sophist-第14章
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of being； for if we could not； the worst of all consequences would
follow； we should have no philosophy。 Moreover； the necessity for
determining the nature of discourse presses upon us at this
moment； if
utterly deprived of it； we could no more hold discourse； and
deprived of it we should be if we admitted that there was no
admixture
of natures at all。
Theaet。 Very true。 But I do not understand why at this moment we
must determine the nature of discourse。
Str。 Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the
following explanation。
Theaet。 What explanation？
Str。 Not…being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many
classes diffused over all being。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And thence arises the question； whether not…being mingles
with opinion and language。
Theaet。 How so？
Str。 If not…being has no part in the proposition； then all things
must be true； but if not…being has a part； then false opinion and
false speech are possible； for。 think or to say what is not…is
falsehood； which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech。
Theaet。 That is quite true。
Str。 And where there is falsehood surely there must be deceit。
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 And if there is deceit； then all things must be full of idols
and images and fancies。
Theaet。 To be sure。
Str。 Into that region the Sophist； as we said； made his
escape； and；
when he had got there； denied the very possibility of falsehood； no
one； he argued； either conceived or uttered falsehood； inasmuch as
not…being did not in any way partake of being。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And now； not…being has been shown to partake of being； and
therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction；
but he will
probably say that some ideas partake of not…being； and some not； and
that language and opinion are of the non…partaking class； and he
will still fight to the death against the existence of the
image…making and phantastic art； in which we have placed
him； because；
as he will say； opinion and language do not partake of not…being；
and unless this participation exists； there can be no such thing as
falsehood。 And； with the view of meeting this evasion； we must begin
by enquiring into the nature of language； opinion； and
imagination； in
order that when we find them we may find also that they have
communion
with not…being； and； having made out the connection of them； may
thus prove that falsehood exists； and therein we will imprison the
Sophist； if he deserves it； or； if not； we will let him go again and
look for him in another class。
Theaet。 Certainly； Stranger； there appears to be truth in what was
said about the Sophist at first； that he was of a class not easily
caught； for he seems to have abundance of defences； which he throws
up； and which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach
the man himself。 And even now； we have with difficulty got
through his
first defence； which is the not…being of not…being； and lo！ here is
another； for we have still to show that falsehood exists in
the sphere
of language and opinion； and there will be another and
another line of
defence without end。
Str。 Any one； Theaetetus； who is able to advance even a
little ought
to be of good cheer； for what would he who is dispirited at a little
progress do； if he were making none at all； or even undergoing a
repulse？ Such a faint heart； as the proverb says； will never take a
city： but now that we have succeeded thus far； the citadel is ours；
and what remains is easier。
Theaet。 Very true。
Str。 Then； as I was saying； let us first of all obtain a
conception of language and opinion； in order that we may have
clearer grounds for determining； whether not…being has any concern
with them； or whether they are both always true； and neither of them
ever false。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 Then； now； let us speak of names； as before we were
speaking of
ideas and letters； for that is the direction in which the answer may
be expected。
Theaet。 And what is the question at issue about names？
Str。 The question at issue is whether all names may be connected
with one another； or none； or only some of them。
Theaet。 Clearly the last is true。
Str。 I understand you to say that words which have a
meaning when in
sequence may be connected； but that words which have no meaning when
in sequence cannot be connected？
Theaet。 What are you saying？
Str。 What I thought that you intended when you gave your
assent； for
there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the
voice。
Theaet。 What are they？
Str。 One of them is called nouns； and the other verbs。
Theaet。 Describe them。
Str。 That which denotes action we call a verb。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And the other； which is an articulate mark set on those who
do the actions； we call a noun。
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 A succession of nouns only is not a sentence any more than of
verbs without nouns。
Theaet。 I do not understand you。
Str。 I see that when you gave your assent you had something else
in your mind。 But what I intended to say was； that a mere succession
of nouns or of verbs is not discourse。
Theaet。 What do you mean？
Str。 I mean that words like 〃walks；〃 〃runs；〃 〃sleeps；〃 or any
other words which denote action； however many of them you string
together； do not make discourse。
Theaet。 How can they？
Str。 Or； again； when you say 〃lion；〃 〃stag；〃 〃horse；〃 or any other
words which denote agents …neither in this way of stringing words
together do you attain to discourse； for there is no expression of
action or inaction； or of the existence of existence or
non…existence indicated by the sounds； until verbs are mingled with
nouns； then the words fit； and the smallest combination of them
forms language； and is the simplest and least form of discourse。
Theaet。 Again I ask； What do you mean？
Str。 When any one says 〃A man learns；〃 should you not call this
the simplest and least of sentences？
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 Yes； for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation
about something which is； or is becoming； or has become； or will be。
And he not only names； but he does something； by connecting
verbs with
nouns； and therefore we say that he discourses； and to this
connection
of words we give the name of discourse。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And as there are some things which fit one another； and other
things which do not fit； so there are some vocal signs which do； and
others which do not； combine and form discourse。
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 There is another small matter。
Theaet。 What is it？
Str。 A sentence must and cannot help having a subject。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And must be of a certain quality。
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 And now let us mind what we are about。
Theaet。 We must do so。
Str。 I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an
action are combined； by the help of a noun and a verb； and you shall
tell me of whom the sentence speaks。
Theaet。 I will； to the best my power。
Str。 〃Theaetetus sits〃…not a very long sentence。
Theaet。 Not very。
Str。 Of whom does the sentence speak； and who is the
subject that is
what you have to tell。
Theaet。 Of me； I am the subject。
Str。 Or this sentence； again…
Theaet。 What sentence？
Str。 〃Theaetetus； with whom I am now speaking； is flying。〃
Theaet。 That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every
one to speak of me； and to apply to me。
Str。 We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain
quality。
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 And what is the quality of each of these two sentences？
Theaet。 The one； as I imagine； is false； and the other true。
Str。 The true says what is true about you？
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 And the false says what is other than true？
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were？
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And say that things are real of you which are not； for； as we
were saying； in regard to each thing or person； there is much that
