the critique of pure reason-第108章

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themselves　effects；　and　presuppose　causes　preceding　them　in　time。　A

primal　action　which　forms　an　absolute　beginning；　is　beyond　the

causal　power　of　phenomena。

　　Now；　is　it　absolutely　necessary　that；　granting　that　all　effects

are　phenomena；　the　causality　of　the　cause　of　these　effects　must　also

be　a　phenomenon　and　belong　to　the　empirical　world？　Is　it　not　rather

possible　that；　although　every　effect　in　the　phenomenal　world　must　be

connected　with　an　empirical　cause；　according　to　the　universal　law　of

nature；　this　empirical　causality　may　be　itself　the　effect　of　a

non…empirical　and　intelligible　causality…　its　connection　with

natural　causes　remaining　nevertheless　intact？　Such　a　causality　would

be　considered；　in　reference　to　phenomena；　as　the　primal　action　of　a

cause；　which　is　in　so　far；　therefore；　not　phenomenal；　but；　by　reason

of　this　faculty　or　power；　intelligible；　although　it　must；　at　the

same　time；　as　a　link　in　the　chain　of　nature；　be　regarded　as

belonging　to　the　sensuous　world。

　　A　belief　in　the　reciprocal　causality　of　phenomena　is　necessary；　if

we　are　required　to　look　for　and　to　present　the　natural　conditions　of

natural　events；　that　is　to　say；　their　causes。　This　being　admitted　as

unexceptionably　valid；　the　requirements　of　the　understanding；　which

recognizes　nothing　but　nature　in　the　region　of　phenomena；　are

satisfied；　and　our　physical　explanations　of　physical　phenomena　may

proceed　in　their　regular　course；　without　hindrance　and　without

opposition。　But　it　is　no　stumbling…block　in　the　way；　even　assuming　the

idea　to　be　a　pure　fiction；　to　admit　that　there　are　some　natural　causes

in　the　possession　of　a　faculty　which　is　not　empirical；　but

intelligible；　inasmuch　as　it　is　not　determined　to　action　by

empirical　conditions；　but　purely　and　solely　upon　grounds　brought

forward　by　the　understanding…　this　action　being　still；　when　the

cause　is　phenomenized；　in　perfect　accordance　with　the　laws　of

empirical　causality。　Thus　the　acting　subject；　as　a　causal

phenomenon；　would　continue　to　preserve　a　complete　connection　with

nature　and　natural　conditions；　and　the　phenomenon　only　of　the

subject　（with　all　its　phenomenal　causality）　would　contain　certain

conditions；　which；　if　we　ascend　from　the　empirical　to　the

transcendental　object；　must　necessarily　be　regarded　as　intelligible。

For；　if　we　attend；　in　our　inquiries　with　regard　to　causes　in　the　world

of　phenomena；　to　the　directions　of　nature　alone；　we　need　not　trouble

ourselves　about　the　relation　in　which　the　transcendental　subject；

which　is　completely　unknown　to　us；　stands　to　these　phenomena　and　their

connection　in　nature。　The　intelligible　ground　of　phenomena　in　this

subject　does　not　concern　empirical　questions。　It　has　to　do　only　with

pure　thought；　and；　although　the　effects　of　this　thought　and　action

of　the　pure　understanding　are　discoverable　in　phenomena；　these

phenomena　must　nevertheless　be　capable　of　a　full　and　complete

explanation；　upon　purely　physical　grounds　and　in　accordance　with

natural　laws。　And　in　this　case　we　attend　solely　to　their　empirical　and

omit　all　consideration　of　their　intelligible　character　（which　is　the

transcendental　cause　of　the　former）　as　completely　unknown；　except　in

so　far　as　it　is　exhibited　by　the　latter　as　its　empirical　symbol。　Now

let　us　apply　this　to　experience。　Man　is　a　phenomenon　of　the　sensuous

world　and；　at　the　same　time；　therefore；　a　natural　cause；　the　causality

of　which　must　be　regulated　by　empirical　laws。　As　such；　he　must　possess

an　empirical　character；　like　all　other　natural　phenomena。　We　remark

this　empirical　character　in　his　actions；　which　reveal　the　presence

of　certain　powers　and　faculties。　If　we　consider　inanimate　or　merely

animal　nature；　we　can　discover　no　reason　for　ascribing　to　ourselves

any　other　than　a　faculty　which　is　determined　in　a　purely　sensuous

manner。　But　man；　to　whom　nature　reveals　herself　only　through　sense；

cognizes　himself　not　only　by　his　senses；　but　also　through　pure

apperception；　and　this　in　actions　and　internal　determinations；　which

he　cannot　regard　as　sensuous　impressions。　He　is　thus　to　himself；　on

the　one　hand；　a　phenomenon；　but　on　the　other　hand；　in　respect　of

certain　faculties；　a　purely　intelligible　object…　intelligible；　because

its　action　cannot　be　ascribed　to　sensuous　receptivity。　These　faculties

are　understanding　and　reason。　The　latter；　especially；　is　in　a　peculiar

manner　distinct　from　all　empirically…conditioned　faculties；　for　it

employs　ideas　alone　in　the　consideration　of　its　objects；　and　by

means　of　these　determines　the　understanding；　which　then　proceeds　to

make　an　empirical　use　of　its　own　conceptions；　which；　like　the　ideas　of

reason；　are　pure　and　non…empirical。

　　That　reason　possesses　the　faculty　of　causality；　or　that　at　least

we　are　compelled　so　to　represent　it；　is　evident　from　the

imperatives；　which　in　the　sphere　of　the　practical　we　impose　on　many　of

our　executive　powers。　The　words　I　ought　express　a　species　of

necessity；　and　imply　a　connection　with　grounds　which　nature　does　not

and　cannot　present　to　the　mind　of　man。　Understanding　knows　nothing

in　nature　but　that　which　is；　or　has　been；　or　will　be。　It　would　be

absurd　to　say　that　anything　in　nature　ought　to　be　other　than　it　is

in　the　relations　of　time　in　which　it　stands；　indeed；　the　ought；　when

we　consider　merely　the　course　of　nature；　bas　neither　application　nor

meaning。　The　question；　〃What　ought　to　happen　in　the　sphere　of　nature？〃

is　just　as　absurd　as　the　question；　〃What　ought　to　be　the　properties　of

a　circle？〃　All　that　we　are　entitled　to　ask　is；　〃What　takes　place　in

nature？〃　or；　in　the　latter　case；　〃What　are　the　properties　of　a

circle？〃

　　But　the　idea　of　an　ought　or　of　duty　indicates　a　possible　action；　the

ground　of　which　is　a　pure　conception；　while　the　ground　of　a　merely

natural　action　is；　on　the　contrary；　always　a　phenomenon。　This　action

must　certainly　be　possible　under　physical　conditions；　if　it　is

prescribed　by　the　moral　imperative　ought；　but　these　physical　or

natural　conditions　do　not　concern　the　determination　of　the　will

itself；　they　relate　to　its　effects　alone；　and　the　consequences　of

the　effect　in　the　world　of　phenomena。　Whatever　number　of　motives

nature　may　present　to　my　will；　whatever　sensuous　impulses…　the　moral

ought　it　is　beyond　their　power　to　produce。　They　may　produce　a

volition；　which；　so　far　from　being　necessary；　is　always　conditioned…　a

volition　to　which　the　ought　enunciated　by　reason；　sets　an　aim　and　a

standard；　gives　permission　or　prohibition。　Be　the　object　what　it

may；　purely　sensuous…　as　pleasure；　or　presented　by　pure　reason…　as

good；　reason　will　not　yield　to　grounds　which　have　an　empirical　origin。

Reason　will　not　follow　the　order　of　things　presented　by　experience；

but；　with　perfect　spontaneity；　rearranges　them　according　to　ideas；

with　which　it　compels　empirical　conditions　to　agree。　It　declares；　in

the　name　of　these　ideas；　certain　actions　to　be　necessary　which

nevertheless　have　not　taken　place　and　which　perhaps　never　will　take

place；　and　yet　presupposes　that　it　possesses　the　faculty　of

causality　in　relation　to　these　actions。　For；　in　the　absence　of　this

supposition；　it　could　not　expect　its　ideas　to　produce　certain

effects　in　the　world　of　experience。

　　Now；　let　us　stop　here　and　admit　it　to　be　at　least　possible　that

reason　does　stand　in　a　really　causal　relation　to　phenomena。　In　this

case　it　must…　pure　reason　as　it　is…　exhibit　an　empirical　character。

For　every　cause　supposes　a　rule；　according　to　which　certain

phenomena　follow　as　effects　from　the　cause；　and　every　rule　requires

uniformity　in　these　effects；　and　this　is　the　proper　ground　of　the

conception　of　a　cause…　as　a　faculty　or　power。　Now　this　conception

（of　a　cause）　may　be　termed　the　empirical　character　of　reason；　and　this

character　is　a　permanent　one；　while　the　effects　produced　appear；　in

conformity　with　the　various　conditions　which　accompany　and　partly

limit　them；　in　various　forms。

　　Thus　the　volition　of　every　man　has　an　empirical　character；　which

is　nothing　more　th