sophist-第8章
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Theaet。 Of course。
Str。 Does false opinion think that things which are not are not；
or that in a certain sense they are？
Theaet。 Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain
sense； if any degree of falsehood is to be possible。
Str。 And does not false opinion also think that things which most
certainly exist do not exist at all？
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 And here； again； is falsehood？
Theaet。 Falsehood…yes。
Str。 And in like manner； a false proposition will be deemed to be
one which are； the nonexistence of things which are； and the
existence
of things which are not。
Theaet。 There is no other way in which a false proposition can
arise。
Str。 There is not； but the Sophist will deny these statements。 And
indeed how can any rational man assent to them； when the very
expressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us
to be unutterable； unspeakable； indescribable； unthinkable？
Do you see
his point； Theaetetus？
Theaet。 Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves
when we hazard the assertion； that falsehood exists in opinion and
in words； for in maintaining this； we are compelled over and over
again to assert being of not…being； which we admitted just now to be
an utter impossibility。
Str。 How well you remember！ And now it is high time to hold a
consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist； for if we
persist in looking for him in the class of false workers and
magicians； you see that the handles for objection and the
difficulties
which will arise are very numerous and obvious。
Theaet。 They are indeed。
Str。 We have gone through but a very small portion of
them； and they
are really infinite。
Theaet。 If that is the case； we cannot possibly catch the Sophist。
Str。 Shall we then be so faint…hearted as to give him up？
Theaet。 Certainly not； I should say； if we can get the slightest
hold upon him。
Str。 Will you then forgive me； and； as your words imply； not be
altogether displeased if I flinch a little from the grasp of such a
sturdy argument？
Theaet。 To be sure I will。
Str。 I have a yet more urgent request to make。
Theaet。 Which is…？
Str。 That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide。
Theaet。 And why？
Str。 Because； in self…defence； I must test the philosophy of my
father Parmenides； and try to prove by main force； that in a certain
sense not…being is； and that being； on the other hand； is not。
Theaet。 Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed。
Str。 Yes； a blind man； as they say； might see that； and； unless
these questions are decided in one way or another； no one when he
speaks false words； or false opinion； or idols； or images or
imitations or appearances； or about the arts which are concerned
with them； can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions。
Theaet。 Most true。
Str。 And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father's
argument； for if I am to be over…scrupulous； I shall have to give
the matter up。
Theaet。 Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so。
Str。 I have a third little request which I wish to make。
Theaet。 What is it？
Str。 You heard me…say what…I have always felt and still feel…that
I have no heart for this argument？
Theaet。 I did。
Str。 I tremble at the thought of what I have said； and expect that
you will deem me mad； when you hear of my sudden changes and
shiftings； let me therefore observe； that I am examining the
question entirely out of regard for you。
Theaet。 There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute any
impropriety to you； if you attempt this refutation and proof； take
heart； therefore； and proceed。
Str。 And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise？ I think that
the road which I must take is…
Theaet。 Which？…Let me hear。
Str。 I think that we had better； first of all； consider the points
which at present are regard as self…evident； lest we may have fallen
into some confusion； and be too ready to assent to one another；
fancying that we are quite clear about them。
Theaet。 Say more distinctly what you mean。
Str。 I think that Parmenides； and all ever yet undertook to
determine the number and nature of existences； talked to us in
rather a light and easy strain。
Theaet。 How？
Str。 As if we had been children； to whom they repeated each his
own mythus or story；…one said that there were three principles； and
that at one time there was war between certain of them； and
then again
there was peace； and they were married and begat children；
and brought
them up； and another spoke of two principles；…a moist and a dry； or
a hot and a cold； and made them marry and cohabit。 The Eleatics；
however； in our part of the world； say that things are many in name；
but in nature one； this is their mythus； which goes back to
Xenophanes； and is even older。 Then there are Ionian； and in more
recent times Sicilian muses； who have arrived at the conclusion that
to unite the two principles is safer； and to say that being
is one and
many； and that these are held together by enmity and friendship；
ever parting； ever meeting； as the…severer Muses assert； while the
gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace； but
admit a relaxation and alternation of them； peace and unity
sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite； and then again
plurality and war； by reason of a principle of strife。 Whether any
of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine； besides；
antiquity and famous men should have reverence； and not be liable to
accusations； so serious； Yet one thing may be said of them without
offence…
Theaet。 What thing？
Str。 That they went on their several ways disdaining to notice
people like ourselves； they did not care whether they took us with
them； or left us behind them。
Theaet。 How do you mean？
Str。 I mean to say； that when they talk of one； two； or more
elements； which are or have become or are becoming； or again of heat
mingling with cold； assuming in some other part of their works
separations and mixtures；…tell me； Theaetetus； do you understand
what they mean by these expressions？ When I was a younger man； I
used to fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the
term 〃not…being；〃 which is our present subject of dispute；
and now you
see in what a fix we are about it。
Theaet。 I see。
Str。 And very likely we have been getting into the same perplexity
about 〃being；〃 and yet may fancy that when anybody utters
the word； we
understand him quite easily； although we do not know about
not…being。 But we may be； equally ignorant of both。
Theaet。 I dare say。
Str。 And the same may be said of all the terms just mentioned。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 The consideration of most of them may be deferred； but we had
better now discuss the chief captain and leader of them。
Theaet。 Of what are you speaking？ You clearly think that we must
first investigate what people mean by the word 〃being。〃
Str。 You follow close at heels； Theaetetus。 For the right method；
I conceive； will be to call into our presence the dualistic
philosophers and to interrogate them。 〃Come；〃 we will say； 〃Ye； who
affirm that hot and cold or any other two principles are the
universe；
what is this term which you apply to both of them； and what do you
mean when you say that both and each of them 'are'？ How are we to
understand the word 'are'？ Upon your view； are we to suppose that
there is a third principle over and above the other two…three in
all； and not two？ For clearly you cannot say that one of the two
principles is being； and yet attribute being equally to both of
them； for； if you did； whichever of the two is identified with
being； will comprehend the other； and so they will be one and not
two。〃
Theaet。 Very true。
Str。 But perhaps you mean to give the name of 〃being〃 to both of
them together？
Theaet。 Quite likely。
Str。 〃Then； friends；〃 we shall reply to them； 〃the answer
is plainly
that the two will still be resolved into one。〃
Theaet。 Most true。
Str。 〃
