science of logic-第68章

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that　a　thought　determination；　or　a　single　one　of　the　immediate　properties；　constitutes　the　simple　and
specific　essence　of　the　object；　is　the　derivation　of　such　a　determination　from　the　concrete
properties　of　the　subject　matter。　But　this　would　demand　an　analysis　transforming　the　immediate
properties　into　thoughts　and　reducing　what　is　concrete　to　something　simple。　Such　an　analysis；
however；　would　be　higher　than　the　one　already　considered；　for　it　could　not　be　abstractive；　but
would　have　to　preserve　in　the　universal　what　is　specific　in　the　concrete；　unify　it　and　show　it　to　be
dependent　on　the　simple　thought　determination。

The　relations　of　the　manifold　determinations　of　immediate　existence　to　the　simple　Notion　would
however　be　theorems　requiring　proof。　But　definition　is　the　first；　still　undeveloped　Notion；
therefore；　when　it　has　to　apprehend　the　simple　determinateness　of　the　subject　matter；　which
apprehension　has　to　be　something　immediate；　it　can　only　employ　for　the　purpose　one　of　its
immediate　so…called　properties…a　determination　of　sensuous　existence　or　representation。　The
isolation；　then；　of　this　property　by　abstraction；　constitutes　simplicity；　and　for　universality　and
essentiality　the　Notion　has　to　fall　back　onto　empirical　universality；　the　persistence　in　altered
circumstances；　and　the　reflection　that　seeks　the　Notion…determination　in　external　existence　and　in
picture　thinking；　that　is；　seeks　it　where　it　is　not　to　be　found。　Definition；　therefore；　automatically
renounces　the　Notion…determinations　proper；　which　would　be　essentially　principles　of　the　subject
matter；　and　contents　itself　with　marks；　that　is；　determinations　in　which　essentiality　for　the　object
itself　is　a　matter　of　indifference；　and　which　are　intended　merely　to　be　distinguishing　marks　for　an
external　reflection。　A　single；　external　determinateness　of　this　kind　is　too　inadequate　to　the　concrete
totality　and　to　the　nature　of　its　Notion；　to　justify　its　selection　for　its　own　sake；　nor　could　it　be　taken
for　the　true　expression　and　determination　of　a　concrete　whole。　According　to　Blumenbach's'
observation；　for　example；　the　lobe　of　the　ear　is　absent　in　all　other　animals；　and　therefore　in　the
usual　phraseology　of　common　and　distinguishing　marks　it　could　quite　properly　be　used　as　the
distinctive　characteristic　in　the　definition　of　physical　man。　But　how　inadequate　such　a　completely
external　determination　at　once　appears　when　compared　with　the　conception　of　the　total　habitue　of
physical　man；　and　with　the　demand　that　the　Notion　determination　shall　be　something　essential！　It　is
quite　contingent　whether　the；　marks　adopted　in　the　definition　are　pure　makeshifts　like　this；　or　on
the　other　hand　approximate　more　to　the　nature　of　a　principle。　It　is　also　to　be　observed　that；　on
account　of　their　externality；　they　have　not　been　the　starting　point　in　the　cognition　of　the　Notion　of
the　object；　on　the　contrary；　an　obscure　feeling；　an　indefinite　but　deeper　sense；　an　inkling　of　what　is
essential；　has　preceded　the　discovery　of　the　genera　in　nature　and　in　spirit；　and　only　afterwards　has
a　specific　externality　been　sought　to　satisfy　the　understanding。　In　existence　the　Notion　has　entered
into　externality　and　is　accordingly　explicated　into　its　differences　and　cannot　be　attached　simply　to　a
single　one　of　such　properties。　The　properties；　as　the　externality　of　the　thing；　are　external　to
themselves；　that　is　why；　as　we　pointed　'　out　in　the　sphere　of　Appearance　when　dealing　with　the
thing　of　many　properties；　properties　essentially　become　even　self…subsistent　matters；　spirit；
regarded　from　the　same　standpoint　of　Appearance；　becomes　an　aggregate　of　a　number　of
self…subsistent　forces。　Through　this　standpoint；　the　single　property　or　force；　even　where　it　is
posited　as　indifferent　to　the　others；　ceases　to　be　a　characterising　principle；　with　the　result　that　the
determinateness；　as　determinateness　of　the　Notion；　vanishes　altogether。

Into　concrete　things；　along　with　the　diversity　of　the　properties　among　themselves；　there　enters　also
the　difference　between　the　Notion　and　its　actualisation。　The　Notion　in　nature　and　in　spirit　has　an
external　presentation　in　which　its　determinateness　shows　itself　as　dependence　on　the　external；　as
transitoriness　and　inadequacy。　Therefore；　although　any　actual　thing　no　doubt　shows　in　itself　what　it
ought　to　be；　yet　in　accordance　with　the　negative　judgement　of　the　Notion　it　may　equally　show　that
its　actuality　only　imperfectly　corresponds　to　this　Notion；　that　it　is　bad。　Now　the　definition　is
supposed　to　indicate　the　determinateness　of　the　Notion　in　an　immediate　property；　yet　there　is　no
property　against　which　an　instance　cannot　be　brought　in　which　the　total　habitus；　though　it　enables
one　to　discern　the　concrete　thing　to　be　defined；　yet　the　property　taken　as　its　characteristic　shows
itself　immature　or　stunted。　In　a　bad　plant；　a　poor　specimen　of　an　animal；　a　contemptible　human
being；　a　bad　state；　aspects　of　its　concrete　existence　are　defective　or　entirely　obliterated　that
otherwise　might　have　been　adopted　for　the　definition　as　the　distinguishing　mark　and　essential
determinateness　in　the　existence　of　such　a　concrete。　But　for　all　that；　a　bad　plant　or　a　bad　animal；
etc。；　still　remains　a　plant　or　an　animal。　If；　therefore；　bad　specimens　too　are　to　be　covered　by　the
definition；　then　all　the　properties　that　we　wanted　to　regard　as　essential　elude　us　through　instances
of　malformations　in　which　tho　se　properties　a　re　lacking。　Thus　for　example　the　essentiality　of　the
brain　for　physical　man　is　contradicted　by　the　instance　of　acephalous　individuals；　the　essentiality　of
the　protection　of　life　and　property　for　the　state；　by　the　instance　of　despotic　states　and　tyrannous
governments。　If　the　Notion　is　asserted　against　such　an　instance　and　the　instance；　being　measured
by　the　Notion；　is　declared　to　be　a　bad　specimen；　then　the　Notion　is　no　longer　attested　by
phenomena。　But　the　self…subsistence　of　the　Notion　is　contrary　to　the　meaning　of　definition；　for
definition　is　supposed　to　be　the　immediate　Notion；　and　therefore　can　only　draw　on　the　immediacy
of　existence　for　its　determinations　for　objects；　and　can　justify　itself　only　in　what　it　finds　already　to
hand。　Whether　its　content　is　in…and…for　itself　truth　or　a　contingency；　this　lies　outside　its　sphere；
but　formal　truth；　the　agreement　between　the　Notion　subjectively　posited　in　the　definition　and　an
actual　object　outside　it；　cannot　be　established　because　the　individual　object　may　also　be　a　bad
specimen。

The　content　of　definition　is　in　general　taken　from　immediate　existence；　and　being　an　immediate
content　has　no　justification；　the　question　of　its　necessity　is　precluded　by　its　origin；　in　enunciating　the
Notion　as　a　mere　immediate；　the　definition　refrains　from　comprehending　the　Notion　itself。　Hence　it
represents　nothing　but　the　form　determination　of　the　Notion　in　a　given　content；　without　the
reflection　of　the　Notion　into　itself；　that　is；　without　the　Notion's　being…for…self。

But　immediacy　in　general　proceeds　only　from　mediation；　and　must　therefore　pass　over　into
mediation。　Or；　in　other　words；　the　determinateness　of　the　content　contained　in　the　definition；
because　it　is　determinateness；　is　not　merely　an　immediate；　but　is　mediated　by　its　opposite；
consequently　definition　can　apprehend　its　subject　matter　only　through　the　opposite　determination
and　must　therefore　pass　over　into　division。

2。　Division

3。　The　Theorem

Axioms

In　synthetic　cognition；　therefore；　the　Idea　attains　its　end　only　to　the　extent　that　the　Notion
becomes　for　the　Notion　according　to　its　moments　of　identity　and　real　determinations；　or　of
universality　and　particular　differences　…　further　also　as　an　identity　that　is　the　connection　and
dependence　of　the　diverse　elements。　But　this　subject　matter　of　the　Notion　is　not　adequate　to　it；　for
the　Notion　does　not　come　to　be　the　unity　of　itself　with　itself　in　its　subject　matter　or　its　reality；
in　necessity　its　identity　is　for　it；　but　in　this　identity　the　necessity　is　not　itself　the　determinateness；
but　appears　as　a　matter　external　to　the　identity；　that　is；　as　a　matter　not　determined　by　the　Notion；　a
matter；　therefore；　in　which　the　Notion　does　not　cognise　itself。　Thus　in　general　th