science of logic-第69章

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matter；　therefore；　in　which　the　Notion　does　not　cognise　itself。　Thus　in　general　the　Notion　is　not　for
itself；　is　not　at　the　same　time　determined　in　and　for　itself　according　to　its　unity。　Hence　in　this
cognition　the　Idea　which　falls　short　of　truth　on　account　of　the　inadequacy　of　the　subject　matter　to
the　subjective　Notion。　But　the　sphere　of　necessity　is　the　apex　of　being　and　reflection；　through　its
own　essential　nature　it　passes　into　its　manifestation；　which　is　the　Notion　as　Notion。　How　this
transition　from　the　sphere　of　necessity　into　the　Notion　is　effected　in　principle　has　been　shown　in
treating　of　necessity；　the　same　transition　also　presented　itself　as　the　genesis　of　the　Notion　at　the
beginning　of　this　Book。　

Here　necessity　has　the　position　of　being　the　reality　or　subject　matter　of　the　Notion；　just　as　the
Notion　into　which　it　passes　now　appears　as　the　Notion's　subject　matter。　But　the　transition　itself　is
the　same。　Here　too　it　is　only　at　first　implicit　and　lies　as　yet　outside　cognition　in　our　reflection；　that
is；　it　is　still　the　inner　necessity　of　the　cognition　itself。　It　is　only　the　result　that　is　for　it。　

The　Idea；　in　so　far　as　the　Notion　is　now　explicitly　determined　in　and　for　itself；　is　the　practical
Idea；　or　action。　



BOOK　III。　The　Doctrine　of　the　Notion
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Section　3　（The　Idea）；　continued

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　2　The　Idea　of　Cognition　（continued）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B　The　Idea　of　the　Good

The　Notion；　which　is　its　own　subject　matter；　being　determined　in　and　for　itself；　the　subject　is
determined　for　itself　as　an　individual。　As　subjective　it　again　presupposes　an　implicit　otherness；　it　is
the　urge　to　realise　itself；　the　end　that　wills　by　means　of　itself　to　give　itself　objectivity　and　to　realise
itself　in　the　objective　world。
In　the　theoretical　Idea　the　subjective　Notion；　as　the　universal　that　lacks　any　determination　of　its
own；　stands　opposed　to　the　objective　world　from　which　it　takes　to　itself　a　determinate　content　and
filling。　But　in　the　practical　Idea　it　is　as　actual　that　it　confronts　the　actual；　but　the　certainty　of　itself
which　the　subject　possesses　in　being　determinate　in　and　for　itself　is　a　certainty　of　its　own　actuality
and　the　non…actuality　of　the　world；　it　is　not　only　the　world's　otherness　as　an　abstract　universality
that　is　a　nullity　for　the　subject；　but　the　world's　individuality　and　the　determination　of　its　individuality。
The　subject　has　here　vindicated　objectivity　for　itself；　its　immanent　determinateness　is　the
objective；　for　it　is　the　universality　that　is　just　as　much　absolutely　determined；　the　formerly　objective
world；　on　the　contrary；　is　now　only　something　posited；　something　immediately　determined　in
various　ways；　but　because　it　is　only　immediately　determined；　the　unity　of　the　Notion　is　lacking　in　it
and　it　is；　by　itself；　a　nullity。　

This　determinateness　contained　in　the　Notion　and　in　the　likeness　of　the　Notion；　and　including
within　it　the　demand　for　an　individual　external　actuality；　is　the　good。　It　comes　upon　the　scene　with
the　worth　of　being　absolute；　because　it　is　within　itself　the　totality　of　the　Notion；　the　objective　that　is
at　the　same　time　in　the　form　of　free　unity　and　subjectivity。　
This　Idea　is　superior　to　the　Idea　of　cognition　already　considered；　for　it　possesses　not　only　the
worth　of　the　universal　but　also　of　the　out…and…out　actual。　It　is　an　urge　in　so　far　as　this　actuality　is
still　subjective；　positing　its　own　self　and　not　having　at　the　same　time　the　form　of　immediate
presupposition；　its　urge　to　realise　itself　is；　strictly　speaking；　not　to　give　itself　objectivity　this　it
possesses　within　itself　but　merely　this　empty　form　of　immediacy。　Hence　the　activity　of　the　end　is
not　directed　against　itself　in　order　to　adopt　and　appropriate　a　given　determination　and　by　sublating
the　determinateness　of　the　external　world　to　give　itself　reality　in　the　form　of　external　actuality。　The
Idea　of　the　will　as　explicitly　self…determining　possesses　the　content　within　itself。　Now　it　is　true　tat
this　is　a　determinate　content　and　to　that　extent　something　finite　and　limited；　self…determination　is
essentially　particularisation；　since　the　reflection　of　the　will　into　itself　as　a　negative　unity　in　general
is　also　individuality　in　the　sense　of　the　exclusion　and　presupposition　of　an　other。　Nevertheless；　the
particularity　of　the　content　is　in　the　first　instance　infinite　through　the　form　of　the　Notion；　whose　own
determinateness　it　is；　and　in　this　content　the　Notion　possesses　its　negative　self…identity；　and
therefore　not　merely　a　particular；　but　its　own　infinite　individuality。　Consequently；　the
above…mentioned　finitude　of　the　content　in　the　practical　Idea　is　tantamount　to　the　latter　being　in
the　first　instance　the　not　yet　realised　Idea；　the　Notion　is；　for　the　content；　something　that　is　in　and
for　itself；　it　is　here　the　Idea　in　the　form　of　objectivity　that　is　for　itself；　on　the　one　hand；　the
subjective　is　for　this　reason　no　longer　something　merely　posited；　arbitrary　or　contingent；　but　an
absolute；　but　on　the　other　hand；　this　form　of　concrete　existence；　being…for…self；　has　not　yet　the
form　of　the　in…itself　as　well。　What　thus　appears　in　respect　of　form　as　such；　as　opposition；　appears
in　the　form　of　the　Notion　reflected　into　simple　identity；　that　is；　appears　in　the　content　as　its　simple
determinateness；　thus　the　good；　although　valid　in　and　for　itself；　is　some　particular　end；　but　an　end
that　has　not　to　wait　to　receive　its　truth　through　its　realisation；　but　is　already　on　its　own　account　the
true。　

The　syllogism　of　immediate　realisation　itself　requires　no　detailed　exposition　here；　it　is　altogether
the　same　as　the　syllogism　of　external　purposiveness　considered　above；　it　is　only　the　content　that
constitutes　the　difference。　In　external　as　in　formal　purposiveness；　it　was　an　indeterminate　finite
content　in　general；　here；　though　it　is　finite　too；　it　is　as　such　at　the　same　time　as　absolutely　valid
content。　But　in　regard　to　the　conclusion；　to　the　realised　end；　a　further　difference　comes　in。　The
finite　end　in　its　realisation；　all　the　same；　gets　no　further　than　a　means；　since　in　its　beginning　it　is　not
an　end　already　determined　in　and　for　itself；　it　remains　even　when　realised　an　end　that　is　not　in　and
for　itself。　If　the　good　again　is　also　fixed　as　something　finite；　if　it　is　essentially　such；　then
notwithstanding　its　inner　infinitude　it　cannot　escape　the　destiny　of　finitude　a　destiny　that　manifests
itself　in　a　number　of　forms。　The　realised　good　is　good　by　virtue　of　what　it　already　is　in　the
subjective　end；　in　its　Idea；　realisation　gives　it　an　external　existence；　but　since　his　existence　is
determined　merely　as　an　intrinsically　worthless　externality；　in　it　the　good　has　only　attained　a
contingent；　destructible　existence；　not　a　realisation　corresponding　to　its　Idea。　Further；　since　in
respect　of　its　content　the　good　is　restricted；　there　are　several　kinds　of　good；　good　in　its　concrete
existence　is　not　only　subject　to　destruction　by　external　contingency　and　by　evil；　but　by　the　collision
and　conflict　of　the　good　itself。　From　the　side　of　the　objective　world　presupposed　for　it；　in　the
presupposition　of　which　the　subjectivity　and　finitude　of　the　good　consists；　and　which　as　a　different
world　goes　its　own　way；　the　very　realisation　of　the　good　is　exposed　to　obstacles；　obstacles　which
may　indeed　even　be　insurmountable。　




In　this　way；　the　good　remains　an　ought…to…be；　it　is　in　and　for　itself；　but　being；　as　the　ultimate
abstract　immediacy；　remains　also　confronting　is　in　the　form　of　a　not…being。　

The　Idea　of　the　realised　good　is；　it　is　true；　an　absolute　postulate；　but　it　is　no　more　than　a
postulate；　that　is；　the　absolute　afflicted　with　the　determinateness　of　subjectivity。　There　are　still　two
worlds　in　opposition；　one　a　realm　of　subjectivity　in　the　pure　regions　of　transparent　thought；　the
other　a　realm　of　objectivity　in　the　element　of　an　externally　manifold　actuality　that　is　an　undisclosed
realm　of　darkness。　The　complete　elaboration　of　the　unresolved　contradiction　between　that
absolute　end　and　the　limitation　of　this　actuality　that　insuperably　opposes　it；　has　been　considered
in　detail　in　the　Phenomenology　of　Spirit。　

As　the　Idea　contains　within