the prince-第22章
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warn a prince； who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state； that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so； and if it be not a natural affection towards him； but only discontent with their government； then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty； for it will be impossible to satisfy them。 And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern affairs； we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under the former government； and are therefore his enemies； than of those who； being discontented with it； were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it。
6。 It has been a custom with princes； in order to hold their states more securely； to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who might design to work against them； and as a place of refuge from a first attack。 I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly。 Notwithstanding that； Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might keep that state； Guido Ubaldo； Duke of Urbino； on returning to his dominion； whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia； razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province； and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it； the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision。 Fortresses； therefore； are useful or not according to circumstances； if they do you good in one way they injure you in another。 And this question can be reasoned thus： the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build fortresses； but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone。 The castle of Milan； built by Francesco Sforza； has made； and will make； more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state。 For this reason the best possible fortress isnot to be hated by the people； because； although you may hold the fortresses； yet they will not save you if the people hate you； for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you。 It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince； unless to the Countess of Forli；＇*＇ when the Count Girolamo； her consort； was killed； for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan； and thus recover her state； and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist the people。 But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her； and when the people； her enemy； were allied with foreigners。 Therefore； it would have been safer for her； both then and before； not to have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses。 All these things considered then； I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as him who does not； and I shall blame whoever； trusting in them； cares little about being hated by the people。
＇*＇ Catherine Sforza； a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia Landriani； born 1463； died 1509。 It was to the Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as envy on 1499。 A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the appointment： 〃I have been with the signori；〃 wrote Fortunati； 〃to learn whom they would send and when。 They tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli； a learned young Florentine noble； secretary to my Lords of the Ten； is to leave with me at once。〃 Cf。 〃Catherine Sforza；〃 by Count Pasolini； translated by P。 Sylvester； 1898。
CHAPTER XXI
HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN
Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a fine example。 We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon； the present King of Spain。 He can almost be called a new prince； because he has risen； by fame and glory； from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in Christendom； and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary。 In the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada； and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions。 He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance； for he held the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations； thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power and authority over them。 He was able with the money of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies； and by that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him。 Further； always using religion as a plea； so as to undertake greater schemes； he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors； nor could there be a more admirable example； nor one more rare。 Under this same cloak he assailed Africa； he came down on Italy； he has finally attacked France； and thus his achievements and designs have always been great； and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of them。 And his actions have arisen in such a way； one out of the other； that men have never been given time to work steadily against him。
Again； it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal affairs； similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano； who； when he had the opportunity； by any one in civil life doing some extraordinary thing； either good or bad； would take some method of rewarding or punishing him； which would be much spoken about。 And a prince ought； above all things； always endeavour in every action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man。
A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy； that is to say； when； without any reservation； he declares himself in favour of one party against the other； which course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral； because if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows； they are of such a character that； if one of them conquers； you have either to fear him or not。 In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war strenuously； because； in the first case； if you do not declare yourself； you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror； to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been conquered； and you will have no reasons to offer； nor anything to protect or to shelter you。 Because he who conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial； and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly； sword in hand； court his fate。
Antiochus went into Greece； being sent for by the Aetolians to drive out the Romans。 He sent envoys to the Achaeans； who were friends of the Romans； exhorting them to remain neutral； and on the other hand the Romans urged them to take up arms。 This question came to be discussed in the council of the Achaeans； where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand neutral。 To this the Roman legate answered： 〃As for that which has been said； that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war； nothing can be more erroneous； because by not interfering you will be left； without favour or consideration； the guerdon of the conqueror。〃 Thus it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality； whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with arms。 And irresolute princes； to avoid present dangers； generally follow the neutral path； and are generally ruined。 But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side； if the party with whom he allies himself conquers； although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy； yet he is indebted to him； and there is established a bond of amity； and men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you。 Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard； especially to justice。 But if he with whom you ally yourself lo
