criminal psychology-第74章
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in which a peasant was accused of having committed arson for the sake of the insurance。 He asserted that he had gone into a room with a candle and that a long spider's web which was hanging down had caught fire from it accidentally and had inflamed the straw which hung from the roof。 So the catastrophe had occurred。 Only in the second examination did it occur to anybody to ask whether spider's web can burn at all； and the first experiment showed that that was impossible。
Most experiences of this kind indicate that in recognizing events we must proceed slowly； without leaping； and that we may construct our notions only on the basis of knowledge we already possess。 Saint Thomas says； ‘‘Omnes cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente。'' If this bit of wisdom were kept in mind in the examination of witnesses it would be an easier and simpler task than usual。 Only when the unknown is connected with the known is it possible to understand the former。 If it is not done the witness will hardly be able to answer。 He nowhere finds support； or he seeks one of his own； and naturally finds the wrong one。 So the information that an ordinary traveler brings home is mainly identical with what he carries away； for he has ears and eyes only for what he expects to see。 For how long a time did the negro believe that disease pales the coral that he wears？ Yet if he had only watched it he would have seen how foolish the notion was。 How long； since Adam Smith； did people believe that extravagance helps industry； and how much longer have people called Copernicus a fool because they actually saw the sun rise and set。 So J。 S。 Mill puts his opinions on this matter。 Benneke＇1＇ adds； ‘‘If anybody describes to me an animal； a region； a work of art； or narrates an event； etc。； I get no notion through the words I hear of the appearance of the subject。 I merely have a problem set me by means of the words and signs； in the conception of the subject； and hence it depends for truth mainly upon the completeness of earlier conceptions of similar things or events； and upon the material I have imaginatively at hand。 These are my perceptual capital and my power of representation。''
＇1＇ E。 Benneke： Pragmatische Psychologie。
It naturally is not necessary to ask whether a narrator has ever seen the things he speaks of； nor to convince oneself in examination that the person in question knows accurately what he is talking about。 At the same time； the examiner ought to be clear on the matter and know what attitude to take if he is going to deal intelligibly with the other。 I might say that all of us； educated and uneducated； have apprehended and remember definite and distinct images of all things we have seen； heard； or learned from descriptions。 When we get new information we simply attach the new image to the old； or extinguish a part of the old and put the new in its place； or we retain only a more or less vigorous breath of the old with the new。 Such images go far back； even animals possess them。 One day my small son came with his exciting information that his guinea pig； well known as a stupid beast； could count。 He tried to prove this by removing the six young from their mother and hiding them so that she could not see what happened to them。 Then he took one of the six； hid it； and brought the remaining five back to the old lady。 She smelled them one after the other and then showed a good deal of excitement； as if she missed something。 Then she was again removed and the sixth pig brought back； when she was restored to her brood； she sniffed all six and showed a great deal of satisfaction。 ‘‘She could count at least six。'' Naturally the beast had only a fixed collective image of her brood； and as one was missing the image was disturbed and incorrect。 At the same time； the image was such as is created by the combination of events or circumstances。 It is not far from the images of low…browed humanity and differs only in degree from those of civilized people。
The fact that a good deal of what is said is incorrect and yet not consciously untrue； depends upon the existence of these images and their association with the new material。 The speaker and the auditor have different sets of images； the first relates the new material differently from a second； and so of course they can not agree。＇1＇ It is the difficult task of the examiner so to adapt what is said as to make it appropriate to the right images without making it possible for incorrect interpretations to enter。 When we have a well…known money…lender as witness concerning some unspeakable deal； a street…walker concerning some brawling in a peasant saloon； a clubman concerning a duel； a game…warden concerning poaching； the set of images of each one of these persons will be a bad foundation for new perceptions。 On the other hand； it will not be difficult to abstract from them correctly。 But cases of this sort are not of constant occurrence and the great trouble consists in once for all discovering what memory…images were present before the witness perceived the event in question。 The former have a great influence upon the perception of the latter。
＇1＇ Cf。 H。 Gross's Archiv； XV； 125。
In this connection it should not be forgotten that the retention of these images is somewhat pedantic and depends upon unimportant things。 In the city hall of Graz there is a secretary with thirty…six sections for the thirty…six different papers。 The name of the appropriate journal was written clearly over each section and in spite of the clearness of the script the depositing and removing of the papers required certain effort； inasmuch as the script had to be read and could not be apprehended。 Later the name of the paper was cut out of each and pasted on the secretary instead of the script； and then； in spite of the various curly and twisted letters； the habitual images of the titles were easily apprehended and their removal and return became mechanical。 The customary and identical things are so habitual that they are apprehended with greater ease than more distinct objects。
Inasmuch as we can conceive only on the basis of the constancy and similarity of forms； we make these forms the essence of experience。 On the other hand； what is constant and similar for one individual is not so for another； and essences of experience vary with the experiencer。
‘‘When we behold a die of which we can see three sides at a time； seven corners； and nine edges； we immediately induce the image or schema of a die； and we make our further sense…perception accord with this schema。 In this way we get a series of schemes which we may substitute for one another'' （Aubert）。 For the same reason we associate in description things unknown to the auditor； which we presuppose in him； and hence we can make him rightly understand only if we have named some appropriate object in comparison。 Conversely； we have to remember that everybody takes his comparison from his own experience； so that we must have had a like experience if we are to know what is compared。 It is disastrous to neglect the private nature of this experience。 Whoever has much to do with peasants； who like to make use of powerful comparisons； must first comprehend their essential life； if he is to understand how to reduce their comparisons to correct meanings。 And if he has done so he will find such comparisons and images the most distinct and the most intelligible。
Sense…perception has a great deal to do in apprehension and no one can determine the boundary where the sense activity ends and the intellectual begins。 I do not recall who has made note of the interesting fact that not one of twenty students in an Egyptian museum knew why the hands of the figures of Egyptian was pictures gave the impression of being incorrectnobody had observed the fact that all the figures had two right hands。
I once paid a great deal of attention to card…sharping tricks and as I acquired them； either of myself or from practiced gamblers； I demonstrated them to the young criminalists。 For a long time I refused to believe what an old Greek told me： ‘‘The more foolish and obvious a trick is； the more certain it is； people never see anything。'' The man w
