the prince-第19章
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aintain himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round him。
That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself； and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against； for； provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people； he can only be attacked with difficulty。 For this reason a prince ought to have two fears； one from within； on account of his subjects； the other from without； on account of external powers。 From the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies； and if he is well armed he will have good friends； and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are quiet without； unless they should have been already disturbed by conspiracy； and even should affairs outside be disturbed； if he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said； as long as he does not despair； he will resist every attack； as I said Nabis the Spartan did。
But concerning his subjects； when affairs outside are disturbed he has only to fear that they will conspire secretly； from which a prince can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised； and by keeping the people satisfied with him； which it is most necessary for him to accomplish； as I said above at length。 And one of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people； for he who conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his removal； but when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them； he will not have the courage to take such a course； for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite。 And as experience shows； many have been the conspiracies； but few have been successful； because he who conspires cannot act alone； nor can he take a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents； and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content himself； for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage； so that； seeing the gain from this course to be assured； and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers； he must be a very rare friend； or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince； to keep faith with you。
And； to reduce the matter into a small compass； I say that； on the side of the conspirator； there is nothing but fear； jealousy； prospect of punishment to terrify him； but on the side of the prince there is the majesty of the principality； the laws； the protection of friends and the state to defend him； so that； adding to all these things the popular goodwill； it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire。 For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot； in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime； because on account of it he has the people for an enemy； and thus cannot hope for any escape。
Endless examples could be given on this subject； but I will be content with one； brought to pass within the memory of our fathers。 Messer Annibale Bentivogli； who was prince in Bologna （grandfather of the present Annibale）； having been murdered by the Canneschi； who had conspired against him； not one of his family survived but Messer Giovanni；＇*＇ who was in childhood： immediately after his assassination the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi。 This sprung from the popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna； which was so great that； although none remained there after the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state； the Bolognese； having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence； who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith； sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their city； and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government。
＇*＇ Giovanni Bentivogli； born in Bologna 1438； died at Milan 1508。 He ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506。 Machiavelli's strong condemnation of conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience （February 1513）； when he had been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy。
For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in esteem； but when it is hostile to him； and bears hatred towards him； he ought to fear everything and everybody。 And well…ordered states and wise princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation； and to keep the people satisfied and contented； for this is one of the most important objects a prince can have。
Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France； and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and security of the king； of these the first is the parliament and its authority； because he who founded the kingdom； knowing the ambition of the nobility and their boldness； considered that a bit to their mouths would be necessary to hold them in； and； on the other side； knowing the hatred of the people； founded in fear； against the nobles； he wished to protect them； yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the king； therefore； to take away the reproach which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people； and from the people for favouring the nobles； he set up an arbiter； who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king。 Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement； or a greater source of security to the king and kingdom。 From this one can draw another important conclusion； that princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of others； and keep those of grace in their own hands。 And further； I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles； but not so as to make himself hated by the people。
It may appear； perhaps； to some who have examined the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my opinion； seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities of soul； nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by subjects who have conspired against them。 Wishing； therefore； to answer these objections； I will recall the characters of some of the emperors； and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me； at the same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times。
It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus； they were Marcus and his son Commodus； Pertinax； Julian； Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla； Macrinus； Heliogabalus； Alexander； and Maximinus。
There is first to note that； whereas in other principalities the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended with； the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers； a matter so beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many； for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people； because the people loved peace； and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince； whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold； cruel； and rapacious； which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people； so that they could get double pay and give vent to their own greed and cruelty。 Hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who； either by birth or training； had no great authority； and most of them； especially those who came new to the principality； recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours； were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers； caring little about injuring the people。 Which course was necessary； because； as princes cannot help being hated by someone； they ought； in the first place； to avoid being hated by every one； and when they cannot compass this； they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerf
