science of logic-第61章

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phenomena；　that　is；　no　empirical　use　can　be　made　of　such　notion　that　is　adequate　to　it。　The
notions　of　reason　are　to　serve　for　the　comprehension　of　perceptions；　the　notions　of　the
understanding　for　understanding　them。　But　in　fact；　if　the　latter　really　are　Notions；　then　they　are
Notions　…　they　enable　one　to　comprehend　；　and　an　understanding　of　perceptions　by　means　of
notions　of　the　understanding　will　be　a　comprehension　of　them。　

But　if　understanding　is　only　a　determining　of　perceptions　by　such　categories　as　for　example　whole
and　parts；　force；　cause；　and　the　like；　it　signifies　only　a　determining　by　reflection；　and　similarly；　by
understanding　can　be　meant　only　the　specific　representation　of　a　completely　determined　sensuous
content；　thus　when　someone；　having　been　directed　that　at　the　end　of　the　wood　he　must　turn　left；
replies　'I　understand'；　understanding　means　nothing　more　than　the　grasping　of　something　in
pictorial　thought　and　in　memory。　'Notion　of　reason'；　too；　is　a　somewhat　clumsy　expression；　for
the　Notion　is　something　altogether　rational；　and　in　so　far　as　reason　is　distinguished　from
understanding　and　the　Notion　as　such；　it　is　the　totality　of　the　Notion　and　of　objectivity。　In　this
sense　the　Idea　is　the　rational；　it　is　the　unconditioned；　because　only　that　has　conditions　which
essentially　relates　itself　to　an　objectivity；　but　an　objectivity　that　it　has　not　itself　determined　but
which　still　confronts　it　in　the　form　of　indifference　and　externality；　just　as　the　external　end　still　had
conditions。　

Reserving　then　the　expression　'Idea'　for　the　objective　or　real　Notion　and　distinguishing　it　from　the
Notion　itself　and　still　more　from　mere　pictorial　thought；　we　must　also　reject　even　more　vigorously
that　estimate　of　the　Idea　according　to　which　it　is　not　anything　actual；　and　true　thoughts　are　said　to
be　only　ideas。　If　thoughts　are　merely　subjective　and　contingent；　they　certainly　have　no　further
value；　but　in　this　respect　they　are　not　inferior　to　temporal　and　contingent　actualities　which　likewise
have　no　further　value　than　that　of　contingencies　and　phenomena。　On　the　other　hand　if；　conversely；
the　Idea　is　not　to　have　the　value　of　truth；　because　in　regard　to　phenomena　it　is　transcendent；　and
no　congruent　object　can　be　assigned　to　it　in　the　world　of　sense；　this　is　an　odd　misunderstanding
that　would　deny　objective　validity　to　the　Idea　because　it　lacks　that　which　constitutes　Appearance；
namely；　the　untrue　being　of　the　objective　world。　In　regard　to　practical　Ideas；　Kant　recognises
that　'nothing　can　be　more　harmful　and　unworthy　of　a　philosopher　than　the　vulgar　appeal　to　an
experience　that　allegedly　conflicts　with　the　Idea。　This　very　experience　would　not　even　exist　if；　for
example；　political　institutions　had　been　established　at　the　proper　time　in　conformity　with　Ideas；　and
if　crude　conceptions；　crude　just　because　they　had　been　drawn　from　experience；　had　not　taken　the
place　of　Ideas　and　so　nullified　every　good　intention。'　Kant　regards　the　Idea　as　a　necessity　and　as
the　goal　which；　as　the　archetype；　it　must　be　our　endeavour　to　set　up　for　a　maximum　and　to　which
we　must　strive　to　bring　the　condition　of　the　actual　world　ever　nearer。　

But　having　reached　the　result　that　the　Idea　is　the　unity　of　the　Notion　and　objectivity；　is　the　true；　it
must　not　be　regarded　merely　as　a　goal　to　which　we　have　to　approximate　but　which　itself　always
remains　a　kind　of　beyond；　on　the　contrary；　we　must　recognise　that　everything　actual　is　only　in　so
far　as　it　possesses　the　Idea　and　expresses　it。　It　is　not　merely　that　the　object；　the　objective　and
subjective　world　in　general；　ought　to　be　congruous　with　the　Idea；　but　they　are　themselves　the
congruence　of　Notion　and　reality；　the　reality　that　does　not　correspond　to　the　Notion　is　mere
Appearance；　the　subjective；　contingent；　capricious　element　that　is　not　the　truth。　

When　it　is　said　that　no　object　is　to　be　found　in　experience　that　is　perfectly　congruous　with　the
Idea；　one　is　opposing　the　Idea　as　a　subjective　standard　to　the　actual；　but　what　anything　actual　is
supposed　in　truth　to　be；　if　its　Notion　is　not　in　it　and　if　its　objectivity　docs　not　correspond　to　its
Notion　at　all；　it　is　impossible　to　say；　for　it　would　be　nothing。　It　is　true　that　the　mechanical　and
chemical　object；　like　the　nonspiritual　subject　and　the　spirit　that　is　conscious　only　of　the　finite；　not　of
its　essence；　do　not；　according　to　their　various　natures；　have　their　Notion　existent　in　them　in　its
own　free　form。　But　they　can　only　be　true　at　all　in　so　far　as　they　are　the　union　of　their　Notion　and
reality；　of　their　soul　and　their　body。　Wholes　like　the　state　and　the　church　cease　to　exist　when　the
unity　of　their　Notion　and　their　reality　is　dissolved；　man；　the　living　being；　is　dead　when　soul　and
body　are　parted　in　him；　dead　nature；　the　mechanical　and　chemical　world　…　taking；　that　is；　the　dead
world　to　mean　the　inorganic　world；　otherwise　it　would　have　no　positive　meaning　at　all　…　dead
nature；　then；　if　it　is　separated　into　its　Notion　and　its　reality；　is　nothing　but　the　subjective　abstraction
of　a　thought　form　and　a　formless　matter。　Spirit　that　was　not　Idea；　was　not　the　unity　of　the　Notion
with　its　own　self；　or　the　Notion　that　did　not　have　the　Notion　itself　for　its　reality　would　be　dead；
spiritless　spirit；　a　material　object。　

The　Idea　being　the　unity　of　Notion　and　reality；　being　has　attained　the　significance　of　truth；
therefore　what　now　is　is　only　what　is　Idea。　Finite　things　are　finite　because　they　do　not　possess　the
complete　reality　of　their　Notion　within　themselves；　but　require　other　things　to　complete　it　…　or；
conversely；　because　they　are　presupposed　as　objects；　hence　possess　the　Notion　as　an　external
determination。　The　highest　to　which　they　attain　on　the　side　of　this　finitude　is　external　purposiveness。
That　actual　things　are　not　congruous　with　the　Idea　is　the　side　of　their　finitude　and　untruth；　and　in
accordance　with　this　side　they　are　objects；　determined　in　accordance　with　their　various　spheres
and　in　the　relationships　of　objectivity；　either　mechanically；　chemically　or　by　an　external　end。　That
the　Idea　has　not　completely　leavened　its　reality；　has　imperfectly　subdued　it　to　the　Notion；　this　is　a
possibility　arising　from　the　fact　that　the　Idea　itself　has　a　restricted　content；　that　though　it　is
essentially　the　unity　of　Notion　and　reality；　it　is　no　less　essentially　their　difference；　for　only　the　object
is　their　immediate；　that　is；　merely　implicit　unity。　But　if　an　object；　for　example　the　state；　did　not
correspond　at　all　to　its　Idea；　that　is；　if　in　fact　it　was　not　the　Idea　of　the　state　at　all；　if　its　reality；
which　is　the　self…conscious　individuals；　did　not　correspond　at　all　to　the　Notion；　its　soul　and　its
body　would　have　parted；　the　former　would　escape　into　the　solitary　regions　of　thought；　the　latter
would　have　broken　up　into　the　single　individualities。　

But　because　the　Notion　of　the　state　so　essentially　constitutes　the　nature　of　these　individualities；　it　is
present　in　them　as　an　urge　so　powerful　that　they　are　impelled　to　translate　it　into　reality；　be　it　only　in
the　form　of　external　purposiveness；　or　to　put　up　with　it　as　it　is；　or　else　they　must　needs　perish。　The
worst　state；　one　whose　reality　least　corresponds　to　the　Notion；　in　so　far　as　it　still　exists；　is　still
Idea；　the　individuals　still　obey　a　dominant　Notion　。　

However；　the　Idea　has　not　merely　the　more　general　meaning　of　the　true　being；　of　the　unity　of
Notion　and　reality；　but　the　more　specific　one　of　the　unity　of　subjective　Notion　and　objectivity。
That　is　to　say；　the　Notion　as　such　is　itself　already　the　identity　of　itself　and　reality；　for　the　indefinite
expression　'reality'　means　in　general　nothing　else　but　determinate　being；　and　this　the　Notion
possesses　in　its　particularity　and　individuality。　Similarly　too；　objectivity　is　the　total　Notion　that　out
of　its　determinateness　has　withdrawn　into　identity　with　itself。　In　the　former　subjectivity　the
determinateness　or　difference　of　the　Notion　is　an　illusory　being　＇semblance＇　that　is　immediately
sublated　and　has　withdrawn　into　being…for…self　or　negative　unity；　it　is　an　inhering　predicate。　But　in
this　objectivity　the　determinateness　is　posited　as　an　immediate　totality；　as　an　external　whole。　No