on memory and reminiscence-第2章

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perception　of　the　mere　impression　be　memory　of　something　else；　instead



of　being　related　to　this　impression　alone？　For　when　one　actually



remembers；　this　impression　is　what　he　contemplates；　and　this　is　what



he　perceives。　How　then　does　he　remember　what　is　not　present？　One　might



as　well　suppose　it　possible　also　to　see　or　hear　that　which　is　not



present。　In　reply；　we　suggest　that　this　very　thing　is　quite



conceivable；　nay；　actually　occurs　in　experience。　A　picture　painted



on　a　panel　is　at　once　a　picture　and　a　likeness：　that　is；　while　one　and



the　same；　it　is　both　of　these；　although　the　'being'　of　both　is　not　the



same；　and　one　may　contemplate　it　either　as　a　picture；　or　as　a



likeness。　Just　in　the　same　way　we　have　to　conceive　that　the　mnemonic



presentation　within　us　is　something　which　by　itself　is　merely　an



object　of　contemplation；　while；　in…relation　to　something　else；　it　is



also　a　presentation　of　that　other　thing。　In　so　far　as　it　is　regarded



in　itself；　it　is　only　an　object　of　contemplation；　or　a　presentation；



but　when　considered　as　relative　to　something　else；　e。g。　as　its



likeness；　it　is　also　a　mnemonic　token。　Hence；　whenever　the　residual



sensory　process　implied　by　it　is　actualized　in　consciousness；　if　the



soul　perceives　this　in　so　far　as　it　is　something　absolute；　it



appears　to　occur　as　a　mere　thought　or　presentation；　but　if　the　soul



perceives　it　qua　related　to　something　else；　then；…just　as　when　one



contemplates　the　painting　in　the　picture　as　being　a　likeness；　and



without　having　（at　the　moment）　seen　the　actual　Koriskos；



contemplates　it　as　a　likeness　of　Koriskos；　and　in　that　case　the



experience　involved　in　this　contemplation　of　it　（as　relative）　is



different　from　what　one　has　when　he　contemplates　it　simply　as　a



painted　figure…（so　in　the　case　of　memory　we　have　the　analogous



difference　for）；　of　the　objects　in　the　soul；　the　one　（the　unrelated



object）　presents　itself　simply　as　a　thought；　but　the　other　（the



related　object）　just　because；　as　in　the　painting；　it　is　a　likeness；



presents　itself　as　a　mnemonic　token。



　　We　can　now　understand　why　it　is　that　sometimes；　when　we　have　such



processes；　based　on　some　former　act　of　perception；　occurring　in　the



soul；　we　do　not　know　whether　this　really　implies　our　having　had



perceptions　corresponding　to　them；　and　we　doubt　whether　the　case　is　or



is　not　one　of　memory。　But　occasionally　it　happens　that　（while　thus



doubting）　we　get　a　sudden　idea　and　recollect　that　we　heard　or　saw



something　formerly。　This　（occurrence　of　the　'sudden　idea'）　happens



whenever；　from　contemplating　a　mental　object　as　absolute；　one



changes　his　point　of　view；　and　regards　it　as　relative　to　something



else。



　　The　opposite　（sc。　to　the　case　of　those　who　at　first　do　not　recognize



their　phantasms　as　mnemonic）　also　occurs；　as　happened　in　the　cases



of　Antipheron　of　Oreus　and　others　suffering　from　mental　derangement；



for　they　were　accustomed　to　speak　of　their　mere　phantasms　as　facts



of　their　past　experience；　and　as　if　remembering　them。　This　takes　place



whenever　one　contemplates　what　is　not　a　likeness　as　if　it　were　a



likeness。



　　Mnemonic　exercises　aim　at　preserving　one's　memory　of　something　by



repeatedly　reminding　him　of　it；　which　implies　nothing　else　（on　the



learner's　part）　than　the　frequent　contemplation　of　something　（viz。　the



'mnemonic'；　whatever　it　may　be）　as　a　likeness；　and　not　as　out　of



relation。



　　As　regards　the　question；　therefore；　what　memory　or　remembering　is；



it　has　now　been　shown　that　it　is　the　state　of　a　presentation；



related　as　a　likeness　to　that　of　which　it　is　a　presentation；　and　as　to



the　question　of　which　of　the　faculties　within　us　memory　is　a　function；



（it　has　been　shown）　that　it　is　a　function　of　the　primary　faculty　of



sense…perception；　i。e。　of　that　faculty　whereby　we　perceive　time。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2







　　Next　comes　the　subject　of　Recollection；　in　dealing　with　which　we



must　assume　as　fundamental　the　truths　elicited　above　in　our



introductory　discussions。　For　recollection　is　not　the　'recovery'　or



'acquisition'　of　memory；　since　at　the　instant　when　one　at　first　learns



（a　fact　of　science）　or　experiences　（a　particular　fact　of　sense）；　he



does　not　thereby　'recover'　a　memory；　inasmuch　as　none　has　preceded；



nor　does　he　acquire　one　ab　initio。　It　is　only　at　the　instant　when



the　aforesaid　state　or　affection　（of　the　aisthesis　or　upolepsis）　is



implanted　in　the　soul　that　memory　exists；　and　therefore　memory　is



not　itself　implanted　concurrently　with　the　continuous　implantation



of　the　（original）　sensory　experience。



　　Further：　at　the　very　individual　and　concluding　instant　when　first



（the　sensory　experience　or　scientific　knowledge）　has　been　completely



implanted；　there　is　then　already　established　in　the　person　affected



the　（sensory）　affection；　or　the　scientific　knowledge　（if　one　ought



to　apply　the　term　'scientific　knowledge'　to　the　（mnemonic）　state　or



affection；　and　indeed　one　may　well　remember；　in　the　'incidental'



sense；　some　of　the　things　（i。e。　ta　katholou）　which　are　properly



objects　of　scientific　knowledge）；　but　to　remember；　strictly　and



properly　speaking；　is　an　activity　which　will　not　be　immanent　until　the



original　experience　has　undergone　lapse　of　time。　For　one　remembers　now



what　one　saw　or　otherwise　experienced　formerly；　the　moment　of　the



original　experience　and　the　moment　of　the　memory　of　it　are　never



identical。



　　Again；　（even　when　time　has　elapsed；　and　one　can　be　said　really　to



have　acquired　memory；　this　is　not　necessarily　recollection；　for



firstly）　it　is　obviously　possible；　without　any　present　act　of



recollection；　to　remember　as　a　continued　consequence　of　the　original



perception　or　other　experience；　whereas　when　（after　an　interval　of



obliviscence）　one　recovers　some　scientific　knowledge　which　he　had



before；　or　some　perception；　or　some　other　experience；　the　state　of



which　we　above　declared　to　be　memory；　it　is　then；　and　then　only；



that　this　recovery　may　amount　to　a　recollection　of　any　of　the　things



aforesaid。　But；　（though　as　observed　above；　remembering　does　not



necessarily　imply　recollecting）；　recollecting　always　implies



remembering；　and　actualized　memory　follows　（upon　the　successful　act　of



recollecting）。



　　But　secondly；　even　the　assertion　that　recollection　is　the



reinstatement　in　consciousness　of　something　which　was　there　before　but



had　disappeared　requires　qualification。　This　assertion　may　be　true；



but　it　may　also　be　false；　for　the　same　person　may　twice　learn　（from



some　teacher）；　or　twice　discover　（i。e。　excogitate）；　the　same　fact。



Accordingly；　the　act　of　recollecting　ought　（in　its　definition）　to　be



distinguished　from　these　acts；　i。e。　recollecting　must　imply　in　those



who　recollect　the　presence　of　some　spring　over　and　above　that　from



which　they　originally　learn。



　　Acts　of　recollection；　as　they　occur　in　experience；　are　due　to　the



fact　that　one　movement　has　by　nature　another　that　succeeds　it　in



regular　order。



　　If　this　order　be　necessary；　whenever　a　subject　experiences　the



former　of　two　movements　thus　connected；　it　will　（invariably）



experience　the　latter；　if；　however；　the　order　be　not　necessary；　but



customary；　only　in　the　majority　of　cases　will　the　subject　experience



the　latter　of　the　two　movements。　But　it　is　a　fact　that　there　are



some　movements；　by　a　single　experience　of　which　persons　take　the



impress　of　custom　more　deeply　than　they　do　by　experiencing　others　many



times；　hence　upon　seeing　some　things　but　once　we　remember　them



better　than　others　which　we　may　have　been　frequently。



　　Whenever　therefore；　we　are　recollecting；　we　are　experiencing　certain



of　the　antecedent　movements　until　finally　we　experience　the　one



after　which　customarily　comes　that　which　we　seek。　This　explains　why　we



hunt　up　the　series　（of　kineseis）　having　started　in　thought　eit