science of logic-第4章

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Because　of　the　fixed　reality　of　natural　objects　the　study　of　nature　compels　us　to　fix　the　categories
which　can　no　longer　be　ignored　in　her；　although　with　complete　inconsistency　towards　other
categories　which　are　also　allowed　to　remain　valid；　and　such　study　does　not　permit　the　further　step
of　abstracting　from　the　opposition　and　indulging　in　generalities　as　so　easily　happens　in　the
intellectual　sphere。

But　while　logical　objects　and　their　expressions　may　be　thoroughly　familiar　to　educated　people　it
does　not　follow；　as　I　have　said　elsewhere；　that　they　are　intelligently　apprehended；　and　to　have　to
occupy　oneself　with　what　is　familiar　can　even　arouse　impatience　—　and　what　is　more　familiar　than
just　those　determinations　of　thought　which　we　employ　on　every　occasion；　which　pass　our　lips　in
every　sentence　we　speak？

It　is　the　purpose　of　this　foreword　to　indicate　the　general　features　of　the　course　followed　by
knowing　in　its　advance　beyond　a　mere　acquaintance　with　its　objects；　of　the　relation　of
philosophical　＇wissenschaftlichen＇　thinking　to　this　natural　thinking。　This　much；　together　with　what
was　contained　in　the　earlier　Introduction；　will　be　sufficient　to　give　a　general　idea　of　what　is　meant
by　logical　cognition；　the　kind　of　preliminary　general　idea　which　is　demanded　in　the　case　of　any
science　prior　to　its　exposition；　that　is；　prior　to　the　import　of　the　science　itself。

In　the　first　place；　we　must　regard　it　as　an　infinite　step　forward　that　the　forms　of　thought　have　been
freed　from　the　material　in　which　they　are　submerged　in　self…conscious　intuition；　figurate　conception；
and　in　our　desiring　and　willing；　or　rather　in　ideational　desiring　and　willing　—　and　there　is　no　human
desiring　or　willing　without　ideation　—　and　that　these　universalities　have　been　brought　into
prominence　for　their　own　sake　and　made　objects　of　contemplation　as　was　done　by　Plato　and　after
him　especially　by　Aristotle；　this　constitutes　the　beginning　of　the　intelligent　apprehension　of　them。　

'It　was　only'；　says　Aristotle；　'after　almost　everything　necessary　and　everything　requisite　for　human
comfort　and　intercourse　was　available；　that　man　began　to　concern　himself　with　philosophical
knowledge'　'In　Egypt'；　he　had　previously　remarked；　'there　was　an　early　development　of　the
mathematical　sciences　because　there　the　priestly　caste　at　an　early　stage　were　in　a　position　to　have
leisure'。　

As　a　matter　of　fact；　the　need　to　occupy　oneself　with　pure　thought　presupposes　that　the　human
spirit　must　already　have　travelled　a　long　road；

In　the　silent　regions　of　thought　which　has　come　to　itself　and　communes　only　with　itself；　the　interests
which　move　the　lives　of　races　and　individuals　are　hushed。？　it　is；　one　may　say；　the　need　of　the
already　satisfied　need　for　the　necessities　to　which　it　must　have　attained；　the　need　of　a　condition
free　from　needs；　of　abstraction　from　the　material　of　intuition；　imagination；　and　so　on；　of　the
concrete　interests　of　desire；　instinct；　will；　in　which　material　the　determinations　of　thought　are　veiled
and　hidden。　In　the　silent　regions　of　thought　which　has　come　to　itself　and　communes　only　with　itself；
the　interests　which　move　the　lives　of　races　and　individuals　are　hushed。

'In　so　many　respects'；　says　Aristotle　in　the　same　context；　'the　nature　of　man　is　in　bondage；　but　this
science；　which　is　not　studied　for　its　utility；　is　the　only　absolutely　free　science　and　seems　therefore
to　be　a　more　than　human　possessions　Philosophical　thinking　in　general　is　still　concerned　with
concrete　objects…God；　nature；　spirit；　but　logic　is　concerned　only　and　solely　with　these　thoughts　as
thoughts；　in　their　complete　abstraction。　For　this　reason　it　is　customary；　to　include　logic　in　the
curriculum　of　youth；　for　youth　is　not　yet　involved　in　the　practical　affairs　of　life；　living　at　leisure　
so　far　as　they　are　concerned；　and　it　is　only　for　its　own　subjective　ends　that　it　has　to　busy　itself　with
acquiring　the　means　to　enable　it　to　become　actively　engaged　with　the　objects　of　those　practical
interests…and　still　theoretically　even　with　these。　Contrary　to　Aristotle's　view　just　mentioned；　the
science　of　logic　is　included　in　these　means；　the　study　of　logic　is　a　preliminary　labour　to　be　carried
out　in　school　and　it　is　not　until　later　that　the　serious　business　of　life　and　the　pursuit　of　substantial
ends　begins。

In　life；　the　categories　are　used；　from　the　honour　of　being　contemplated　for　their　own　sakes　they
are　degraded　to　the　position　where　they　serve　in　the　creation　and　exchange　of　ideas　involved　in
intellectual　exercise　on　a　living　content。　First　they　serve　as　abbreviations　through　their　universality
（for　what　a　host　of　particulars　of　outer　existence　and　actions　is　embraced　by　a　conception　—
battle；　war；　nation；　ocean　or　animal；　for　example　—　and　in　the　conception　of　God　or　of　love　there
is　epitomised　in　the　simplicity　of　such　ideating　an　infinite　host　of　ideas；　actions；　states；　etc。！）。

Secondly；　the　categories　serve　for　the　more　exact　determination　and　discovery　of　objective
relations；　but　in　this　process　the　import　and　purpose；　the　correctness　and　truth　of　the　thought
involved；　are　made　to　depend　entirely　on　the　subject　matter　itself　and　the　thought　determinations
are　not　themselves　credited　with　any　active　part　in　determining　the　content。　Such　a　use　of
categories；　which　above　was　called　natural　logic；　is　unconscious；　and　when　in　philosophical
reflection　the　categories　are　assigned　the　role　of　serving　as　means；　then　thinking　as　such　is　treated
as　something　subordinate　to　the　other　activities　of　mind。　We　do　not　indeed　say　of　our　feelings；
impulses　or　interests　that　they　serve　us；　rather　do　they　count　as　independent　forces　and　powers；　so
that　to　have　this　particular　feeling；　to　desire　this；　is　what　we　are。？　But　probably　we　are　more
conscious　of　obeying　our　feelings；　impulses；　passions；　interests；　not　to　mention　habits；　than　of
having　them　in　our　possession；　still　less；　in　view　of　our　intimate　union　with　them；　of　their　being　at
our　disposal。　Such　determinations　of　feeling　and　mind　soon　show　themselves　as　particular　in
contrast　to　the　universality　which　we　are　conscious　ourselves　of　being　and　in　which　we　have　our
freedom；　and　we　are　disposed　to　regard　ourselves　as　caught　up　in　these　particular　states　and
dominated　by　them。

Consequently　it　is　much　more　difficult　to　believe　that　the　forms　of　thought　which　permeate　all　our
ideas　—　whether　these　are　purely　theoretical　or　contain　a　matter　belonging　to　feeling；　impulse；　will
—　are　means　for　us；　rather　than　that　we　serve　them；　that　in　fact　they　have　us　in　their　possession；
what　is　there　more　in　us　as　against　them；　how　shall　we；　how　shall　I；　set　myself　up　as　more
universal　than　they；　which　are　universal　as　such？

When　we　give　ourselves　up　to　a　sensation；　a　purpose；　an　interest；　and　in　it　feel　ourselves　confined
and　unfree；　the　place　into　which　we　can　withdraw　ourselves　back　into　freedom　is　this　region　of
self…certainty；　of　pure　abstraction；　of　thought。　Or　again；　to　speak　of　things；　we　call　the　nature　or
the　essence　of　things　their　notion；　and　this　is　only　for　thought；　but　still　less　shall　we　say　of　the
notions　of　things　that　we　dominate　them；　or　that　the　determinations　of　thought　of　which　they　are　the
complex　are　at　our　service；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　our　thinking　that　must　accommodate　itself　to　them
and　our　caprice　or　freedom　ought　not　to　want　to　mould　them　to　suit　itself。

Since；　therefore；　subjective　thought　is　our　very　own；　innermost；　act；　and　the　objective　notion　of
things　constitutes　their　essential　import；　we　cannot　go　outside　this　our　act；　we　cannot　stand　above
it；　and　just　as　little　can　we　go　beyond　the　nature　of　things。　We　can　however　disregard　the　latter
determination；　in　so　far　as　it　coincides　with　the　first　it　would　yield　a　relation　of　our　thoughts　to　the
object；　but　this　would　be　a　valueless　result　because　it　would　imply　that　the　thing；　the　object；　would
be　set　up　as　a　criterion　for　our　notions　and　yet　for　us　the　object　can　be　nothing　else　but　our　notions
of　it。　The　way　in　which　the　critical　philosophy　understands　the　relationship　of　these　three　terms　is
that　we　place　our　thoughts　as　a　medium　instead　of　connecting　us　with　the　objects　rather　cuts　us　off