science of logic-第6章

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pictorial　thought；　but　also　a　Notion　is；　first；　in　its　own　self　the　Notion；　and　this　is　only　one　and　is
the　substantial　foundation；　secondly；　a　Notion　is　determinate　and　it　is　this　determinateness　in　it
which　appears　as　content：　but　the　determinateness　of　the　Notion　is　a　specific　form　of　this
substantial　oneness；　a　moment　of　the　form　as　totality；　of　that　same　Notion　which　is　the　foundation
of　the　specific　Notions。

This　Notion　is　not　sensuously　intuited　or　represented；　it　is　solely　an　object；　a　product　and　content
of　thinking；　and　is　the　absolute；　self…subsistent　object；　the　logos；　the　reason　of　that　which　is；　the
truth　of　what　we　call　things；　it　is　least　of　all　the　logos　which　should　be　left　outside　of　the　science　of
logic。

Therefore　its　inclusion　in　or　omission　from　this　science　must　not　be　simply　a　matter　of　choice。
When　those　determinations　of　thought　which　are　only　external　forms　are　truly　considered　in
themselves；　this　can　only　result　in　demonstrating　their　finitude　and　the　untruth　of　their　supposed
independent　self…subsistence；　that　their　truth　is　the　Notion。　Consequently；　the　science　of　logic　in
dealing　with　the　thought　determinations　which　in　general　run　through　our　mind　instinctively　and
unconsciously…and　even　when　they　become　part　of　the　language　do　not　become　objects　of　our
attention…will　also　be　a　reconstruction　of　those　which　are　singled　out　by　reflection　and　are　fixed　by
it　as　subjective　forms　external　to　the　matter　and　import　of　the　determinations　of　thought。



No　subject　matter　is　so　absolutely　capable　of　being　expounded　with　a　strict　immanent　plasticity　as
is　thought　in　its　own　necessary　development；　no　other　brings　with　it　this　demand　in　such　a　degree；
in　this　respect　the　Science　of　Logic　must　surpass　even　mathematics；　for　no　subject　matter　has　in　its
own　self　this　freedom　and　independence。　Such　an　exposition　would　demand　that　at　no　stage　of　the
development　should　any　thought…determination　or　reflection　occur　which　does　not　immediately
emerge　at　this　stage　and　that　has　not　entered　this　stage　from　the　one　preceding　it…a　requirement
which　is　satisfied；　after　its　fashion；　in　the　process　of　mathematical　reasoning。　However；　such　an
abstract　perfection　of　exposition　must；　I　admit；　in　general　be　dispensed　with；　the　very　fact　that　the
science　must　begin　with　what　is　absolutely　simple；　that　is；　with　what　is　most　general　and　of　least
import；　would　restrict　the　exposition　solely　to　these　same　quite　simple　expressions　of　the　simple
without　any　further　addition　of　a　single　word；　all　that　could　properly　be　admitted　would　be
negative　considerations　intended　to　ward　off　and　banish　any　heterogeneous　elements　which
otherwise　might　be　introduced　by　pictorial　thought　or　unregulated　thinking。　However；　such
intrusive　elements　in　the　simple　immanent　course　of　the　development　are　themselves　contingent；　so
that　the　effort　to　ward　them　off　is　itself　tainted　with　this　contingency；　besides　which　it　is　futile　to　try
to　deal　with　all　of　them；　lying　as　they　do　outside　the　subject　matter；　and　in　any　case；　any　demand
for　a　systematic　disposal　of　such　random　reflections　could　only　be　partially　satisfied。　But　the
peculiar　restlessness　and　distraction　of　our　modern　consciousness　compel　us　to　take　some　account
of　the　more　readily　suggested　reflections　and　opinions。　A　plastic　discourse　demands；　too；　a　plastic
receptivity　and　understanding　on　the　part　of　the　listener；　but　youths　and　men　of　such　a　temper　who
would　calmly　suppress　their　own　reflections　and　opinions　in　which　original　thought　is　so　impatient
to　manifest　itself；　listeners　such　as　Plato　feigned；　who　would　attend　only　to　the　matter　in　hand；
could　have　no　place　in　a　modern　dialogue；　still　less　could　one　count　on　readers　of　such　a
disposition。　On　the　contrary；　I　have　been　only　too　often　and　too　vehemently　attacked　by
opponents　who　were　incapable　of　making　the　simple　reflection　that　their　opinions　and　objections

contain　categories　which　are　presuppositions　and　which　themselves　need　to　be　criticised　first
before　they　are　employed。　Ignorance　in　this　matter　reaches　incredible　lengths；　it　is　guilty　of；　the
fundamental　misunderstanding；　the　uncouth　and　uneducated　behaviour　of　taking　a　category　which
is　under　consideration　for　something　other　than　the　category　itself。　This　ignorance　is　the　less
justifiable　because　this　'something　other'　consists　of　determinate　thoughts　and　concepts；　and　in　a
system　of　logic　these　other　categories　must　likewise　have　been　assigned　their　own　place　and　must
themselves　have　been　subjected　to　critical　examination　within　the　system。　This　ignorance　is　most
obvious　in　the　great　majority　of　the　objections　and　attacks　on　the　first　Notions　of　logic；　being　and
nothing；　and　becoming　which；　itself　a　simple　determination…the　simplest　analysis　shows　it　to　be
so…contains　the　two　other　determinations　as　moments。　Thoroughness　seems　to　require　that　the
beginning；　as　the　foundation　on　which　everything　is　built；　should　be　examined　before　anything　else；
in　fact　that　we　should　not　go　any　further　until　it　has　been　firmly　established　and　if；　on　the　other
hand；　it　is　not；　that　we　should　reject　all　that　follows。

This　thoroughness　at　the　same　time　has　the　advantage　of　guaranteeing　that　the　labour　of　thinking
shall　be　reduced　to　a　minimum；　it　has　before　it；　enclosed　in　this　germ；　the　entire　development　

This　restriction　to　what　is　simple　gives　scope　for　the　free　play　of　caprice　which　does　not　want　to
remain　simple　…but　brings　in　Its　own　reflections　on　the　subject　matter。　Having　good　right　to　occupy
itself　at　first　only　with　the　principle　and　in　doing　so　not　to　concern　itself　with　what　lies　beyond　it；
this　thoroughness　actually　proceeds　to　do　the　opposite　of　this；　for　it　does　bring　in　what　lies
beyond；　that　is；　categories　other　than　those　which　constitute　the　principle　itself；　other
presuppositions　and　prejudices。　Such　presuppositions　as　that　infinite　is　different　from　finitude；　that
content　is　other　than　form；　that　the　inner　is　other　than　the　outer；　also　that　mediation　is　no
immediacy　（as　if　anyone　did　not　know　such　things）；　are　brought　forward　by　way　of　information
and　narrated　and　asserted　rathe　than　proved。　But　there　is　something　stupid…I　can　find　no　other

word　for　it　—　about　this　didactic　behaviour；　technically　it　is　unjustifiable　simply　to　presuppose　and
straightway　assume　such　propositions；　and；　still　more；　it　reveals　ignorance　of　the　fact　that　it　is　the
requirement　and　the　business　of　logical　thinking　to　enquire　into　just　this；　whether　such　a　finite
without　infinity　is　something　true；　or　whether　such　an　abstract　infinity；　also　a　content　without　form
and　a　form　without　content；　an　inner　by　itself　which　has　no　outer　expression；　an　externality　without
an　inwardness；　whether　any　of　these　is　something；　true　or　something　actual。　But　this　education
and　discipline　of　thinking　by　which　it　acquires　plasticity　and　by　which　the　impatience　of　casual
reflection　is　overcome；　is　procured　solely　by　going　further；　by　study　and　by　carrying　out　to　its
conclusion　the　entire　development。

Anyone　who　labours　at　presenting　anew　an　independent　structure　of　philosophical　science　may；
when　referring　to　the　Platonic　exposition；　be　reminded　of　the　story　that　Plato　revised　his　Republic
seven　times　over。　The　remembrance　of　this；　the　comparison；　so　far　as　such　may　seem　to　be
implied　in　it；　should　only　urge　one　all　the　more　to　wish　that　for　a　work　which；　as　belonging　to　the
modern　world；　is　confronted　by　a　profounder　principle；　a　more　difficult　subject　matter　and　a
material　richer　in　compass；　leisure　had　been　afforded　to　revise　it　seven　and　seventy　times。
However；　the　author；　in　face　of　the　magnitude　of　the　task；　has　had　to　content　himself　with　what　it
was　possible　to　achieve　in　circumstances　of　external　necessity；　of　the　inevitable　distractions　caused
by　the　magnitude　and　many…sidedness　of　contemporary　affairs；　even　under　the　doubt　whether　the
noisy　clamour　of　current　affairs　and　the　deafening　chatter　of　a　conceit　which　prides　itself　on
confining　itself　to　such　matters　leave　any　room　for　participation　in　the　passionless　calm　of　a
knowledge　which　is　in　the　element　of　pure　thought　alone。

Berlin；　November　7；　1831