liberty-第11章
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putation。 IV。 From these grounds it followes； that an injury can be done to no man but him with whom we enter Covenant； or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift； or to whom somwhat is promis'd by way of bargain。 And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoyn'd： for if a Master command his Servant； who hath promis'd to obey him； to pay a summe of money； or carry some present to a third man； the Servant； if he doe it not； hath indeed damag'd this third party； but he injur'd his Master onely。 So also in a civill government； if any man offend another； with whom he hath made no Contract； he damages him to whom the evill is done； but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs： for if he； who receives the hurt； should expostulate the mischief。 and he that did it； should answer thus； What art thou to me？ Why should I rather doe according to yours； then mine owne will； since I do not hinder； but you may do your own； and not my mind？ In which speech； where there hath no manner of pre…contract past； I see not； I confesse； what is reprehensible。 Injury can be done against no man＇ The word injustice relates to some Law： Injury to some Person； as well as some Law。 For what's unjust； is unjust to all； but there may an injury be done； and yet not against me； nor thee； but some other； and sometimes against no private Person； but the Magistrate only； sometimes also neither against the Magistrate； nor any private man； but onely against God； for through Contract； and conveighance of Right； we say； that an injury is done against this； or that man。 Hence it is （which we see in all kind of Government） that what private men contract between themselves by word； or writing； is releast againe at the will of the Obliger。 But those mischiefes which are done against the Lawes of the Land； as theft； homicide； and the like； are punisht not as he wills； to whom the hurt is done； but according to the will of the Magistrate； that is； the constituted Lawes。 V。 These words just； and unjust； as also justice； and injustice； are equivocall； for they signifie one thing when they are attributed to Persons； another when to actions： When they are attributed to Actions； Just signifies as much as what's done with Right； and unjust； as what's done with injury： he who hath done some just thing is not therefore said to be a just Person； but guiltlesse； and he that hath done some unjust thing； we doe not therefore say he is an unjust； but guilty man。 But when the words are applyed to Persons； to be just； signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing； to study how to doe righteousnesse； or to indeavour in all things to doe that which is just； and to be unjust； is to neglect righteous dealing； or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract； but some present benefit； so as the justice or injustice of the mind； the intention； or the man； is one thing； that of an action； or omission； another； and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust； and of an unjust man； just： But that man is to be accounted just； who doth just things because the Law commands it； unjust things only by reason of his infirmity； and he is properly said to be unjust who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annext unto the Law； and unrighteousnesse by reason of the iniquity of his mind。 VI。 The justice of actions is commonly distinguisht into two kinds； Commutative； and Distributive； the former whereof they say consists in Arithmeticall； the latter in Geometricall proportion： and that is conversant in exchanging； in buying； selling； borrowing； lending； location； and conduction； and other acts whatsoever belonging to Contracters； where； if there be an equall return made； hence they say springs a commutative justice： But this is busied about the dignity； and merits of men； so as if there be rendred to every man kata pen axian more to him who is more worthy； and lesse to him that deserves lesse； and that proportionably； hence they say ariseth distributive justice： I acknowledge here some certaine distinction of equality； to wit； that one is an equality simply so called； as when two things of equall value are compar'd together； as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver； the other is an equality； secundum； quod as when a 1000 pound is to be divided to an hundred men； 600 pounds are given to 60 men； and 400 to 40 where there is no equality between 600 and 400。 But when it happens； that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed； every one of them shall take an equall part； whence it is called an equall distribution： But such like equality is the same thing with Geometricall proportion。 But what is all this to Justice？ for neither； if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them； doe I injure the buyer； who sought； and desir'd them of me？ neither if I divide more of what is mine to him who deserves lesse； so long as I give the other what I have agreed for； do I wrong to either？ which truth our Saviour himself； being God； testifies in the Gospell。 This therefore is no distinction of Justice； but of equality； yet perhaps it cannot be deny'd； but that Justice is a certain equality； as consisting in this onely； that since we are all equall by nature； one should not arrogate more Right to himselfe； then he grants to another； unlesse he have fairly gotten it by Compact。 And let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of Justice； although now almost generally receiv'd by all； lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else； then the breach of Faith； or Contract； as hath been defin'd above。 VII。 It is an old saying； Volenti non fit iniuria （the willing man receives no injury） yet the truth of it may be deriv'd from our Principles。 For grant； that a man be willing that that should be done； which he conceives to be an injury。 to him； why then that is done by his will； which by Contract was not lawfull to be done； but he being willing that should be done； which was not lawfull by Contract； the Contract it self （by the 15。 5 Article of the foregoing Chapter） becomes void： The Right therefore of doing it returnes； therefore it is done by Right； wherefore it is no injury。 VIII。 The third precept of the Naturall Law； is； That you suffer not him to be the worse for you； who out of the confidence he had in you； first did you a good turn； or that you accept not a gift； but with a mind to endeavour； that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift。 For without this he should act without reason that would conferre a benefit where he sees it would be lost； and by this meanes all beneficence； and trust； together with all kind of benevolence would be taken from among men； neither would there be ought of mutuall assistance among them； nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour。 by reason whereof the state of Warre would necessarily remain； contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature： But because the breach of this Law is not a breach of trust； or contract； （for we suppose no Contracts to have pass'd among them） therefore is it not usually termed an iniury； but because good turns and thankes have a mutuall eye to each other； it is called INGRATITUDE。 IX。The fourth precept of Nature； is； That every man render himself usefull unto others： which； that we may rightly understand； we must remember that there is in men； a diversity of dispositions to enter into society； arising from the diversity of their affections； not unlike that which is found in stones； brought together in the Building； by reason of the diversity of their matter； and figure。 For as a stone； which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones then it fils up it selfe； neither because of the hardnesse of its matter cannot well be prest together； or easily cut； and would hinder the building from being fitly compacted； is cast away； as not fit for use： so a man； who for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself； and detaining of necessaries from others； and being incorrigible； by reason of the stubbornnesse of his affections； is commonly said to be uselesse； and troublesome unto others。 Now； because each one not by Right onely； but
