science of logic-第58章

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relation　of　the　activity　of　the　end　and　the　means。　The　means　is　an　object；　in　itself　the　totality　of
the　Notion；　it　has　no　power　of　resistance　against　the　end；　as　it　has　in　the　first　instance　against
another　immediate　object。　To　the　end；　therefore；　which　is　the　posited　Notion；　it　is　absolutely
penetrable；　and　receptive　of　this　communication；　because　it　is　in　itself　identical　with　the　end。　But
now　it　is　also　posited　as　penetrable　by　the　Notion；　for　in　centrality　it　is　an　object　striving　towards
the　negative　unity；　similarly　in　chemism；　it　is　as　a　neutral　and　also　as　a　different　object；　no　longer
self…subsistent。　Its　lack　of　self…subsistence　consists　precisely　in　its　being　only　in　itself　the　totality　of
the　Notion；　but　the　latter　is　a　being…for…self。　Consequently　the　object　has　the　character　of　being
powerless　against　the　end　and　of　serving　it；　the　end　is　the　object's　subjectivity　or　soul；　that　has　in
the　object　its　external　side。

The　object；　being　in　this　manner　immediately　subjected　to　the　end；　is　not　an　extreme　of　the
syllogism；　but　this　relation　constitutes　one　of　its　premises。　But　the　means　has　also　a　side　from
which　it　still　has　self…subsistence　as　against　the　end。　The　objectivity　that　is　connected　with　the　end
in　the　means　is　still　external　to　it；　because　it　is　only　immediately　so　connected；　and　therefore　the
presupposition　still　persists。　The　activity　of　the　end　through　the　means　is　for　that　reason　still
directed　against　this　presupposition；　and　the　end　is　activity　and　no　longer　merely　an　urge　and　a
striving；　precisely　because　the　moment　of　objectivity　is　posited　in　the　means　in　its　determinateness
as　something　external；　and　the　simple　unity　of　the　Notion　now　has　this　objectivity　as　such　in　itself。

C。　The　Realised　End

1。　The　end　in　its　relation　to　the　means　is　already　reflected　into　itself；　but　its　objective　return　into
itself　is　not　yet　posited。　The　activity　of　the　end　through　its　means　is　still　directed　against　objectivity
as　an　original　presupposition；　the　nature　of　this　activity　is　precisely　this；　to　be　indifferent　to　the
determinateness。　Were　the　activity　again　to　consist　in　merely　determining　the　immediate　objectivity；
the　product　would　again　be　merely　a　means；　and　so　on　to　infinity；　the　outcome　would　be　only　a
means　suitable　to　the　end；　but　not　the　objectivity　of　the　end　itself。　Therefore　the　end　which　is　active
in　its　means；　in　determining　the　immediate　object　must　not　do　so　as　a　determinant　external　to　it；
and　consequently　the　object　must　spontaneously　conform　to　the　unity　of　the　Notion；　in　other
words；　the　former　external　activity　of　the　end　through　its　means　must　determine　itself　as　mediation
and　sublate　its　own　self。

The　relation　of　the　activity　of　the　end　through　the　means　to　the　external　object　is　in　the　first　instance
the　second　premise　of　the　syllogism　—　an　immediate　relation　of　the　middle　term　to　the　other
extreme。　It　is　immediate　because　the　middle　term　has　an　external　object　in　it　and　the　other
extreme　is　another　such　object。　The　means　is　effective　and　potent　against　the　latter　because　its
own　object　is　connected　with　the　self…determining　activity；　while　for　the　other　object　the　immediate
determinateness　that　it　possesses　is　an　indifferent　one。　Their　process　in　this　relation　is　none　other
than　the　mechanical　or　chemical　one；　in　this　objective　externality　the　previous　relationships　emerge
but　under　the　dominance　of　the　end。　These　processes；　however；　as　they　themselves　showed；
spontaneously　return　into　the　end。　if；　therefore；　in　the　first　instance；　the　relation　of　the　means　to　the
external　object　it　has　to　work　upon　is　an　immediate　one；　it　has　already　at　an　earlier　stage　exhibited
itself　as　a　syllogism；　the　end　having　proved　itself　to　be　their　true　middle　term　and　unity。　As；
therefore；　the　means　is　the　object　that　stands　on　the　side　of　the　end　and　has　within　it　the　activity　of
the　end；　the　mechanism　that　is　found　here　is　at　the　same　time　the　return　of　objectivity　into　itself；
into　the　Notion；　which　however　is　already　presupposed　as　the　end；　the　negative　attitude　of
purposive　activity　towards　the　object　is　thus　not　an　external　attitude；　but　the　alteration　and
transition　of　objectivity　in　its　own　self　into　the　end。

That　the　end　relates　itself　immediately　to　an　object　and　makes　it　a　means；　as　also　that　through　this
means　it　determines　another　object；　may　be　regarded　as　violence　＇Gewalt＇　in　so　far　as　the　end
appears　to　be　of　quite　another　nature　than　the　object；　and　the　two　objects　similarly　are　mutually
independent　totalities。　But　that　the　end　posits　itself　in　a　mediate　relation　with　the　object　and
interposes　another　object　between　itself　and　it；　may　be　regarded　as　the　cunning　of　reason。　The
finitude　of　rationality　has；　as　remarked；　this　side；　that　the　end　enters　into　relationship　with　the
presupposition；　that　is；　with　the　externality　of　the　object。　In　the　immediate　relation　to　the　object；
it　would　itself　enter　into　the　sphere　of　mechanism　or　chemism　and　thereby　be　subject　to
contingency　and　the　loss　of　its　determination　as　the　Notion　that　is　in　and　for　itself。　But　as　it　is；　it
puts　forward　an　object　as　means；　allows　it　to　wear　itself　out　in　its　stead；　exposes　it　to　attrition　and
shields　itself　behind　it　from　mechanical　violence。

Further；　since　the　end　is　finite　it　has　a　finite　content；　accordingly　it　is　not　an　absolute；　nor　simply
something　that　in　its　own　nature　is　rational。　But　the　means　is　the　external　middle　term　of　the
syllogism　which　is　the　realisation　of　the　end；　in　the　means；　therefore；　the　rationality　in　it　manifests
itself　as　such　by　maintaining　itself　in　this　external　other；　and　precisely　through　this　externality。　To
this　extent　the　means　is　superior　to　the　finite　ends　of　external　purposiveness：　the　plough　is　more
honourable　than　are　immediately　the　enjoyments　procured　by　it　and　which　are　ends。　The　tool
lasts；　while　the　immediate　enjoyments　pass　away　and　are　forgotten。　In　his　tools　man　possesses
power　over　external　nature；　even　though　in　respect　of　his　ends　he　is；　on　the　contrary；　subject　to　it。

But　the　end　does　not　merely　keep　outside　the　mechanical　process；　rather　it　maintains　itself　in　it　and
is　its　determination。　The　end；　as　the　Notion　that　freely　exists　in　face　of　the　object　and　its　process
and　is　a　self…determining　activity；　is　no　less　the　absolute　truth　of　mechanism；　and　therefore　in
mechanism　it　is　only　meeting　with　itself。　The　power　of　the　end　over　the　object　is　this　explicit
identity　and　its　activity　is　the　manifestation　of　it。　The　end　as　content　is　the　determinateness　that
exists　in　and　for　itself；　which　appears　in　the　object　as　indifferent　and　external；　but　the　activity　of　the
end　is；　on　the　one　hand；　the　truth　of　the　process　and　as　negative　unity　the　sublating　of　the
illusory　show　of　externality。　From　the　abstract　point　of　view；　it　is　the　indifferent　determinateness
of　the　object　that　equally　externally　is　replaced　by　another；　but　the　simple　abstraction　of　the
determinateness　is　in　its　truth　the　totality　of　the　negative；　the　concrete　Notion　that　posits　externality
within　itself。

The　content　of　the　end　is　its　negativity　as　simple　particularity　reflected　into　itself；　distinguished
from　its　totality　as　form。　On　account　of　this　simplicity　whose　determinateness　is　in　and　for　itself
the　totality　of　the　Notion；　the　content　appears　as　the　permanently　identical　element　in　the
realisation　of　the　end。　The　teleological　process　is　the　translation　of　the　Notion　that　has　a　distinct
concrete　existence　as　Notion　into　objectivity；　this　translation　into　a　presupposed　other　is　seen　to
be　the　meeting　of　the　Notion　with　itself　through　itself。　

Now　the　content　of　the　end　is　this　identity　that　has　a　concrete　existence　in　the　form　of　the　identical。
In　every　transition　the　Notion　maintains　itself；　for　example；　when　cause　becomes　effect　it　is　only
the　cause　meeting　with　itself　in　the　effect；　but　in　the　teleological　transition　it　is　the　Notion　that　as
such　already　has　a　concrete　existence　as　cause；　as　the　absolute　concrete　unity　that　is　free　in　the
face　of　objectivity　and　its　external　determinability。　The　externality　into　which　the　end　translates
itself　is　itself；　as　we　have　seen；　already　posited　as　moment　of　the　N