criminal psychology-第86章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！




＇3＇　H　Dorner：　Das　menschliche　Erkennen。　Berlin　1877。

＇4＇　O。　Klpe：　Grundriss　der　Psychologie。　Leipzig　1893。


When　we　take　all　these　opinions　concerning　memory　together　we　conclude　that　neither　any　unity　nor　any　clear　description　of　the　matter　has　been　attained。　Ebbinghaus's　sober　statement　may　certainly　be　correct：　‘‘Our　knowledge　of　memory　rises　almost　exclusively　from　the　observation　of　extreme；　especially　striking　cases。　Whenever　we　ask　about　more　special　solutions　concerning　the　detail　of　what　has　been　counted　up；　and　their　other　relations　of　dependence；　their　structure；　etc。；　there　are　no　answers。''　

Nobody　has　as　yet　paid　attention　to　the　simple　daily　events　which　constitute　the　routine　of　the　criminalists。　We　find　little　instruction　concerning　them；　and　our　difficulties　as　well　as　our　mistakes　are　thereby　increased。　Even　the　modern　repeatedly　cited　experimental　investigations　have　no　direct　bearing　upon　our　work。

We　will　content　ourselves　with　viewing　the　individual　conceptions　of　memory　and　recollection　as　occurring　in　particular　cases　and　with　considering　them；　now　one；　now　the　other；　according　to　the　requirements　of　the　case。　We　shall　consider　the　general　relation　of　‘‘reproduction''　to　memory。　‘‘Reproduction''　we　shall　consider　in　a　general　sense　and　shall　subsume　under　it　also　the　so…called　involuntary　reproductions　which　rise　in　the　forms　and　qualities　of　past　events　without　being　evoked；　i。　e。；　which　rise　with　the　help　of　unconscious　activity　through　the　more　or　less　independent　association　of　ideas。　Exactly　this　unconscious　reproduction；　this　apparently　involuntary　activity；　is　perhaps　the　most　fruitful；　and　we　therefore　unjustly　meet　with　unexceptionable　distrust　the　later　sudden　‘‘occurrence；''　especially　when　these　occurrences　happen　to　defendant　and　his　witnesses。　It　is　true　that　they　frequently　deceive　us　because　behind　the　sudden　occurrence　there　often　may　be　nothing　more　than　a　better　training　and　instruction　from　experienced　cell…mates；　though　very　often　the　circumstances　are　such　that　the　suspect　has　succeeded　through　some　released　prisoner；　or　by　a　blackened　letter；　in　sending　a　message　from　his　prison；　by　means　of　which　false　witnesses　of　alibi；　etc。；　are　provided。　Distrust　is　in　any　event　justified；　when　his　most　important　witnesses　suddenly　‘‘occur''　to　the　accused。　But　this　does　not　always　happen；　and　we　find　in　our　own　experience　evidence　of　the　fact　that　memory　and　the　capacity　to　recall　something　often　depend　upon　health；　feeling；　location；　and　chance　associations　which　can　not　be　commanded；　and　happen　as　accidentally　as　anything　in　life　can。　That　we　should　remember　anything　at　all　depends　upon　the　point　of　time。　Everybody　knows　how　important　twilight　may　be　for　memory。　Indeed；　twilight　has　been　called　the　visiting…hour　of　recollection；　and　it　is　always　worth　while　to　observe　the　situation　when　anybody　asserts　that　some　matter　of　importance　occurred　to　him　in　the　twilight。　Such　an　assertion　merits；　at　least；　further　examination。　Now；　if　we　only　know　how　these　occurrences　constitute　themselves；　it　would　not　be　difficult　to　study　them　out　and　to　estimate　their　probability。　But　we　do　not　know；　and　we　have　to　depend；　primarily；　on　observation　　and　test。　Not　one　of　the　theories　applied　is　supported　by　experience　altogether。

They　may　be　divided　into　three　essential　groups。

1。　What　is　received；　fades　away；　becomes　a　‘‘trace；''　and　is　more　or　less　overlaid　by　new　perceptions。　When　these　latter　are　ever　set　aside；　the　old　trace　comes　into　the　foreground。

2。　The　ideas　sink；　darken；　and　disintegrate。　If　they　receive　support　and　intensification　they　regain　complete　clearness。

3。　The　ideas　crumble　up；　lose　their　parts。　When　anything　occurs　that　reunites　them　and　restores　what　is　lost；　they　become　whole　again。

Ebbinghaus　maintains；　correctly　enough；　that　not　one　of　these　explanations　is　universally　satisfactory；　but　it　must　be　granted　that　now　one；　now　another　is　useful　in　controlling　this　or　that　particular　case。　The　processes　of　the　destruction　of　an　idea；　may　be　as　various　as　those　of　the　destruction　and　restoration　of　a　building。　If　a　building　is　destroyed　by　fire；　I　certainly　can　not　explain　the　image　given　by　merely　assuming　that　it　was　the　victim　of　the　hunger　of　time。　A　building　which　has　suffered　because　of　the　sinking　of　the　earth　I　shall　have　to　image　by　quite　other　means　than　those　I　would　use　if　it　had　been　destroyed　by　water。

For　the　same　reason　when；　in　court；　somebody　asserts　a　sudden　‘‘occurrence；''　or　when　we　want　to　help　him　and　something　occurs　to　him；　we　shall　have　to　proceed　in　different　fashion　and　determine　our　action　empirically　by　the　conditions　of　the　moment。　We　shall　have　to　go　back；　with　the　help　of　the　witness；　to　the　beginning　of　the　appearance　of　the　idea　in　question　and　study　its　development　as　far　as　the　material　permits　us。　In　a　similar　manner　we　must　make　use　of　every　possibility　of　explanation　when　we　are　studying　the　disappearance　of　ideas。　At　one　point　or　another　we　shall　find　certain　connections。　One　chief　mistake　in　such　reconstructive　work　lies　in　overlooking　the　fact　that　no　individual　is　merely　passive　when　he　receives　sensations；　he　is　bound　to　make　use　of　a　certain　degree　of　activity。　Locke　and　Bonnet　have　already　mentioned　this　fact；　and　anybody　may　verify　it　by　comparing　his　experiments　of　trying　to　avoid　seeing　or　hearing；　and　trying　actively　to　see　or　to　hear。　For　this　reason　it　is　foolish　to　ask　anybody　how　it　happened　that　he　perceived　less　than　another；　because　both　have　equally　good　senses　and　were　able　to　perceive　as　much。　On　the　other　hand；　the　grade　of　activity　each　has　made　use　of　in　perception　is　rarely　inquired　into；　and　this　is　the　more　unfortunate　because　memory　is　often　propor…　　tionate　to　activity。　If；　then；　we　are　to　explain　how　various　statements　concerning　contemporaneous　matters；　observed　a　long　time　ago；　are　to　be　combined；　it　will　not　be　enough　to　compare　the　memory；　sensory　acuteness；　and　intelligence　of　the　witnesses。　The　chief　point　of　attention　should　be　the　activity　which　has　been　put　in　motion　during　the　sense…perception　in　question。


Section　53。　（b）　The　Forms　of　Reproduction。


Kant　analyzes　memory：

1。　As　apprehending　something　in　memory。

2。　As　retaining　it　for　a　long　time。

3。　As　immediately　recalling　it。

One　might；　perhaps　add；　as　4：　that　the　memory…image　is　most　conformable　to　the　actual　one。　This　is　not　identical　with　the　fact　that　we　recollect　at　all。　It　is　to　be　assumed　that　the　forms　of　memory…　images　vary　very　much　with　different　persons；　because　each　individual　verifies　his　images　of　various　objects　variously。　I　know　two　men　equally　well　for　an　equal　time；　and　yet　have　two　memory…　images　of　them。　When　I　recall　one；　a　life…sized；　moving；　and　moved　figure　appears　before　me；　even　the　very　man　himself；　when　I　think　of　the　other；　I　see　only　a　small；　bare　silhouette；　foggy　and　colorless；　and　the　difference　does　not　require　that　the　first　shall　be　an　interesting　and　the　second　a　boresome　individual。　This　is　still　clearer　in　memory　of　travels。　One　city　appears　in　recollection　with　size；　color　and　movement；　real；　the　other；　in　which　I　sojourned　for　the　same　length　of　time　and　only　a　few　days　later；　under　similar　conditions　of　weather；　etc。；　appears　like　a　small；　flat　photograph。　Inquiry　reveals　that　this　is　as　true　of　other　people　as　of　me；　and　that　the　problem　of

memory　is　much　differentiated　by　the　method　of　recollection。　In　fact；　this　is　so　little　in　doubt　that　at　some　periods　of　time　there　are　more　images　of　one　sort　than　of　another　and　what　is　a　rule　for　one　kind　of　individual　is　an　exception　for　another。

Now　there　is　a　series　of　phenomena　for　which　we　possess　particular　types　of　images　which　often　have　little　to　do　with　the　things　themselves。　So　Exner　says：　‘‘We　might　know　the　physiognomy　of　an　individual　very　accurately；　be　able　to　pick　him　out　among　a　thousand；　without　being　clear　about　the　differences　between　him　and　another；　indeed；　we　often　do　not　know　the　color　of　his　eyes　and　hair；　yet　marvel　when　it　suddenly　becomes　different。''

Kries＇1＇　calls　attention　to　another　fact：　‘‘When　we　try　to　mark　in　　memory　the　contour　of　a　very　well…known　c