science of logic-第42章

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general　one　that　the　judgment　contains　the　determinate　Notion　over　against　the　still
indeterminate　Notion。　The　subject　can　therefore；　in　the　first　instance；　be　taken　in　relation　to　the
predicate　as　the　individual　over　against　the　universal；　or　even　as　the　particular　over　against　the
universal；　or　as　the　individual　over　against　the　particular；　so　far；　they　confront　each　other　only　in
general；　as　the　more　determinate　and　the　more　universal。

It　is　therefore　appropriate　and　necessary　to　have　these　names；　subject　and　predicate　for　the
determinations　of　the　judgment；　as　names；　they　are　something　indeterminate　that　still　awaits　its
determination；　and　are；　therefore；　no　more　than　names。　It　is　partly　for　this　reason　that　the　Notion
determinations　themselves　could　not　be　used　for　the　two　sides　of　the　judgment；　but　a　stronger
reason　is　because　the　nature　of　the　Notion　determination　is　emphatically　to　be；　not　something
abstract　and　fixed；　but　to　have　and　to　posit　its　opposite　within　it；　since　the　sides　of　the　judgment
are　themselves　Notions　and　therefore　the　totality　of　its　determinations；　each　side　must　run　through
all　these　determinations　and　exhibit　them　within　itself；　whether　in　abstract　or　concrete　form。　Now
in　order　to　fix　the　sides　of　the　judgment　in　a　general　way　when　their　determination　is　altered；　those
names　are　most　serviceable　which　remain　the　same　throughout　the　alteration。　The　name　however
stands　over　against　the　matter　in　hand　or　the　Notion；　this　distinction　presents　itself　in　the　judgment
as　such；　now　the　subject　is　in　general　the　determinate；　and　is　therefore　more　that　which
immediately　is；　whereas　the　predicate　expresses　the　universal；　the　essential　nature　or　the　Notion；
therefore　the　subject　as　such　is；　in　the　first　instance；　only　a　kind　of　name；　for　what　it　is　is　first
enunciated　by　the　predicate　which　contains　being　in　the　sense　of　the　Notion。　In　the　question：　what
is　this？　or：　what　kind　of　a　plant　is　this？　what　is　often　understood　by　the　being　enquired　after；　is
merely　the　name；　and　when　this　is　learned　one　is　satisfied　and　now　knows　what　the　thing　is。　This　is
being　in　the　sense　of　the　subject。　But　the　Notion；　or　at　least　the　essence　and　the　universal　in
general；　is　first　given　by　the　predicate；　and　it　is　this　that　is　asked　for　in　the　sense　of　the　judgment。
Consequently；　God；　spirit；　nature；　or　whatever　it　may　be；　is　as　the　subject　of　a　judgment　at　first
only　the　name；　what　such　a　subject　is　as　regards　its　Notion　is　first　enunciated　in　the　predicate。
When　enquiry　is　made　as　to　the　kind　of　predicate　belonging　to　such　subject；　the　act　of　judgment
necessarily　implies　an　underlying　Notion。　But　this　Notion　is　first　enunciated　by　the　predicate　itself。
Properly　speaking；　therefore；　it　is　the　mere　general　idea　that　constitutes　the　presupposed　meaning
of　the　subject　and　that　leads　to　the　naming　of　it；　and　in　doing　this　it　is　contingent　and　a　historical
fact；　what　is；　or　is　not；　to　be　understood　by　a　name。　So　many　disputes　about　whether　a　predicate
does　or　does　not　belong　to　a　certain　subject　are　therefore　nothing　more　than　verbal　disputes；
because　they　start　from　the　form　above　mentioned；　what　lies　at　the　base　is　so　far　nothing　more
than　the　name。

We　have　now　to　examine；　secondly；　how　the　relation　of　subject　and　predicate　in　the　judgment　is
determined　and　how　subject　and　predicate　themselves　are　at　first　determined　through　this　very
relation。　The　judgment　has　in　general　for　its　sides　totalities　which　to　begin　with　are　essentially
self…subsistent。　The　unity　of　the　Notion　is；　therefore；　at　first　only　a　relation　of　self…subsistents；　not
as　yet　the　concrete　and　pregnant　unity　that　has　returned　into　itself　from　this　reality；　but　only　a
unity　outside　which　the　self…subsistent　sides　persist　as　extremes　that　are　not　sublated　in　it。　Now
consideration　of　the　judgment　can　begin　from　the　original　unity　of　the　Notion；　or　from　the
self…subsistence　of　the　extremes。　The　judgment　is　the　self…diremption　of　the　Notion；　this　unity　is；
therefore；　the　ground　from　which　the　consideration　of　the　judgment　in　accordance　with　its　true
objectivity　begins。　It　is　thus　the　original　division　＇Teilung＇　of　what　is　originally　one；　thus　the
word　Urteil　refers　to　what　judgment　is　in　and　for　itself。　But　regarded　from　the　side　of　externality；
the　Notion　is　present　in　the　judgment　as　Appearance；　since　its　moments　therein　attain
self…subsistence；　and　it　is　on　this　external　side　that　ordinary　thinking　tends　to　fasten。

From　this　subjective　standpoint；　then；　subject　and　predicate　are　considered　to　be　complete；　each
on　its　own　account；　apart　from　the　other：　the　subject　as　an　object　that　would　exist　even　if　it　did　not
possess　this　predicate；　the　predicate　as　a　universal　determination　that　would　exist　even　if　it　did　not
belong　to　this　subject。　From　this　standpoint；　the　act　of　judgment　involves　the　reflection；　whether
this　or　that　predicate　which　is　in　someone's　head　can　and　should　be　attached　to　the　object　which
exists　on　its　own　account　outside；　the　very　act　of　judging　consists　in　this；　that　only　through　it　is　a
predicate　combined　with　a　subject；　so　that；　if　this　combination　did　not　take　place；　each　on　its　own
would　still　remain　what　it　is；　the　latter　an　existent　object；　the　former　an　idea　in　someone's　head。
The　predicate　which　is　attached　to　the　subject　should；　however；　also　belong　to　it；　that　is；　be　in　and
for　itself　identical　with　it。　Through　this　significance　of　attachment；　the　subjective　meaning　of
judgment　and　the　indifferent；　outer　subsistence　of　subject　and　predicate　are　sublated　again：　this
action　is　good；　the　copula　indicates　that　the　predicate　belongs　to　the　being　of　the　subject　and　is
not　merely　externally　combined　with　it。　In　the　grammatical　sense；　that　subjective　relationship　in
which　one　starts　from　the　indifferent　externality　of　the　subject　and　predicate　has　its　complete
validity；　for　it　is　words　that　are　here　externally　combined。　We　may　take　this　opportunity　of
remarking；　too；　that　though　a　proposition　has　a　subject　and　predicate　in　the　grammatical　sense；
this　does　not　make　it　a　judgment。　The　latter　requires　that　the　predicate　be　related　to　the　subject
as　one　Notion　determination　to　another；　and　therefore　as　a　universal　to　a　particular　or　individual。　If
a　statement　about　a　particular　subject　only　enunciates　something　individual；　then　this　is　a　mere
proposition；　For　example；　'Aristotle　died　at　the　age　of　73；　in　the　fourth　year　of　the　115th
Olympiad；'　is　a　mere　proposition；　not　a　judgment。　It　would　partake　of　the　nature　of　a　judgment
only　if　doubt　had　been　thrown　on　one　of　the　circumstances；　the　date　of　the　death；　or　the　age　of
that　philosopher；　and　the　given　figures　had　been　asserted　on　the　strength　of　some　reason　or　other。
In　that　case；　these　figures　would　be　taken　as　something　universal；　as　time　that　still　subsists　apart
from　this　particular　content　of　the　death　of　Aristotle；　whether　as　time　filled　with　some　other
content；　or　even　as　empty　time。　Similarly；　the　news　that　my　friend　N。　has　died　is　a　proposition；　and
it　would　be　a　judgment　only　if　there　were　a　question　whether　he　was　really　dead　or　only　in　a　state
of　catalepsy。

In　the　usual　way　of　defining　the　judgment　we　may　indeed　accept　the　indeterminate　expression
connection　for　the　external　copula；　as　also　that　the　connected　terms　are　at　least　supposed　to　be
notions。　But　in　other　respects　this　definition　is　superficial　in　the　extreme：　not　only；　for　example；　that
in　the　disjunctive　judgment　more　than　two　so…called　notions　are　connected；　but　rather　that　the
definition　is　far　better　than　its　subject　matter；　for　it　is　not　notions　at　all　that　are　meant；　hardly
determinations　of　the　Notion；　but　really　only　determinations　of　representational　thought；　it　was
remarked　in　connection　with　the　Notion　in　general　and　the　determinate　Notion；　that　what　is　usually
so　named　by　no　means　deserves　the　name　of　Notion；　where　then　should　Notions　come　from　in　the
case　of　the　judgment？　Above　all；　in　this　definition　the　essential　feature　of　the　judgment；　namely；　the
difference　of　its　determinations；　is　passed　over；　still　less　does　it　take　into　account　the　relationship
of　the　judgment　to　the　Notion。

As　regards　the　further　determination　of　the