science of logic-第7章

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knowledge　which　is　in　the　element　of　pure　thought　alone。

Berlin；　November　7；　1831　




Introduction

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　General　Notion　of　Logic

In　no　science　is　the　need　to　begin　with　the　subject　matter　itself；　without　preliminary　reflections；　felt
more　strongly　than　in　the　science　of　logic。　In　every　other　science　the　subject　matter　and　the
scientific　method　are　distinguished　from　each　other；　also　the　content　does　not　make　an　absolute
beginning　but　is　dependent　on　other　concepts　and　is　connected　on　all　sides　with　other　material。
These　other　sciences　are；　therefore；　permitted　to　speak　of　their　ground　and　its　context　and　also　of
their　method；　only　as　premises　taken　for　granted　which；　as　forms　of　definitions　and　such…like
presupposed　as　familiar　and　accepted；　are　to　be　applied　straight…way；　and　also　to　employ　the
usual　kind　of　reasoning　for　the　establishment　of　their　general　concepts　and　fundamental
determinations。

Logic　on　the　contrary；　cannot　presuppose　any　of　these　forms　of　reflection　and　laws　of　thinking；　for
these　constitute　part　of　its　own　content　and　have　first　to　be　established　within　the　science。　But　not
only　the　account　of　scientific　method；　but　even　the　Notion　itself　of　the　science　as　such　belongs　to
its　content；　and　in　fact　constitutes　its　final　result；　what　logic　is　cannot　be　stated　beforehand；　rather
does　this　knowledge　of　what　it　is　first　emerge　as　the　final　outcome　and　consummation　of　the　whole
exposition。　Similarly；　it　is　essentially　within　the　science　that　the　subject　matter　of　logic；　namely；
thinking　or　more　specifically　comprehensive　thinking　is　considered；　the　Notion　of　logic　has　its
genesis　in　the　course　of　exposition　and　cannot　therefore　be　premised。　Consequently；　what　is
premised　in　this　Introduction　is　not　intended；　as　it　were；　to　establish　the　Notion　of　Logic　or　to
justify　its　method　scientifically　in　advance；　but　rather　by　the　aid　of　some　reasoned　and　historical
explanations　and　reflections　to　make　more　accessible　to　ordinary　thinking　the　point　of　view　from
which　this　science　is　to　be　considered。

When　logic　is　taken　as　the　science　of　thinking　in　general；　it　is　understood　that　this　thinking
constitutes　the　mere　form　of　a　cognition　that　logic　abstracts　from　all　content　and　that　the
so…called　second　constituent　belonging　to　cognition；　namely　its　matter；　must　come　from
somewhere　else；　and　that　since　this　matter　is　absolutely　independent　of　logic；　this　latter　can
provide　only　the　formal　conditions　of　genuine　cognition　and　cannot　in　its　own　self　contain　any　real
truth；　not　even　be　the　pathway　to　real　truth　because　just　that　which　is　essential　in　truth；　its　content；
lies　outside　logic。？

But　in　the　first　place；　it　is　quite　inept　to　say　that　logic　abstracts　from　all　content；　that　it　teaches　only
the　rules　of　thinking　without　any　reference　to　what　is　thought　or　without　being　able　to　consider　its
nature。　For　as　thinking　and　the　rules　of　thinking　are　supposed　to　be　the　subject　matter　of　logic；
these　directly　constitute　its　peculiar　content；　in　them；　logic　has　that　second　constituent；　a　matter；
about　the　nature　of　which　it　is　concerned。

But　secondly；　the　conceptions　on　which　the　Notion　of　logic　has　rested　hitherto　have　in　part　already
been　discarded；　and　for　the　rest；　it　is　time　that　they　disappeared　entirely　and　that　this　science　were
grasped　from　a　higher　standpoint　and　received　a　completely　changed　shape。

Hitherto；　the　Notion　of　logic　has　rested　on　the　separation；　presupposed　once　and　for　all　in　the
ordinary　consciousness；　of　the　content　of　cognition　and　its　form；　or　of　truth　and　certainty。　First；
it　is　assumed　that　the　material　of　knowing　is　present　on　its　own　account　as　a　ready…made　world
apart　from　thought；　that　thinking　on　its　own　is　empty　and　comes　as　an　external　form　to　the　said
material；　fills　itself　with　it　and　only　thus　acquires　a　content　and　so　becomes　real　knowing。

Further；　these　two　constituents　—　for　they　are　supposed　to　be　related　to　each　other　as
constituents；　and　cognition　is　compounded　from　them　in　a　mechanical　or　at　best　chemical　fashion
—　are　appraised　as　follows：　the　object　is　regarded　as　something　complete　and　finished　on　its　own
account；　something　which　can　entirely　dispense　with　thought　for　its　actuality；　while　thought　on　the
other　hand　is　regarded　as　defective　because　it　has　to　complete　itself　with　a　material　and　moreover；
as　a　pliable　indeterminate　form；　has　to　adapt　itself　to　its　material。　Truth　is　the　agreement　of　thought
with　the　object；　and　in　order　to　bring　about　this　agreement　—　for　it　does　not　exist　on　its　own
account　—　thinking　is　supposed　to　adapt　and　accommodate　itself　to　the　object。

Thirdly；　when　the　difference　of　matter　and　form；　of　object　and　thought　is　not　left　in　that　nebulous
indeterminateness　but　is　taken　more　definitely；　then　each　is　regarded　as　a　sphere　divorced　from　the
other。　Thinking　therefore　in　its　reception　and　formation　of　material　does　not　go　outside　itself；　its
reception　of　the　material　and　the　conforming　of　itself　to　it　remains　a　modification　of　its　own　self；　it
does　not　result　in　thought　becoming　the　other　of　itself；　and　self…conscious　determining　moreover
belongs　only　to　thinking。　In　its　relation　to　the　object；　therefore；　thinking　does　I　not　go　out　of　itself
to　the　object；　this；　as　a　thing…in…itself；　remains　a　sheer　beyond　of　thought。

These　views　on　the　relation　of　subject　and　object　to　each　other　express　the　determinations　which
constitute　the　nature　of　our　ordinary；　phenomenal　consciousness；　but　when　these　prejudices　are
carried　out　into　the　sphere　of　reason　as　if　the　same　relation　obtained　there；　as　if　this　relation　were
something　true　in　its　own　self；　then　they　are　errors　the　—　refutation　of　which　throughout　every　part
of　the　spiritual　and　natural　universe　is　philosophy；　or　rather；　as　they　bar　the　entrance　to
philosophy；　must　be　discarded　at　its　portals。

Ancient　metaphysics　had　in　this　respect　a　higher　conception　of　thinking　than　is　current　today。　For　it
based　itself　on　the　fact　that　the　knowledge　of　things　obtained　through　thinking　is　alone　what　is
really　true　in　them；　that　is；　things　not　in　their　immediacy　but　as　first　raised　into　the　form　of　thought；
as　things　thought。　Thus　this　metaphysics　believed　that　thinking　（and　its　determinations）　is　not
anything　alien　to　the　object；　but　rather　is　its　essential　nature；　or　that　things　and　the　thinking　of　them
—　our　language　too　expresses　their　kinship　—　are　explicitly　in　full　agreement；　thinking　in　its
immanent　determinations　and　the　true　nature　of　things　forming　one　and　the　same　content。

But　reflective　understanding　took　possession　of　philosophy。　We　must　know　exactly　what　is　meant
by　this　expression　which　moreover　is　often　used　as　a　slogan；　in　general　it　stands　for　the
understanding　as　abstracting；　and　hence　as　separating　and　remaining　fixed　in　its　separations。
Directed　against　reason；　it　behaves　as　ordinary　common　sense　and　imposes　its　view　that　truth　rests
on　sensuous　reality；　that　thoughts　are　only　thoughts；　meaning　that　it　is　sense　perception　which　first
gives　them　filling　and　reality　and　that　reason　left　to　its　own　resources　engenders　only　figments　of
the　brain。　In　this　self…renunciation　on　the　part　of　reason；　the　Notion　of　truth　is　lost；　it　is　limited　to
knowing　only　subjective　truth；　only　phenomena；　appearances；　only　something　to　which　the　nature
of　the　object　itself　does　not　correspond：　knowing　has　lapsed　into　opinion。

However；　this　turn　taken　by　cognition；　which　appears　as　a　loss　and　a　retrograde　step；　is　based　on
something　more　profound　on　which　rests　the　elevation　of　reason　into　the　loftier　spirit　of　modern
philosophy。　The　basis　of　that　universally　held　conception　is；　namely；　to　be　sought　in　the　insight　into
the　necessary　conflict　of　the　determinations　of　the　understanding　with　themselves。　The　reflection
already　referred　to　is　this；　to　transcend　the　concrete　immediate　object　and　to　determine　it　and
separate　it。　But　equally　it　must　transcend　these　its　separating　determinations　and　straightway
connect　them。　It　is　at　the　stage　of　this　connecting　of　the　determinations　that　their　conflict　emerges。
This　connecting　activity　of　reflection　belongs　in　itself　to　reason　and　the　rising　above　those