the critique of pure reason-第101章

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skill　in　discussion；　maintained　and　subverted　the　same　proposition

by　arguments　as　powerful　and　convincing　on　the　one　side　as　on　the

other。　He　maintained；　for　example；　that　God　（who　was　probably

nothing　more；　in　his　view；　than　the　world）　is　neither　finite　nor

infinite；　neither　in　motion　nor　in　rest；　neither　similar　nor

dissimilar　to　any　other　thing。　It　seemed　to　those　philosophers　who

criticized　his　mode　of　discussion　that　his　purpose　was　to　deny

completely　both　of　two　self…contradictory　propositions…　which　is

absurd。　But　I　cannot　believe　that　there　is　any　justice　in　this

accusation。　The　first　of　these　propositions　I　shall　presently　consider

in　a　more　detailed　manner。　With　regard　to　the　others；　if　by　the　word

of　God　he　understood　merely　the　Universe；　his　meaning　must　have

been…　that　it　cannot　be　permanently　present　in　one　place…　that　is；

at　rest…　nor　be　capable　of　changing　its　place…　that　is；　of　moving…

because　all　places　are　in　the　universe；　and　the　universe　itself　is；

therefore；　in　no　place。　Again；　if　the　universe　contains　in　itself

everything　that　exists；　it　cannot　be　similar　or　dissimilar　to　any

other　thing；　because　there　is；　in　fact；　no　other　thing　with　which　it

can　be　compared。　If　two　opposite　judgements　presuppose　a　contingent

impossible；　or　arbitrary　condition；　both…　in　spite　of　their　opposition

（which　is；　however；　not　properly　or　really　a　contradiction）…　fall

away；　because　the　condition；　which　ensured　the　validity　of　both；　has

itself　disappeared。

　　If　we　say：　〃Everybody　has　either　a　good　or　a　bad　smell；〃　we　have

omitted　a　third　possible　judgement…　it　has　no　smell　at　all；　and　thus

both　conflicting　statements　may　be　false。　If　we　say：　〃It　is　either

good…smelling　or　not　good…smelling　（vel　suaveolens　vel

non…suaveolens）；〃　both　judgements　are　contradictorily　opposed；　and　the

contradictory　opposite　of　the　former　judgement…　some　bodies　are　not

good…smelling…　embraces　also　those　bodies　which　have　no　smell　at

all。　In　the　preceding　pair　of　opposed　judgements　（per　disparata）；

the　contingent　condition　of　the　conception　of　body　（smell）　attached　to

both　conflicting　statements；　instead　of　having　been　omitted　in　the

latter；　which　is　consequently　not　the　contradictory　opposite　of　the

former。

　　If；　accordingly；　we　say：　〃The　world　is　either　infinite　in　extension；

or　it　is　not　infinite　（non　est　infinitus）〃；　and　if　the　former

proposition　is　false；　its　contradictory　opposite…　the　world　is　not

infinite…　must　be　true。　And　thus　I　should　deny　the　existence　of　an

infinite；　without；　however　affirming　the　existence　of　a　finite

world。　But　if　we　construct　our　proposition　thus：　〃The　world　is

either　infinite　or　finite　（non…infinite）；〃　both　statements　may　be

false。　For；　in　this　case；　we　consider　the　world　as　per　se　determined

in　regard　to　quantity；　and　while；　in　the　one　judgement；　we　deny　its

infinite　and　consequently；　perhaps；　its　independent　existence；　in

the　other；　we　append　to　the　world；　regarded　as　a　thing　in　itself；　a

certain　determination…　that　of　finitude；　and　the　latter　may　be　false

as　well　as　the　former；　if　the　world　is　not　given　as　a　thing　in　itself；

and　thus　neither　as　finite　nor　as　infinite　in　quantity。　This　kind　of

opposition　I　may　be　allowed　to　term　dialectical；　that　of

contradictories　may　be　called　analytical　opposition。　Thus　then；　of　two

dialectically　opposed　judgements　both　may　be　false；　from　the　fact；

that　the　one　is　not　a　mere　contradictory　of　the　other；　but　actually

enounces　more　than　is　requisite　for　a　full　and　complete　contradiction。

　　When　we　regard　the　two　propositions…　〃The　world　is　infinite　in

quantity；〃　and；　〃The　world　is　finite　in　quantity；〃　as　contradictory

opposites；　we　are　assuming　that　the　world…　the　complete　series　of

phenomena…　is　a　thing　in　itself。　For　it　remains　as　a　permanent

quantity；　whether　I　deny　the　infinite　or　the　finite　regress　in　the

series　of　its　phenomena。　But　if　we　dismiss　this　assumption…　this

transcendental　illusion…　and　deny　that　it　is　a　thing　in　itself；　the

contradictory　opposition　is　metamorphosed　into　a　merely　dialectical

one；　and　the　world；　as　not　existing　in　itself…　independently　of　the

regressive　series　of　my　representations…　exists　in　like　manner　neither

as　a　whole　which　is　infinite　nor　as　a　whole　which　is　finite　in　itself。

The　universe　exists　for　me　only　in　the　empirical　regress　of　the　series

of　phenomena　and　not　per　se。　If；　then；　it　is　always　conditioned；　it　is

never　completely　or　as　a　whole；　and　it　is；　therefore；　not　an

unconditioned　whole　and　does　not　exist　as　such；　either　with　an

infinite；　or　with　a　finite　quantity。

　　What　we　have　here　said　of　the　first　cosmological　idea…　that　of　the

absolute　totality　of　quantity　in　phenomena…　applies　also　to　the

others。　The　series　of　conditions　is　discoverable　only　in　the

regressive　synthesis　itself；　and　not　in　the　phenomenon　considered　as　a

thing　in　itself…　given　prior　to　all　regress。　Hence　I　am　compelled　to

say：　〃The　aggregate　of　parts　in　a　given　phenomenon　is　in　itself

neither　finite　nor　infinite；　and　these　parts　are　given　only　in　the

regressive　synthesis　of　decomposition…　a　synthesis　which　is　never

given　in　absolute　completeness；　either　as　finite；　or　as　infinite。〃　The

same　is　the　case　with　the　series　of　subordinated　causes；　or　of　the

conditioned　up　to　the　unconditioned　and　necessary　existence；　which　can

never　be　regarded　as　in　itself；　ind　in　its　totality；　either　as

finite　or　as　infinite；　because；　as　a　series　of　subordinate

representations；　it　subsists　only　in　the　dynamical　regress　and

cannot　be　regarded　as　existing　previously　to　this　regress；　or　as　a

self…subsistent　series　of　things。

　　Thus　the　antinomy　of　pure　reason　in　its　cosmological　ideas

disappears。　For　the　above　demonstration　has　established　the　fact

that　it　is　merely　the　product　of　a　dialectical　and　illusory

opposition；　which　arises　from　the　application　of　the　idea　of

absolute　totality…　admissible　only　as　a　condition　of　things　in

themselves…　to　phenomena；　which　exist　only　in　our　representations；

and…　when　constituting　a　series…　in　a　successive　regress。　This

antinomy　of　reason　may；　however；　be　really　profitable　to　our

speculative　interests；　not　in　the　way　of　contributing　any　dogmatical

addition；　but　as　presenting　to　us　another　material　support　in　our

critical　investigations。　For　it　furnishes　us　with　an　indirect　proof　of

the　transcendental　ideality　of　phenomena；　if　our　minds　were　not

completely　satisfied　with　the　direct　proof　set　forth　in　the

Trancendental　Aesthetic。　The　proof　would　proceed　in　the　following

dilemma。　If　the　world　is　a　whole　existing　in　itself；　it　must　be　either

finite　or　infinite。　But　it　is　neither　finite　nor　infinite…　as　has　been

shown；　on　the　one　side；　by　the　thesis；　on　the　other；　by　the

antithesis。　Therefore　the　world…　the　content　of　all　phenomena…　is

not　a　whole　existing　in　itself。　It　follows　that　phenomena　are　nothing；

apart　from　our　representations。　And　this　is　what　we　mean　by

transcendental　ideality。

　　This　remark　is　of　some　importance。　It　enables　us　to　see　that　the

proofs　of　the　fourfold　antinomy　are　not　mere　sophistries…　are　not

fallacious；　but　grounded　on　the　nature　of　reason；　and　valid…　under　the

supposition　that　phenomena　are　things　in　themselves。　The　opposition　of

the　judgements　which　follow　makes　it　evident　that　a　fallacy　lay　in　the

initial　supposition；　and　thus　helps　us　to　discover　the　true

constitution　of　objects　of　sense。　This　transcendental　dialectic　does

not　favour　scepticism；　although　it　presents　us　with　a　triumphant

demonstration　of　the　advantages　of　the　sceptical　method；　the　great

utility　of　which　is　apparent　in　the　antinomy；　where　the　arguments　of

reason　were　allowed　to　confront　each　other　in　undiminished　force。

And　although　the　result　of　these　conflicts　of　reason　is　not　what　we

expected…　although　we　have　obtained　no　positive　dogmatical　addition　to

metaphysical　science…　we　have　still　reaped　a　great　advantage　in　the

correction　of　our　judgements　on　these　subjects　of　thought。



　　　　　SECTION　VIII。　Regulati