the psychology of revolution-第43章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



extremely　advantageous　to　the　French。　　Had　the　Austrians　marched

upon　Paris　in　the　summer　of　1793；　‘‘we　should；''　said　General

Thiebault；　‘‘have　lost　a　hundred　times　for　one。　　They　alone

saved　us；　by　giving　us　time　to　make　soldiers；　officers；　and

generals。''



After　the　treaty　of　Basle；　France　had　no　important　adversaries　on

the　Continent；　save　the　Austrians。　　It　was　then　that　the

Directory　attacked　Austria　in　Italy。　　Bonaparte　was　entrusted

with　the　charge　of　this　campaign。　　After　a　year　of　fighting；　from

April；　1796；　to　April；　1797；　he　forced　the　last　enemies　of　France

to　demand　peace。





3。　　Psychological　and　Military　Factors　which　determined　the

Success　of　the　Revolutionary　Armies。





To　realise　the　causes　of　the　success　of　the　revolutionary　armies

we　must　remember　the　prodigious　enthusiasm；　endurance；　and

abnegation　of　these　ragged　and　often　barefoot　troops。　　Thoroughly

steeped　in　revolutionary　principles；　they　felt　that　they　were　the

apostles　of　a　new　religion；　which　was　destined　to　regenerate　the

world。



The　history　of　the　armies　of　the　Revolution　recalls　that　of　the

nomads　of　Arabia；　who；　excited　to　fanaticism　by　the　ideals　of

Mohammed；　were　transformed　into　formidable　armies　which　rapidly

conquered　a　portion　of　the　old　Roman　world。　　An　analogous　faith

endowed　the　Republican　soldiers　with　a　heroism　and　intrepidity

which　never　failed　them；　and　which　no　reverse　could　shake

When　the　Convention　gave　place　to　the　Directory　they　had

liberated　the　country；　and　had　carried　a　war　of　invasion　into　the

enemy's　territory。　　At　this　period　the　soldiers　were　the　only

true　Republicans　left　in　France。



Faith　is　contagious；　and　the　Revolution　was　regarded　as　a　new

era；　so　that　several　of　the　nations　invaded；　oppressed　by　the

absolutism　of　their　monarchs；　welcomed　the　invaders　as

liberators。　　The　inhabitants　of　Savoy　ran　out　to　meet　the　troops。



At　Mayence　the　crowd　welcomed　them　with　enthusiasm　planted　trees

of　liberty；　and　formed　a　Convention　in　imitation　of　that　of

Paris。



So　long　as　the　armies　of　the　Revolution　had　to　deal　with　peoples

bent　under　the　yoke　of　absolute　monarchy；　and　having　no　personal

ideal　to　defend；　their　success　was　relatively　easy。　　But　when

they　entered　into　conflict　with　peoples　who　had　an　ideal　as

strong　as　their　own　victory　became　far　more　difficult。



The　new　ideal　of　liberty　and　equality　was　capable　of　seducing

peoples　who　had　no　precise　convictions；　and　were　suffering　from

the　despotism　of　their　masters；　but　it　was　naturally　powerless

against　those　who　possessed　a　potent　ideal　of　their　own　which　had

been　long　established　in　their　minds。　　For　this　reason　Bretons

and　Vendeeans；　whose　religious　and　monarchical　sentiments　were

extremely　powerful；　successfully　struggled　for　years　against　the

armies　of　the　Republic。



In　March；　1793；　the　insurrections　of　the　Vendee　and　Brittany

had　spread　to　ten　departments。　　The　Vendeeans　in　Poitou

and　the　Chouans　in　Brittany　put　80；000　men　in　the　field。



The　conflicts　between　contrary　idealsthat　is；　between　beliefs

in　which　reason　can　play　no　partare　always　pitiless；　and　the

struggle　with　the　Vendee　immediately　assumed　the　ferocious

savagery　always　observable　in　religious　wars。　　It　lasted　until

the　end　of　1795；　when　Hoche　finally　‘‘pacified''　the　country。　

This　pacification　was　the　simple　result　of　the　practical

extermination　of　its　defenders。



‘‘After　two　years　of　civil　war；''　writes　Molinari；　‘‘the

Vendee　was　no　more　than　a　hideous　heap　of　ruins。　　About

900；000　individualsmen；　women；　children；　and　aged　peoplehad

perished；　and　the　small　number　of　those　who　had　escaped　massacre

could　scarcely　find　food　or　shelter。　　The　fields　were　devastated；

the　hedges　and　walls　destroyed；　and　the　houses　burned。''



Besides　their　faith；　which　so　often　rendered　them　invincible；　the

soldiers　of　the　Revolution　had　usually　the　advantage　of　being　led

by　remarkable　generals；　full　of　ardour　and　formed　on　the　battle…

field。



The　majority　of　the　former　leaders　of　the　army；　being　nobles；　had

emigrated　so　that　a　new　body　of　officers　had　to　be　organised。　

The　result　was　that　those　gifted　with　innate　military　aptitudes

had　a　chance　of　showing　them；　and　passed　through　all　the　grades

of　rank　in　a　few　months。　　Hoche；　for　instance；　a　corporal　in

1789；　was　a　general　of　division　and　commander　of　an　army　at　the

age　of　twenty…five。　　The　extreme　youth　of　these　leaders　resulted

in　a　spirit　of　aggression　to　which　the　armies　opposed　to　them

were　not　accustomed。　　Selected　only　according　to　merit；

and　hampered　by　no　traditions；　no　routine；　they　quickly　succeeded

in　working　out　a　tactics　suited　to　the　new　necessities。



Of　soldiers　without　experience　opposed　to　seasoned　professional

troops；　drilled　and　trained　according　to　the　methods　in　use

everywhere　since　the　Seven　Years'　War；　one　could　not　expect

complicated　manoeuvres。



Attacks　were　delivered　simply　by　great　masses　of　troops。　　Thanks

to　the　numbers　of　the　men　at　the　disposal　of　their　generals；　the

considerable　gaps　provoked　by　this　efficacious　but　barbarous

procedure　could　be　rapidly　filled。



Deep　masses　of　men　attacked　the　enemy　with　the　bayonet；　and

quickly　routed　men　accustomed　to　methods　which　were　more　careful

of　the　lives　of　soldiers。　　The　slow　rate　of　fire　in　those　days

rendered　the　French　tactics　relatively　easy　of　employment。　　It

triumphed；　but　at　the　cost　of　enormous　losses。　　It　has　been

calculated　that　between　1792　and　1800　the　French　army　left　more

than　a　third　of　its　effective　force　on　the　battle…field　（700；000

men　out　of　2；000；000）。



Examining　events　from　a　psychological　point　of　view；　we　shall

continue　to　elicit　the　consequences　from　the　facts　on　which　they

are　consequent。



A　study　of　the　revolutionary　crowds　in　Paris　and　in　the　armies

presents　very　different　but　readily　interpreted　pictures。



We　have　proved　that　crowds；　unable　to　reason；　obey　simply　their

impulses；　which　are　always　changing；　but　we　have　also　seen　that

they　are　readily　capable　of　heroism；　that　their　altruism　is　often

highly　developed；　and　that　it　is　easy　to　find　thousands　of

men　ready　to　give　their　lives　for　a　belief。



Psychological　characteristics　so　diverse　must　naturally；

according　to　the　circumstances；　lead　to　dissimilar　and　even

absolutely　contradictory　actions。　　The　history　of　the　Convention

and　its　armies　proves　as　much。　　It　shows　us　crowds　composed　of

similar　elements　acting　so　differently　in　Paris　and　on　the

frontiers　that　one　can　hardly　believe　the　same　people　can　be　in

question。



In　Paris　the　crowds　were　disorderly；　violent；　murderous；　and　so

changeable　in　their　demands　as　to　make　all　government　impossible。



In　the　armies　the　picture　was　entirely　different。　　The　same

multitudes　of　unaccustomed　men；　restrained　by　the　orderly

elements　of　a　laborious　peasant　population；　standardised　by

military　discipline；　and　inspired　by　contagious　enthusiasm；

heroically　supported　privations；　disdained　perils；　and

contributed　to　form　that　fabulous　strain　which　triumphed　over　the

most　redoubtable　troops　in　Europe。



These　facts　are　among　those　which　should　always　be　invoked　to

show　the　force　of　discipline。　　It　transforms　men。　　Liberated　from

its　influence；　peoples　and　armies　become　barbarian　hordes。



This　truth　is　daily　and　increasingly　forgotten。　　Ignoring　the

fundamental　laws　of　collective　logic；　we　give　way　more　and　more

to　shifting　popular　impulses；　instead　of　learning　to　direct　them。



The　multitude　must　be　shown　the　road　to　follow；　it　is　not　for

them　to　choose　it。







CHAPTER　VII



PSYCHOLOGY　OF　THE　LEADERS　OF　THE　REVOLUTION





1。　　Mentality　of　the　Men　of　the　Revolution。　　The　respective

Influence　of　Violent　and　Feeble　Characters。



Men　judge　with　their　intelligence；　and　are　guided　by　their

characters。　　To　understand　a　man　fully　one　must　separate　these

two　elements。



During　the　great　periods　of　activit