but

in　individuo…　as　an　individual　thing；　determinable　or　determined　by

the　idea　alone。　The　idea　of　humanity　in　its　complete　perfection

supposes　not　only　the　advancement　of　all　the　powers　and　faculties；

which　constitute　our　conception　of　human　nature；　to　a　complete

attainment　of　their　final　aims；　but　also　everything　which　is　requisite

for　the　complete　determination　of　the　idea；　for　of　all　contradictory

predicates；　only　one　can　conform　with　the　idea　of　the　perfect　man。

What　I　have　termed　an　ideal　was　in　Plato's　philosophy　an　idea　of　the

divine　mind…　an　individual　object　present　to　its　pure　intuition；　the

most　perfect　of　every　kind　of　possible　beings；　and　the　archetype　of

all　phenomenal　existences。

　　Without　rising　to　these　speculative　heights；　we　are　bound　to　confess

that　human　reason　contains　not　only　ideas；　but　ideals；　which

possess；　not；　like　those　of　Plato；　creative；　but　certainly　practical

power…　as　regulative　principles；　and　form　the　basis　of　the

perfectibility　of　certain　actions。　Moral　conceptions　are　not　perfectly

pure　conceptions　of　reason；　because　an　empirical　element…　of

pleasure　or　pain…　lies　at　the　foundation　of　them。　In　relation；

however；　to　the　principle；　whereby　reason　sets　bounds　to　a　freedom

which　is　in　itself　without　law；　and　consequently　when　we　attend　merely

to　their　form；　they　may　be　considered　as　pure　conceptions　of　reason。

Virtue　and　wisdom　in　their　perfect　purity　are　ideas。　But　the　wise

man　of　the　Stoics　is　an　ideal；　that　is　to　say；　a　human　being

existing　only　in　thought　and　in　complete　conformity　with　the　idea　of

wisdom。　As　the　idea　provides　a　rule；　so　the　ideal　serves　as　an

archetype　for　the　perfect　and　complete　determination　of　the　copy。　Thus

the　conduct　of　this　wise　and　divine　man　serves　us　as　a　standard　of

action；　with　which　we　may　compare　and　judge　ourselves；　which　may

help　us　to　reform　ourselves；　although　the　perfection　it　demands　can

never　be　attained　by　us。　Although　we　cannot　concede　objective

reality　to　these　ideals；　they　are　not　to　be　considered　as　chimeras；　on

the　contrary；　they　provide　reason　with　a　standard；　which　enables　it　to

estimate；　by　comparison；　the　degree　of　incompleteness　in　the　objects

presented　to　it。　But　to　aim　at　realizing　the　ideal　in　an　example　in

the　world　of　experience…　to　describe；　for　instance；　the　character　of

the　perfectly　wise　man　in　a　romance…　is　impracticable。　Nay　more；　there

is　something　absurd　in　the　attempt；　and　the　result　must　be　little

edifying；　as　the　natural　limitations；　which　are　continually　breaking

in　upon　the　perfection　and　completeness　of　the　idea；　destroy　the

illusion　in　the　story　and　throw　an　air　of　suspicion　even　on　what　is

good　in　the　idea；　which　hence　appears　fictitious　and　unreal。

　　Such　is　the　constitution　of　the　ideal　of　reason；　which　is　always

based　upon　determinate　conceptions；　and　serves　as　a　rule　and　a　model

for　limitation　or　of　criticism。　Very　different　is　the　nature　of　the

ideals　of　the　imagination。　Of　these　it　is　impossible　to　present　an

intelligible　conception；　they　are　a　kind　of　monogram；　drawn

according　to　no　determinate　rule；　and　forming　rather　a　vague

picture…　the　production　of　many　diverse　experiences…　than　a

determinate　image。　Such　are　the　ideals　which　painters　and

physiognomists　profess　to　have　in　their　minds；　and　which　can　serve

neither　as　a　model　for　production　nor　as　a　standard　for

appreciation。　They　may　be　termed；　though　improperly；　sensuous

ideals；　as　they　are　declared　to　be　models　of　certain　possible

empirical　intuitions。　They　cannot；　however；　furnish　rules　or　standards

for　explanation　or　examination　with

　　In　its　ideals；　reason　aims　at　complete　and　perfect　determination

according　to　a　priori　rules；　and　hence　it　cogitates　an　object；　which

must　be　completely　determinable　in　conformity　with　principles；

although　all　empirical　conditions　are　absent；　and　the　conception　of

the　object　is　on　this　account　transcendent。



　　　　　　　SECTION　II。　Of　the　Transcendental　Ideal　（Prototypon

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Trancendentale）。



　　Every　conception　is；　in　relation　to　that　which　is　not　contained　in

it；　undetermined　and　subject　to　the　principle　of　determinability。　This

principle　is　that；　of　every　two　contradictorily　opposed　predicates；

only　one　can　belong　to　a　conception。　It　is　a　purely　logical　principle；

itself　based　upon　the　principle　of　contradiction；　inasmuch　as　it　makes

complete　abstraction　of　the　content　and　attends　merely　to　the

logical　form　of　the　cognition。

　　But　again；　everything；　as　regards　its　possibility；　is　also　subject

to　the　principle　of　complete　determination；　according　to　which　one

of　all　the　possible　contradictory　predicates　of　things　must　belong

to　it。　This　principle　is　not　based　merely　upon　that　of

contradiction；　for；　in　addition　to　the　relation　between　two

contradictory　predicates；　it　regards　everything　as　standing　in　a

relation　to　the　sum　of　possibilities；　as　the　sum　total　of　all

predicates　of　things；　and；　while　presupposing　this　sum　as　an　a

priori　condition；　presents　to　the　mind　everything　as　receiving　the

possibility　of　its　individual　existence　from　the　relation　it　bears　to；

and　the　share　it　possesses　in；　the　aforesaid　sum　of　possibilities。*

The　principle　of　complete　determination　relates　the　content　and　not　to

the　logical　form。　It　is　the　principle　of　the　synthesis　of　all　the

predicates　which　are　required　to　constitute　the　complete　conception　of

a　thing；　and　not　a　mere　principle　analytical　representation；　which

enounces　that　one　of　two　contradictory　predicates　must　belong　to　a

conception。　It　contains；　moreover；　a　transcendental　presupposition…

that；　namely；　of　the　material　for　all　possibility；　which　must

contain　a　priori　the　data　for　this　or　that　particular　possibility。



　　*Thus　this　principle　declares　everything　to　possess　a　relati