science of logic-第75章

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identical；　the　universal。　If　one　insists　on　counting；　this　second　immediate　is；　in　the　course　of　the
method　as　a　whole；　the　third　term　to　the　first　immediate　and　the　mediated。　It　is　also；　however；　the
third　term　to　the　first　or　formal　negative　and　to　absolute　negativity　or　the　second　negative；　now　as
the　first　negative　is　already　the　second　term；　the　term　reckoned　as　third　can　also　be　reckoned　as
fourth；　and　instead　of　a　triplicity；　the　abstract　form　may　be　taken　as　a　quadruplicity；　in　this　way；
the　negative　or　the　difference　is　counted　as　a　duality。　The　third　or　fourth　is　in　general　the　unity　of
the　first　and　second　moments；　of　the　immediate　and　the　mediated。　

That　it　is　this　unity；　as　also　that　the　whole　form　of　the　method　is　a　triplicity；　is；　it　is　true；　merely　the
superficial　external　side　of　the　mode　of　cognition；　but　to　have　demonstrated　even　this；　and　that　too
in　a　more　specific　application　…　for　it　is　well　known　that　the　abstract　number　form　itself　was
advanced　at　quite　an　early　period；　but；　in　the　absence　of　the　Notion；　without　result　…　must　also　be
regarded　as　an　infinite　merit　of　the　Kantian　philosophy。
　

The　syllogism；　which　is　threefold；　has　always　been　recognised　as　the　universal　form　of　reason；　but
for　one　thing　it　counted　generally　for　a　quite　external　form　that　did　not　determine　the　nature　of　the
content；　and　for　another　thing；　since　it　progresses　in　the　formal　sense　merely　in　the　understanding's
determination　of　identity；　it　lacks　the　essential　dialectical　moment　of　negativity；　yet　this　moment
enters　into　the　triplicity　of　determinations　because　the　third　is　the　unity　of　the　first　two；　and　these；
since　they　are　different；　can　be　in　the　unity　only　as　sublated　determinations。　Formalism　has；　it　is
true；　also　taken　possession　of　triplicity　and　adhered　to　its　empty　schema；　the　shallow　ineptitude
and　barrenness　of　modern　philosophic　construction　so…called；　that　consists　in　nothing　but　fastening
this　schema　on　to　everything　without　Notion　and　immanent　determination　and　employing　it　for　an
external　arrangement；　has　made　the　said　form　tedious　and　given　it　a　bad　name。　Yet　the　triteness　of
this　use　of　it　cannot　detract　from　its　inner　worth　and　we　must　always　value　highly　the　discovery　of
the　shape　of　the　rational；　even　though　it　was　at　first　uncomprehended。


Now　more　precisely　the　third　is　the　immediate；　but　the　immediate　resulting　from　sublation　of
mediation；　the　simple　resulting　from　sublation　of　difference；　the　positive　resulting　from　sublation
of　the　negative；　the　Notion　that　has　realised　itself　by　means　of　its　otherness　and　by　the　sublation　of
this　reality　has　become　united　with　itself；　and　has　restored　its　absolute　reality；　its　simple　relation　to
itself。　This　result　is　therefore　the　truth。　It　is　equally　immediacy　and　mediation；　but　such　forms　of
judgement　as：　the　third　is　immediacy　and　mediation；　or　it　is　the　unity　of　them；　are　not　capable　of
grasping　it；　for　it　is　not　a　quiescent　third；　but；　precisely　as　this　unity；　is　self…mediating　movement
and　activity。　As　that　with　which　we　began　was　the　universal；　so　the　result　is　the　individual；　the
concrete；　the　subject；　what　the　former　is　in　itself　the　latter　is　now　equally　for　itself；　the　universal　is
posited　in　the　subject。　The　first　two　moments　of　the　triplicity　are　abstract；　untrue　moments　which
for　that　very　reason　are　dialectical；　and　through　this　their　negativity　make　themselves　into　the
subject。　The　Notion　itself　is　for　us；　in　the　first　instance；　alike　the　universal　that　is　in　itself；　and　the
negative　that　is　for　itself；　and　also　the　third；　that　which　is　both　in　and　for　itself；　the　universal　that
runs　through　all　the　moments　of　he　syllogism；　but　the　third　is　the　conclusion；　in　which　the　Notion
through　its　negativity　is　mediated　with　itself　and　thereby　posited　for　itself　as　the　universal　and　the
identity　of　its　moments。　

Now　this　result；　as　the　whole　that　has　withdrawn　into　and　is　identical　with　itself；　has　given　itself
again　the　form　of　immediacy。　Hence　it　is　now　itself　the　same　thing　as　the　starting…point　had
determined　itself　to　be。　As　simple　self…relation　it　is　a　universal；　and　in　this　universality；　the
negativity　that　constituted　its　dialectic　and　mediation　has　also　collapsed　into　simple
determinateness　which　can　again　be　a　beginning。　It　may　seem　at　first　sight　that　this　cognition　of
the　result　is　an　analysis　of　it　and　therefore　must　again　dissect　these　determinations　and　the　process
by　which　it　has　come　into　being　and　been　examined。　But　if　the　treatment　of　the　subject　matter　is
actually　carried　out　in　this　analytic　manner；　it　belongs　to　that　stage　of　the　Idea　considered　above；
to　the　cognition　of　enquiry；　which　merely　states　of　its　subject　matter　what　is；　but　not　the　necessity
of　its　concrete　identity　and　the　Notion　of　it。　But　though　the　method　of　truth　which　comprehends　the
subject　matter　is；　as　we　have　shown；　itself　analytic；　for　it　remains　entirely　within　the　Notion；　yet　it　is
equally　synthetic；　for　through　the　Notion　the　subject　matter　is　determined　dialectically　and　as　an
other。　On　the　new　foundation　constituted　by　the　result　as　the　fresh　subject　matter；　the　method
remains　the　same　as　with　the　previous　subject　matter。　The　difference　is　concerned　solely　with　the
relationship　of　the　foundation　as　such；　true；　it　is　now　likewise　a　foundation；　but　its　immediacy　is
only　a　form；　since　it　was　a　result　as　well；　hence　its　determinateness　as　content　is　no　longer
something　merely　picked　up；　but　something　deduced　and　proved。　

It　is　here　that　the　content　of　cognition　as　such　first　enters　into　the　circle　of　consideration；　since；　as
deduced；　it　now　belongs　to　the　method。　The　method　itself　by　means　of　this　moment　expands　itself
into　a　system。　At　first　the　beginning　had　to　be；　for　the　method；　wholly　indeterminate　in　respect　of
content；　to　this　extent　it　appears　as　the　merely　formal　soul；　for　and　by　which　the　beginning　was
determined　simply　and　solely　in　regard　to　its　form；　namely；　as　the　immediate　and　the　universal。
Through　the　movement　we　have　indicated；　the　subject　matter　has　obtained　for　itself　a
determinateness　that　is　a　content；　because　the　negativity　that　has　withdrawn　into　simplicity　is　the
sublated　form；　and　as　simple　determinateness　stands　over　against　its　development；　and　first　of　all
over　against　its　very　opposition　to　universality。　

Now　as　this　determinateness　is　the　proximate　truth　of　the　indeterminate　beginning；　it　condemns　the
latter　as　something　imperfect；　as　well　as　the　method　itself　that；　in　starting　from　that　beginning；　was
merely　formal。　This　can　be　expressed　as　the　now　specific　demand　that　the　beginning；　since　it　is
itself　a　determinate　relatively　to　the　determinateness　of　the　result；　shall　be　taken　not　as　an
immediate　but　as　something　mediated　and　deduced。　This　may　appear　as　the　demand　for　an　infinite
retrogression　in　proof　and　deduction；　just　as　from　the　fresh　beginning　that　has　been　obtained；　a
result　likewise　emerges　from　the　method　in　its　course；　so　that　the　advance　equally　rolls　onwards　to
infinity。　

It　has　been　shown　a　number　of　times　that　the　infinite　progress　as　such　belongs　to　reflection　that　is
without　the　Notion；　the　absolute　method；　which　has　the　Notion　for　its　soul　and　content；　cannot
lead　into　that。　At　first　sight；　even　such　beginnings　as　being；　essence；　universality；　seem　to　be　of
such　a　kind　as　to　possess　the　complete　universality　and　absence　of　content　demanded　for　a　wholly
formal　beginning；　as　it　is　supposed　to　be；　and　therefore；　as　absolutely　first　beginnings；　demand　and
admit　of　no　further　regress。　As　they　are　pure　relations　to　self；　immediate　and　indeterminate；　they
do　not　of　course　possess　within　themselves　the　difference　which　in　any　other　kind　of　beginning；　is
directly　posited　between　the　universality　of　its　form　and　its　content。　But　it　is　the　very
indeterminateness　which　the　above　logical　beginnings　have　for　their　sole　content　that　constitutes
their　determinateness；　this　consists；　namely；　in　their　negativity　as　sublated　mediation；　the
particularity　of　this　gives　even　their　indeterminateness　a　particularity　by　which　being；　essence；　and
universality　are　distinguished　from　one　another。　The　determinateness　then　which　belongs　to　them
if　t