evolution and ethics and other essays-第19章

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the　former　one。　But；　how　this　too　place；　how　the　craving　desire
produced　this　effect；　was　acknowledged　to　be　a　mystery　patent　only　to
a　Buddha。〃　（Rhys　Davids；　Hibbert　Lectures；　P。　95。）

Among　the　many　parallelisms　of　Stoicism　and　Buddhism；　it　is　curious　to
find　one　for　this　Tanha；　〃thirst；〃　or　〃craving　desire〃　for　life。
Seneca　writes　（Epist。　lxxvi。　18）：　〃Si　enim　ullum　aliud　est　bonum　quam
honestum；　sequetur　nos　aviditas　vitae　aviditas　rerum　vitam
instruentium：　quod　est　intolerabile　infinitum；　vagum。〃

Note　8　（P。　66）。

〃The　distinguishing　characteristic　of　Buddhism　was　that　it　started　a
new　line；　that　it　looked　upon　the　deepest　questions　men　have　to　solve
from　an　entirely　different　standpoint。　It　swept　away　from　the　field　of
its　vision　the　whole　of　the　great　soul　theory　which　had　hitherto　so
completely　filled　and　dominated　the　minds　of　the　superstitious　and　the
thoughtful　alike。　For　the　first　time　in　the　history　of　the　world；　it
proclaimed　a　salvation　which　each　man　could　gain　for　himself　and　by
himself；　in　this　world；　during　this　life；　without　any　the　least
reference　to　God；　or　to　Gods；　either　great　or　small。　Like　the
Upanishads；　it　placed　the　first　importance　on　knowledge；　but　it　was　no
longer　a　knowledge　of　God；　it　was　a　clear　perception　of　the　real
nature；　as　＇97＇　they　supposed　it　to　be；　of　men　and　things。　And　it　added
to　the　necessity　of　knowledge；　the　necessity　of　purity；　of　courtesy；
of　uprightness；　of　peace　and　of　a　universal　love　far　reaching；　grown
great　and　beyond　measure。〃　（Rhys　Davids；　Hibbert　Lectures；　p。　29。）

The　contemporary　Greek　philosophy　takes　an　analogous　direction。
According　to　Heracleitus；　the　universe　was　made　neither　by　Gods　nor
men；　but；　from　all　eternity；　has　been；　and　to　all　eternity；　will　be；
immortal　fire；　glowing　and　fading　in　due　measure。　（Mullach；　Heracliti
Fragmenta；　27。）　And　the　part　assigned　by　his　successors；　the　Stoics；
to　the　knowledge　and　the　volition　of　the　〃wise　man〃　made　their
Divinity　（for　logical　thinkers）　a　subject　for　compliments；　rather　than
a　power　to　be　reckoned　with。　In　Hindu　speculation　the　〃Arahat；〃　still
more　the　〃Buddha；〃　becomes　the　superior　of　Brahma；　the　stoical　〃wise
man〃　is；　at　least；　the　equal　of　Zeus。

Berkeley　affirms　over　and　over　again　that　no　idea　can　be　formed　of　a
soul　or　spirit〃If　any　man　shall　doubt　of　the　truth　of　what　is　here
delivered；　let　him　but　reflect　and　try　if　he　can　form　any　idea　of
power　or　active　being；　and　whether　he　hath　ideas　of　two　principal
powers　marked　by　the　names　of　will　and　understanding　distinct　from
each　other；　as　well　as　from　a　third　idea　of　substance　or　being　in
general；　with　a　relative　notion　of　its　supporting　or　being　the　subject
of　the　aforesaid　power；　which　is　signified　by　the　name　soul　or　spirit。
This　is　what　some　hold　but；　so　far　as　I　can　see；　the　words　will；　soul；
spirit；　do　not　stand　for　different　ideas　or；　in　truth；　for　any　idea　at
all；　but　for　something　which　is　very　different　from　ideas；　and　which；
being　an　agent；　cannot　be　like　unto　or　represented　by　Any　idea
whatever　＇though　it　must　be　owned　at　the　same　time；　that　we　have　some
notion　of　soul；　spirit；　and　the　operations　of　the　mind；　such　as
willing；　loving；　hating；　inasmuch　as　we　know　or　understand　the　meaning
of　these　words〃。　（The　Principles　of　Human　Knowledge；　lxxvi。　See　also
sections　lxxxix。；　cxxxv。；　cxlv。）

It　is　open　to　discussion；　I　think；　whether　it　is　possible　to　have
〃some　notion〃　of　that　of　which　we　can　form　no　〃idea。〃

Berkeley　attaches　several　predicates　to　the　〃perceiving　active　being
mind；　spirit；　soul　or　myself〃　（Parts　I。　II。）　It　is　said；　for　example；
to　be　〃indivisible；　incorporeal；　unextended；　and　incorruptible。〃　The
predicate　indivisible；　though　negative　in　form；　has　highly　positive
consequences。　For；　if　〃perceiving　active　being〃　is　strictly
indivisible；　man's　soul　must　be　one　with　the　Divine　spirit：　which　is
good　Hindu　or　Stoical　doctrine；　but　hardly　orthodox　Christian
philosophy。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　the　〃substance〃　of　active
perceiving　〃being〃　is　actually　divided　into　the　one　Divine　and
innumerable　human　entities；　how　can　the　predicate　〃indivisible〃　be
rigorously　applicable　to　it？

Taking　the　words　cited；　as　they　stand；　the　amount　to　the　denial　of　the
possibility　of　any　knowledge　of　substance。　〃Matter〃　having　been
resolved　into　mere　affections　of　〃spirit〃；　〃spirit〃　melts　away　into　an
admittedly　inconceivable　and　unknowable　＇99＇　hypostasis　of　thought　and
powerconsequently　the　existence　of　anything　in　the　universe　beyond　a
flow　of　phenomena　is　a　purely　hypothetical　assumption。　Indeed　a
pyrrhonist　might　raise　the　objection　that　if　〃esse〃　is　〃percipi〃
spirit　itself　can　have　no　existence　except　as　a　perception；
hypostatized　into　a　〃self；〃　or　as　a　perception　of　some　other　spirit。
In　the　former　case；　objective　reality　vanishes；　in　the　latter；　there
would　seem　to　be　the　need　of　an　infinite　series　of　spirits　each
perceiving　the　others。

It　is　curious　to　observe　how　very　closely　the　phraseology　of　Berkeley
sometimes　approaches　that　of　the　Stoics：　thus　（cxlviii。）　〃It　seems　to
be　a　general　pretence　of　the　unthinking　herd　that　they　cannot　see　God。
。　。　But；　alas；　we　need　only　open　our　eyes　to　see　the　Sovereign　Lord　of
all　things　with　a　more　full　and　clear　view；　than　we　do　any　of　our
fellow…creatures　。　。　　。　we　do　at　all　times　and　in　all　places　perceive
manifest　tokens　of　the　Divinity：　everything　we　see；　hear；　feel；　or　any
wise　perceive　by　sense；　being　a　sign　or　effect　of　the　power　of　God〃　。
。　。　cxlix。　〃It　is　therefore　plain；　that　nothing　can　be　more　evident　to
any　one　that　is　capable　of　the　least　reflection；　than　the　existence　of
God；　or　a　spirit　who　is　intimately　present　to　our　minds；　producing　in
them　all　that　variety　of　ideas　or　sensations　which　continually　affect
us；　on　whom　we　have　an　absolute　and　entire　dependence；　in　short；　in
whom　we　live　and　move　and　have　our　being。〃　cl。　〃＇But　you　will　say　hath
Nature　no　share　in　the　production　of　natural　things；　and　must　they　all
be　ascribed　to　the　immediate　and　sole　operation　of　God？　。。。　if　by
Nature　is　＇100＇　meant　some　being　distinct　from　God；　as　well　as　from
the　laws　of　nature　and　things　perceived　by　sense；　I　must　confess　that
word　is　to　me　an　empty　sound；　without　any　intelligible　meaning　annexed
to　it。＇　Nature　in　this　acceptation　is　a　vain　Chimaera　introduced　by
those　heathens；　who　had　not　just　notions　of　the　omnipresence　and
infinite　perfection　of　God。〃

Compare　Seneca　（De　Beneficiis；　iv。　7）：

〃Natura；　inquit；　haec　mihi　praestat。　Non　intelligis　te；　quum　hoc
dicis；　mutare　Nomen　Deo？　Quid　enim　est　aliud　Natura　quam　Deus；　et
divina　ratio；　toti　mundo　et　partibus　ejus　inserta？　Quoties　voles　tibi
licet　aliter　hunc　auctorem　rerum　nostrarum　compellare；　et　Jovem　illum
optimum　et　maximum　rite　dices；　et　tonantem；　et　statorem：　qui　non；　ut
historici　tradiderunt；　ex　eo　quod　post　votum　susceptum　acies　Romanorum
fugientum　stetit；　sed　quod　stant　beneficio　ejus　omnina；　stator；
stabilitorque　est：　hunc　eundem　et　fatum　si　dixeris；　non　mentieris；　nam
quum　fatum　nihil　aliud　est；　quam　series　implexa　causarum；　ille　est
prima　omnium　causa；　ea　qua　caeterae　pendent。〃　It　would　appear；
therefore；　that　the　good　Bishop　is　somewhat　hard　upon　the　〃heathen；〃
of　whose　words　his　own　might　be　a　paraphrase。

There　is　yet　another　direction　in　which　Berkeley's　philosophy；　I　will
not　say　agrees　with　Gautama's；　but　at　any　rate　helps　to　make　a
fundamental　dogma　of　Buddhism　intelligible。

〃I　find　I　can　excite　ideas　in　my　mind　at　pleasure；　and　vary　and　shift
the　scene　as　often　as　I　think　fit。　It　is　no　more　than　willing；　and
straightway　this　or　that　idea　arises　in　my　fancy：　and　by　the　same
power　＇101＇　it　is　obliterated；　and　makes　way　for　another。　This　making
and　unmaking　of　ideas　doth　very　properly　denominate　the　mind　active。
This　much　is　certain　and　grounded　on　experience。　。　。〃　（Principles；
xxviii。）

A　good　many　of　us；　I　fancy；　have　reason　to　think　that　experience　tells
them　very　much　the　contrary；　and　are　painfully　familiar　with　the
obsession　of　the　mind　by　ideas　which　cannot　be　obliterated　by　any
effort　of　the　will　and　steadily　refuse　to　make　way　for　others。　But
what　I　desire　to　point　out　is　that　if　Gautama　was　equally　confident