criminal psychology-第80章
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Even if Helmholtz is right； it is important for the lawyer to recognize the distinction between the witness who has the gymnasium behind him and the educated man who has helped himself without that institution。 Our time； which has invented the Ph。 D。； which wants to do everything for the public school and is eager to cripple the classical training in the gymnasium； has wholly forgotten that the incomparable value of the latter does not lie in the minimum of Latin and Greek which the student has acquired； but in the disciplinary intellectual drill contained in the grammar of the ancient tongues。 It is superfluous to make fun of the fact that the technician writes on his visiting cards： Stud。 Eng。 or Stud。 Mech。 and can not pronounce the words the abbreviations stand for； that he becomes Ph。 D。 and can not translate his title；these are side issues。 But it is forgotten that the total examination in which the public school pupil presents his hastily crammed Latin and Greek； never implies a careful training in his most impressionable period of life。 Hence the criminalist repeatedly discovers that the capacity for trained thinking belongs mainly to the person who has been drilled for eight years in Greek and Latin grammar。 We criminalists have much experience in this matter。
Helmholtz's first point would； for legal purposes； require very broad interpretation of the term； ‘‘universally valid laws；'' extending it also to laws in the judicial sense of the word。 The assertion is frequently made that laws are passed in the United States in order that they might not be obeyed； and political regulations are obeyed by the public for； at most； seven weeks。 Of course； the United States is no exception； it seems as if the respect for law is declining everywhere； and if this decline occurs in one field no other is likely to be free from it。 A certain subjective or egoistic attitude is potent in this regard； for people in the main conceive the law to be made only for others； they themselves are exceptions。 Narrow； unconditional adherence to general norms is not modern； and this fact is to be seen not only in the excuses offered； but also in the statements of witnesses； who expect others to follow prescriptions approximately； and themselves hardly at all。 This fact has tremendous influence on the conceptions and constructions of people； and a failure to take it into consideration means considerable error。
Not less unimportant is the second point raised in the notion of ‘‘authority。'' To judge for himself is everybody's business； and should be required of everybody。 Even if nobody should have the happy thought of making use of the better insight； the dependent person who always wants to go further will lead himself into doubtful situations。 The three important factors； school； newspaper； and theater； have reached an extraordinary degree of power。 People apperceive； think； and feel as these three teach them； and finally it becomes second nature to follow this line of least resistance； and to seek intellectual conformity。 We know well enough what consequences this has in law； and each one of us can tell how witnesses present us stories which we believe to rest on their own insight but which show themselves finally to depend upon the opinion of some other element。 We frequently base our constructions upon the remarkable and convincing unanimity of such witnesses when upon closer examination we might discover that this unanimity has a single source。 If we make this discovery it is fortunate； for only time and labor have then been lost and no mistake has been committed。 But if the discovery is not made； the unanimity remains an important； but really an unreliable means of proof。
Section 47。 （b） The Mechanism of Thinking。
Since the remarkable dissertation of W。 Ostwald；＇1＇ on Sept。 20； 1905； we have been standing at a turning point which looks toward a new view of the world。 We do not know whether the ‘‘ignorabimus'' of some of the scientists will hold； or whether we shall be able to think everything in terms of energy。 We merely observe that the supposedly invincible principles of scientific materialism are shaken。
＇1＇ W。 Ostwald： Die berwindung des wissenschaftlichen Materialismus。
Frederick the Great； in a letter to Voltaire； says something which suggests he was the first to have thought of the purely mechanical nature of thought。 Cabanis had said briefly； that the brain secretes thought as the liver bile。 Tyndall expressed this conception more cautiously； and demanded merely the confession that every act of consciousness implies a definite molecular condition of the brain； while Bois…Reymond declared that we could not explain certain psychical processes and events by knowledge of the material processes in the brain。 ‘‘You shall make no picture or comparison； but see as directly as the nature of our spirit will permit；'' Ostwald tells us； and it is well to stick to this advice。 We need neither to cast aside the mechanical view of the world nor to accept energism； neither of them is required。 But according to the teachings of the latter； we shall be enabled to recognize the meaning of natural law in the determination of how actual events are conditioned by possible ones。 And thus we shall see that the form that all natural laws turn to expresses the mediation of an invariable； a quantity that remains unchangeable even when all the other elements in the formula of a possible event alter within the limits defined by the law。＇2＇
＇2＇ A。 Hfler： Psychologie。 Vienna 1897。
Every science must provide its own philosophy； and it is our duty to know properly and to understand clearly how far we may perceive connections between the physical qualities of any one of our witnesses and his psychic nature。 We will draw no inferences ourselves； but we will take note of what does not explain itself and apply to experts to explain what we can not。 This is especially necessary where the relation of the normal to the abnormal becomes a question。
The normal effects to be spoken of are very numerous； but we shall consider only a few。 The first is the connection of symbol and symbolized。 ‘‘The circumstance that the symbol； on its side of the union of the two； becomes perfectly clear while the symbolized object is rather confused； is explained by the fact that the symbol recalls its object more quickly than the object the symbol； e。g。； the tool recalls its use more quickly than the purpose its instrument。 Name and word recall more quickly； reliably； and energetically the objects they stand for than do the objects their symbols。''＇1＇ This matter is more important than it looks at first glance； inasmuch as the particles of time with which we are dealing are greater than those with which modern psychologists have to deal；so large indeed； that they may be perceived in practice。 We lay stress during the examination； when we are in doubt about the correctness of the expected answer； upon the promptness and rapidity with which it is given。 Drawn out； tentative； and uncertain answers； we take for a sign that the witness either is unable or unwilling to give his replies honestly。 If； however； psychologically there are real reasons for variation in the time in which an answer is given； reasons which do not depend on its correctness； we must seek out this correctness。 Suppose that we have before us a case in which the name awakens more quickly and reliably the idea of the person to whom it belongs than conversely。 This occurs to any one of us； and often we can not remember the name of even a close friend for a greater or shorter period。 But we very rarely find that we do not think of the appearance of the individual whose name we hear mentioned。 But it would be wrong to relate this phenomenon to certain qualities which contradict it only apparently。 E。 g。； when I examine old statutes which I myself have worked with and review the names of the series； I recall that I had something to do with this Jones； Smith； Black； or White； and I recall what the business was； but I do not recall their appearance。 The reason is； first of all； the fact that during the trial I did not care about the names which served as a means of distinguishi
