the prince-第12章

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＇*＇　Nabis；　tyrant　of　Sparta；　conquered　by　the　Romans　under　Flamininus　　　　　in　195　B。C。；　killed　192　B。C。

＇＋＇　Messer　Giorgio　Scali。　This　event　is　to　be　found　in　Machiavelli's　　　　　〃Florentine　History；〃　Book　III。

These　principalities　are　liable　to　danger　when　they　are　passing　from　the　civil　to　the　absolute　order　of　government；　for　such　princes　either　rule　personally　or　through　magistrates。　In　the　latter　case　their　government　is　weaker　and　more　insecure；　because　it　rests　entirely　on　the　goodwill　of　those　citizens　who　are　raised　to　the　magistracy；　and　who；　especially　in　troubled　times；　can　destroy　the　government　with　great　ease；　either　by　intrigue　or　open　defiance；　and　the　prince　has　not　the　chance　amid　tumults　to　exercise　absolute　authority；　because　the　citizens　and　subjects；　accustomed　to　receive　orders　from　magistrates；　are　not　of　a　mind　to　obey　him　amid　these　confusions；　and　there　will　always　be　in　doubtful　times　a　scarcity　of　men　whom　he　can　trust。　For　such　a　prince　cannot　rely　upon　what　he　observes　in　quiet　times；　when　citizens　have　need　of　the　state；　because　then　every　one　agrees　with　him；　they　all　promise；　and　when　death　is　far　distant　they　all　wish　to　die　for　him；　but　in　troubled　times；　when　the　state　has　need　of　its　citizens；　then　he　finds　but　few。　And　so　much　the　more　is　this　experiment　dangerous；　inasmuch　as　it　can　only　be　tried　once。　Therefore　a　wise　prince　ought　to　adopt　such　a　course　that　his　citizens　will　always　in　every　sort　and　kind　of　circumstance　have　need　of　the　state　and　of　him；　and　then　he　will　always　find　them　faithful。



CHAPTER　X

CONCERNING　THE　WAY　IN　WHICH　THE　STRENGTH　OF　ALL　PRINCIPALITIES　OUGHT　TO　BE　MEASURED

It　is　necessary　to　consider　another　point　in　examining　the　character　of　these　principalities：　that　is；　whether　a　prince　has　such　power　that；　in　case　of　need；　he　can　support　himself　with　his　own　resources；　or　whether　he　has　always　need　of　the　assistance　of　others。　And　to　make　this　quite　clear　I　say　that　I　consider　those　who　are　able　to　support　themselves　by　their　own　resources　who　can；　either　by　abundance　of　men　or　money；　raise　a　sufficient　army　to　join　battle　against　any　one　who　comes　to　attack　them；　and　I　consider　those　always　to　have　need　of　others　who　cannot　show　themselves　against　the　enemy　in　the　field；　but　are　forced　to　defend　themselves　by　sheltering　behind　walls。　The　first　case　has　been　discussed；　but　we　will　speak　of　it　again　should　it　recur。　In　the　second　case　one　can　say　nothing　except　to　encourage　such　princes　to　provision　and　fortify　their　towns；　and　not　on　any　account　to　defend　the　country。　And　whoever　shall　fortify　his　town　well；　and　shall　have　managed　the　other　concerns　of　his　subjects　in　the　way　stated　above；　and　to　be　often　repeated；　will　never　be　attacked　without　great　caution；　for　men　are　always　adverse　to　enterprises　where　difficulties　can　be　seen；　and　it　will　be　seen　not　to　be　an　easy　thing　to　attack　one　who　has　his　town　well　fortified；　and　is　not　hated　by　his　people。

The　cities　of　Germany　are　absolutely　free；　they　own　but　little　country　around　them；　and　they　yield　obedience　to　the　emperor　when　it　suits　them；　nor　do　they　fear　this　or　any　other　power　they　may　have　near　them；　because　they　are　fortified　in　such　a　way　that　every　one　thinks　the　taking　of　them　by　assault　would　be　tedious　and　difficult；　seeing　they　have　proper　ditches　and　walls；　they　have　sufficient　artillery；　and　they　always　keep　in　public　depots　enough　for　one　year's　eating；　drinking；　and　firing。　And　beyond　this；　to　keep　the　people　quiet　and　without　loss　to　the　state；　they　always　have　the　means　of　giving　work　to　the　community　in　those　labours　that　are　the　life　and　strength　of　the　city；　and　on　the　pursuit　of　which　the　people　are　supported；　they　also　hold　military　exercises　in　repute；　and　moreover　have　many　ordinances　to　uphold　them。

Therefore；　a　prince　who　has　a　strong　city；　and　had　not　made　himself　odious；　will　not　be　attacked；　or　if　any　one　should　attack　he　will　only　be　driven　off　with　disgrace；　again；　because　that　the　affairs　of　this　world　are　so　changeable；　it　is　almost　impossible　to　keep　an　army　a　whole　year　in　the　field　without　being　interfered　with。　And　whoever　should　reply：　If　the　people　have　property　outside　the　city；　and　see　it　burnt；　they　will　not　remain　patient；　and　the　long　siege　and　self…　interest　will　make　them　forget　their　prince；　to　this　I　answer　that　a　powerful　and　courageous　prince　will　overcome　all　such　difficulties　by　giving　at　one　time　hope　to　his　subjects　that　the　evil　will　not　be　for　long；　at　another　time　fear　of　the　cruelty　of　the　enemy；　then　preserving　himself　adroitly　from　those　subjects　who　seem　to　him　to　be　too　bold。

Further；　the　enemy　would　naturally　on　his　arrival　at　once　burn　and　ruin　the　country　at　the　time　when　the　spirits　of　the　people　are　still　hot　and　ready　for　the　defence；　and；　therefore；　so　much　the　less　ought　the　prince　to　hesitate；　because　after　a　time；　when　spirits　have　cooled；　the　damage　is　already　done；　the　ills　are　incurred；　and　there　is　no　longer　any　remedy；　and　therefore　they　are　so　much　the　more　ready　to　unite　with　their　prince；　he　appearing　to　be　under　obligations　to　them　now　that　their　houses　have　been　burnt　and　their　possessions　ruined　in　his　defence。　For　it　is　the　nature　of　men　to　be　bound　by　the　benefits　they　confer　as　much　as　by　those　they　receive。　Therefore；　if　everything　is　well　considered；　it　will　not　be　difficult　for　a　wise　prince　to　keep　the　minds　of　his　citizens　steadfast　from　first　to　last；　when　he　does　not　fail　to　support　and　defend　them。



CHAPTER　XI

CONCERNING　ECCLESIASTICAL　PRINCIPALITIES

It　only　remains　now　to　speak　of　ecclesiastical　principalities；　touching　which　all　difficulties　are　prior　to　getting　possession；　because　they　are　acquired　either　by　capacity　or　good　fortune；　and　they　can　be　held　without　either；　for　they　are　sustained　by　the　ancient　ordinances　of　religion；　which　are　so　all…powerful；　and　of　such　a　character　that　the　principalities　may　be　held　no　matter　how　their　princes　behave　and　live。　These　princes　alone　have　states　and　do　not　defend　them；　and　they　have　subjects　and　do　not　rule　them；　and　the　states；　although　unguarded；　are　not　taken　from　them；　and　the　subjects；　although　not　ruled；　do　not　care；　and　they　have　neither　the　desire　nor　the　ability　to　alienate　themselves。　Such　principalities　only　are　secure　and　happy。　But　being　upheld　by　powers；　to　which　the　human　mind　cannot　reach；　I　shall　speak　no　more　of　them；　because；　being　exalted　and　maintained　by　God；　it　would　be　the　act　of　a　presumptuous　and　rash　man　to　discuss　them。

Nevertheless；　if　any　one　should　ask　of　me　how　comes　it　that　the　Church　has　attained　such　greatness　in　temporal　power；　seeing　that　from　Alexander　backwards　the　Italian　potentates　（not　only　those　who　have　been　called　potentates；　but　every　baron　and　lord；　though　the　smallest）　have　valued　the　temporal　power　very　slightlyyet　now　a　king　of　France　trembles　before　it；　and　it　has　been　able　to　drive　him　from　Italy；　and　to　ruin　the　Venetiansalthough　this　may　be　very　manifest；　it　does　not　appear　to　me　superfluous　to　recall　it　in　some　measure　to　memory。

Before　Charles；　King　of　France；　passed　into　Italy；＇*＇　this　country　was　under　the　dominion　of　the　Pope；　the　Venetians；　the　King　of　Naples；　the　Duke　of　Milan；　and　the　Florentines。　These　potentates　had　two　principal　anxieties：　the　one；　that　no　foreigner　should　enter　Italy　under　arms；　the　other；　that　none　of　themselves　should　seize　more　territory。　Those　about　whom　there　was　the　most　anxiety　were　the　Pope　and　the　Venetians。　To　restrain　the　Venetians　the　union　of　all　the　others　was　necessary；　as　it　was　for　the　defence　of　Ferrara；　and　to　keep　down　the　Pope　they　made　use　of　the　barons　of　Rome；　who；　being　divided　into　two　factions；　Orsini　and　Colonnesi；　had　always　a　pretext　for　disorder；　and；　standing　with　arms　in　their　hands　under　the　eyes　of　the　Pontiff；　kept　the　pontificate　weak　and　powerless。　And　although　there　might　arise　sometimes　a　courageous　pope；　such　as　Sixtus；　yet　neither　fortune　nor　wisdom　could　rid　him　of　these　annoyances。　And　the　short　life　of　a　pope　is　also　a　cause　of　weakness；　for　in　the　ten　years；　which　is　the　average　life　of　a　pope；　he　can　with　difficulty　lower　one　of　the　factions；　and　if；　so　to　speak；　one　people　should　almost　destroy　the　Col