science of logic-第59章

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face　of　objectivity　and　its　external　determinability。　The　externality　into　which　the　end　translates
itself　is　itself；　as　we　have　seen；　already　posited　as　moment　of　the　Notion；　as　form　of　its　immanent
differentiation。　The　end　possesses；　therefore；　in　externality　its　own　moment；　and　the　content；　as
content　of　the　concrete　unity；　is　its　simple　form；　which　not　merely　remains　implicitly　self…identical
in　the　distinct　moments　of　the　end…as　subjective　end；　as　means　and　mediating　activity；　and　as
objective　end…but　also　has　a　concrete　existence　as　the　abiding　self…identical。

It　can　therefore　be　said　of　the　teleological　activity　that　in　it　the　end　is　the　beginning；　the　consequent
the　ground；　the　effect　the　cause；　that　it　is　a　becoming　of　what　has　become；　that　in　it　only　what
already　exists　comes　into　existence；　and　so　forth；　which　means　that　in　general　all　the
determinations　of　relationship　belonging　to　the　sphere　of　reflection　or　of　immediate　being　have　lost
their　distinctions；　and　what　was　enunciated　as　an　other；　such　as　end；　consequent；　effect；　etc。；　no
longer　has　in　the　end　relation　the　determination　of　an　other；　but　on　the　contrary　is　posited　as
identical　with　the　simple　Notion。

2。　Now　examining　more　closely　the　product　of　the　teleological　activity；　we　see　that　it　contains　the
end　only　externally；　in　so　far　as　it　is　an　absolute　presupposition　over　against　the　subjective　end；
that　is　to　say；　in　so　far　as　we　stop　short　at　the　point　of　view　that　the　purposive　activity　through　its'
means　is　only　in　a　mechanical　relation　with　the　object；　and　instead　of　positing　one　indifferent
determinateness　of　the　latter　posits　another　equally　external　to　it。　A　determinateness　of　this　kind；
which　an　object　possesses　through　the　end；　differs　in　general　from　another　merely　mechanical　one
by　the　fact　that　the　former　is　moment　of　a　unity；　so　that　although　the　determinateness　is　indeed
external　to　the　object；　yet　it　is　not　in　its　own　self　something　merely　external。　The　object　that
exhibits　such　a　unity　is　a　whole；　towards　which　its　parts；　its　own　externality；　is　indifferent；　a
determinate　concrete　unity　which　unites　within　itself　distinct　relations　and　determinatenesses。　This
unity　which　cannot　be　comprehended　from　the　specific　nature　of　the　object；　and　as　regards
determinate　content　is　another　content　than　that　peculiar　to　the　object；　is　not　by　itself　a　mechanical
determinateness；　but　it　is　still　mechanically　related　to　the　object。　Just　as　in　this　product　of　the
purposive　activity　the　content　of　the　end　and　the　content　of　the　object　are　external　to　each　other；
so　a　like　relation　holds　between　the　determinations　of　this　activity　in　the　other　moments　of　the
syllogism…in　the　unifying　middle　term；　between　the　purposive　activity　and　the　object　which　is
means；　and　in　the　subjective　end；　the　other　extreme；　between　the　infinite　form　as　totality　of　the
Notion　and　its　content。　According　to　the　relation　by　which　the　subjective　end　is　united　with
objectivity；　both　premises　alike…the　relation　of　the　object　determined　as　means　to　the　still　external
object；　and　the　relation　of　the　subjective　end　to　the　object　which　is　made　means…are　immediate
relations。　The　syllogism　therefore　suffers　from　the　defect　of　the　formal　syllogism　in　general；　that　the
relations　of　which　it　consists；　are　not　themselves　conclusions　or　mediations；　but　in　fact　already
presuppose　the　conclusion　for　whose　production　they　are　supposed　to　serve　as　means。

If　we　consider　one　of　the　premises；　the　immediate　relation　of　the　subjective　end　to　the　object
which　thereby　becomes　the　means；　then　the　former　cannot　immediately　relate　itself　to　the　latter；　for
the　latter　is　no　less　immediate　than　the　object　of　the　other　extreme；　in　which　the　end　is　to　be
realised　through　mediation。　Since　they　are　thus　posited　as　diverse；　it　is　necessary　to　interpolate
between　this　objectivity　and　the　subjective　end　a　means　of　their　relation；　but　this　means　is　likewise
an　object　already　determined　by　the　end；　and　between　that　object's　objectivity　and　the　teleological
determination　a　new　means　must　be　interpolated；　and　so　on　to　infinity。　Thus　there　is　posited　the
infinite　progress　of　mediation。　The　same　thing　takes　place　in　respect　of　the　other　premise；　the
relation　of　the　means　to　the　as　yet　undetermined　object。　Since　they　are　absolutely　self…subsistent；
they　can　only　be　united　in　a　third；　and　so　on　to　infinity。　Or　conversely；　since　the　premises　already
presuppose　the　conclusion；　the　conclusion；　being　based　on　these　merely　immediate　premises；　can
only　be　imperfect。　The　conclusion　or　the　product　of　the　purposive　act　is　nothing　but　an　object
determined　by　an　end　external　to　it；　consequently　it　is　the　same　thing　as　the　means。　In　such　a
product；　therefore；　only　a　means；　not　a　realised　end；　has　resulted；　or　the　end　has　not　truly
attained　an　objectivity　in　it。　

It　is　therefore　a　matter　of　complete　indifference　whether　we　regard　an　object　determined　by
external　end　as　a　realised　end　or　only　as　a　means；　the　determination　here　is　relative；　external　to　the
object　itself　and　not　objective。　All　objects；　therefore；　in　which　an　external　end　is　realised；　are
equally　only　a　means　of　the　end。　Whatever　is　intended　to　be　used　for　realising　an　end　and　to　be
taken　essentially　as　means；　is　a　means　which；　in　accordance　with　its　destiny；　is　to　be　destroyed。
But　the　object　that　is　supposed　to　contain　the　realised　end；　and　to　represent　the　objectivity　of　the
end；　is　also　perishable；　it　too　fulfils　its　end　not　by　a　tranquil　existence　in　which　it　preserves　itself；
but　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　worn　away；　for　only　thus　does　it　conform　to　the　unity　of　the　Notion；　in　that
its　externality；　that　is；　its　objectivity；　sublates　itself　in　that　unity。　A　house；　a　clock；　may　appear　as
ends　in　relation　to　the　tools　employed　for　their　production；　but　the　stones　and　beams；　or　wheels
and　axles；　and　so　on；　which　constitute　the　actuality　of　the　end　fulfil　that　end　only　through　the
pressure　that　they　suffer；　through　the　chemical　processes　with　air；　light；　and　water　to　which　they
are　exposed　and　that　deprive　man　of　them　by　their　friction　and　so　forth。　Accordingly；　they　fulfil
their　destiny　only　by　being　used　and　worn　away　and　they　correspond　to　what　they　are　supposed
to　be　only　through　their　negation。　They　are　not　positively　united　with　the　end；　because　they
possess　self…determination　only　externally　and　are　only　relative　ends；　or　essentially　nothing　but
means。

These　ends；　as　we　have　seen；　have　in　general　a　limited　content；　their　form　is　the　infinite
self…determination　of　the　Notion；　which　through　that　content　has　limited　itself　to　an　external
individuality。　The　limited　content　makes　these　ends　inadequate　to　the　infinity　of　the　Notion　and
reduces　them　to　an　untruth；　such　a　determinateness　is　already　through　the　sphere　of　necessity；
through　being；　at　the　mercy　of　becoming　and　alteration　and　must　pass　away。

3。　Thus　we　obtain　the　result　that　external　purposiveness　which　has　as　yet　only　the　form　of
teleology；　really　only　comes　to　be　a　means；　not　an　objective　end…because　the　subjective　end
remains　an　external　subjective　determination；　or；　in　so　far　as　the　end　is　active　and　realises　itself；
though　only　in　a　means　it　is　still　connected　with　the　object　immediately；　immersed　in　it；　it　is　itself
an　object；　and　the　end；　one　may　say；　does　not　attain　to　a　means；　because　the　realisation　of　the　end
is　a　prior　requirement　before　that　realisation　could　be　brought　about　through　a　means。

In　fact；　however；　the　result　is　not　only　an　external　end　relation；　but　the　truth　of　it；　an　internal　end
relation　and　an　objective　end。　The　externality　of　the　object；　self…subsistent　as　against　the　Notion；
which　the　end　presupposes　for　itself　is　posited　in　this　presupposition　as　an　unessential　illusory
show　and　is　also　already　sublated　in　and　for　itself；　the　activity　of　the　end　is　therefore；　strictly
speaking；　only　the　representation　of　this　illusory　show　and　the　sublating　of　it。　As　the　Notion　has
shown　us；　the　first　object　becomes　by　communication　a　means；　because　it　is　in　itself　totality　of　the
Notion；　and　its　determinateness　which　is　none　other　than　externality　itself　is　posited　merely　as
something　external　and　unessential　a