sophist-第13章
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and are existent。
Theaet。 So we may assume。
Str。 Every class； then； has plurality of being and infinity of
not…being。
Theaet。 So we must infer。
Str。 And being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds。
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 Then we may infer that being is not； in respect of as many
other things as there are； for not…being these it is itself one； and
is： not the other things； which are infinite in number。
Theaet。 That is not far from the truth。
Str。 And we must not quarrel with this result； since it is of the
nature of classes to have communion with one another； and if any one
denies our present statement ＇viz。； that being is not； etc。＇； let
him first argue with our former conclusion ＇i。e。； respecting the
communion of ideas＇； and then he may proceed to argue with what
follows。
Theaet。 Nothing can be fairer。
Str。 Let me ask you to consider a further question。
Theaet。 What question？
Str。 When we speak of not…being； we speak； I suppose； not of
something opposed to being； but only different。
Theaet。 What do you mean？
Str。 When we speak of something as not great； does the expression
seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal？
Theaet。 Certainly not。
Str。 The negative particles； ou and me； when prefixed to words； do
not imply opposition； but only difference from the words； or more
correctly from the things represented by the words； which
follow them。
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 There is another point to be considered； if you do not object。
Theaet。 What is it？
Str。 The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into
fractions like knowledge。
Theaet。 How so？
Str。 Knowledge； like the other； is one； and yet the
various parts of
knowledge have each of them their own particular name； and
hence there
are many arts and kinds of knowledge。
Theaet。 Quite true。
Str。 And is not the case the same with the parts of the
other； which
is also one？
Theaet。 Very likely； but will you tell me how？
Str。 There is some part of the other which is opposed to the
beautiful？
Theaet。 There is。
Str。 Shall we say that this has or has not a name？
Theaet。 It has； for whatever we call not beautiful is
other than the
beautiful； not than something else。
Str。 And now tell me another thing。
Theaet。 What？
Str。 Is the not…beautiful anything but this…an existence parted
off from a certain kind of existence； and again from another point
of view opposed to an existing something？
Theaet。 True。
Str。 Then the not…beautiful turns out to be the opposition of
being to being？
Theaet。 Very true。
Str。 But upon this view； is the beautiful a more real and the
not…beautiful a less real existence？
Theaet。 Not at all。
Str。 And the not…great may be said to exist； equally with
the great？
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 And； in the same way； the just must be placed in the same
category with the not…just the one cannot be said to have any more
existence than the other。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 The same may be said of other things； seeing that the
nature of
the other has a real existence； the parts of this nature must
equally be supposed to exist。
Theaet。 Of course。
Str。 Then； as would appear； the opposition of a part of the other；
and of a part of being； to one another； is； if I may venture to say
so； as truly essence as being itself； and implies not the opposite
of being； but only what is other than being。
Theaet。 Beyond question。
Str。 What then shall we call it？
Theaet。 Clearly； not…being； and this is the very nature for which
the Sophist compelled us to search。
Str。 And has not this； as you were saying； as real an existence as
any other class？ May I not say with confidence that not…being has an
assured existence； and a nature of its own？ just as the great was
found to be great and the beautiful beautiful； and the not…great
not…great； and the not…beautiful not…beautiful； in the same manner
not…being has been found to be and is not…being； and is to
be reckoned
one among the many classes of being。 Do you； Theaetetus； still feel
any doubt of this？
Theaet。 None whatever。
Str。 Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us beyond the
range of Parmenides' prohibition？
Theaet。 In what？
Str。 We have advanced to a further point； and shown him
more than he
for bad us to investigate。
Theaet。 How is that？
Str。 Why； because he says…
Not…being never is； and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way
of enquiry。
Theaet。 Yes； he says so。
Str。 Whereas； we have not only proved that things which
are not are；
but we have shown what form of being not…being is； for we have shown
that the nature of the other is； and is distributed over all
things in
their relations to one another； and whatever part of the other is
contrasted with being； this is precisely what we have
ventured to call
not…being。
Theaet。 And surely； Stranger； we were quite right。
Str。 Let not any one say； then； that while affirming the
opposition of not…being to being； we still assert the being of
not…being； for as to whether there is an opposite of being； to that
enquiry we have long said good…bye…it may or may not be； and may or
may not be capable of definition。 But as touching our present
account of not…being； let a man either convince us of error； or； so
long as he cannot； he too must say； as we are saying； that there is
a communion of classes； and that being； and difference or other；
traverse all things and mutually interpenetrate； so that the other
partakes of being； and by reason of this participation is； and yet
is not that of which it partakes； but other； and being other than
being； it is clearly a necessity that not…being should be。 again；
being； through partaking of the other； becomes a class other than
the remaining classes； and being other than all of them； is not each
one of them； and is not all the rest； so that undoubtedly there are
thousands upon thousands of cases in which being is not； and
all other
things； whether regarded individually or collectively； in many
respects are； and in many respects are not。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And he who is sceptical of this contradiction； must think how
he can find something better to say； or if。 he sees a puzzle； and
his pleasure is to drag words this way and that； the argument will
prove to him； that he is not making a worthy use of his
faculties； for
there is no charm in such puzzles； and there is no difficulty in
detecting them； but we can tell him of something else the pursuit of
which is noble and also difficult。
Theaet。 What is it？
Str。 A thing of which I have already spoken；…letting alone these
puzzles as involving no difficulty； he should be able to follow； and
criticize in detail every argument； and when a man says that the
same is in a manner other； or that other is the same； to understand
and refute him from his own point of view； and in the same respect
in which he asserts either of these affections。 But to show that
somehow and in some sense the same is other； or the other
same； or the
great small； or the like unlike； and to delight in always bringing
forward such contradictions； is no real refutation； but is
clearly the
new…born babe of some one who is only beginning to approach the
problem of being。
Theaet。 To be sure。
Str。 For certainly； my friend； the attempt to separate all
existences from one another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of
an educated or philosophical mind。
Theaet。 Why so？
Str。 The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation
of all reasoning； for only by the union of conceptions with one
another do we attain to discourse of reason。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And； observe that we were only just in time in making a
resistance to such separatists； and compelling them to admit that
one thing mingles with another。
Theaet。 Why so？
Str。 Why； that we might be able to assert discourse to be a kind
of being； for if we could not； the worst of all consequences would
